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


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THE EDUCATION OF THE YOUNG
IN
THE REPUBLIC
OF PLATO

TRANSLATED
INTO ENGLISH WITH NOTES AND INTRODUCTION

BY
BERNARD BOSANQUET, M.A., LL.D.
AUTHOR OF 'A COMPANION TO PLATO'S REPUBLIC.'

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The education of the young in the Republic



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PREFATORY NOTE.

THE present volume is intended to bring before English readers the description and theory of education for the young which is found in the earlier books of Plato's *Republic*. The volume ends with the account of a commonwealth considered as a moral organism, which explains the reason and purpose of that earlier education. It must be understood that here we have before us only a portion of the educational scheme, and only the preface to the philosophical conceptions, which Plato sets forth in the *Republic* as a whole. And this volume may possibly serve, to some readers, as an introduction to a completer study of the *Republic*¹ and of Plato's ideas.

There are obvious reasons which make it convenient and desirable for an annotator to supplement his commentary by a version from his own hand. This practice implies no desire to compare his own version, on its whole merits, with those which have found their recognised place in English literature. Its object is to set before students a definite type of renderings and conceptions, which otherwise could only be conveyed by a greatly extended commentary.

The only deviation from the text is the omission of a few lines in pp. 402—3.

BERNARD BOSANQUET.

¹ See the author's *Companion to Plato's Republic*, Rivington & Co.

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EDUCATION IN PLATO'S TIME.

ERRATUM.

On p. 49, Footnote 1 to stand as Footnote 2, and Footnote 2 as Footnote 1.

EDUCATION IN PLATO'S TIME.

INTRODUCTION.

I. GREEK EDUCATION IN THE BEST DAYS OF GREECE.

THE following account of a Greek education in the best days of Greece may be taken as substantially true. When the speaker insists upon the attention devoted to moral training, he is making a point which his argument happens to need. But the passage, which comes from one of Plato's imaginary conversations, would have lost its force if it had gone beyond the bounds of probability.

"From the moment that a child can understand pretty quickly what is said, his nurse and his mother and his tutor and even his father strive their hardest for this one end, that the boy may be as good as possible. At every deed and word they are teaching him and pointing out to him, 'This is right, that is wrong; This is pretty, that is ugly; This is pious, that is impious; Do this, Don't do that.' So if he obeys them of his own accord it is well, if not, they correct him with threats and blows, like a bit of wood which is twisting and warping. After that, when they send him to the schoolmasters', they urge upon them to look after the children's good behaviour much

more than their letters or their lyre-playing. And the school-masters do pay great attention to this; and again, when the boys have learned their letters, and are on the point of understanding what they find in books, as before they understood what was told them, the teachers set them to work on their benches to read the poems of great poets, and oblige them to learn these by heart, containing as they do many admonitions, and many adventures, and commendations and laudations of good men of old, that the boy may set his heart on imitating them, and long to grow up such as they. And in the same way again, the teachers of the lyre take precautions for morality and that the boys may do nothing wrong; and besides this, when they have learned to play the lyre, they teach them poems of other good poets again, lyrical poets, setting them to the lyre; and they compel the rhythm and the tunes to be appropriated by the souls of the boys, that these may be the more gentle, and becoming more rhythmical and more tuneful may be of use for speech and action; for man's whole life needs good rhythm and good tune.

"Then, moreover, in addition to this, they send them to the gymnastic master's, that they may be in better bodily condition to serve their good intelligence, and may not be obliged to run away from their duty owing to bodily defectiveness, whether in war or in any other line of action. All this is what those do who are best able; and those best able are the most wealthy. And it is their sons who begin to attend the teachers at the earliest age, and who leave off latest."

If now we write down in a few words the general nature of what was learned by a Greek citizen's son in the best age of Greece from the whole of the regular teaching which was given him, we are disposed to reflect that it amounts to no more than what we should call a primary education, with one exceptional feature. He was taught reading and writing, to which a little practical arithmetic was added, and in some cases perhaps the

elements of geometry ; he was taught to sing, and to play a simple stringed instrument ; and—here is the feature which we at once recognise as exceptional—he was instructed in dancing and in very various athletic exercises by a special teacher, whose lessons he attended no less regularly than those of his other masters, and for quite as many years of his life.

But on looking closer we see that this very simple primary training filled the place and in some degree did the work of what we should call a secondary education. Its apparent scantiness did not arise from want of money or of time, though in a certain sense it arose from want of knowledge. It was held to be the right and the best education, and was imparted in that spirit. It formed the whole systematic preparation for life enjoyed by the ruling classes in the highly civilised Greek commonwealths, until by gradual steps something corresponding to University culture was introduced among a part of them. The serious attention given to athletic training, which in some ways finds a parallel in the rank held by games at English public schools and Universities, is part of its character as an education for a leisured class ; to whom efficiency in war was a duty, and a fine physical development an end in itself. The same thing is true of the time for which education was continued. In Greece, as elsewhere, the children of the rich attended school to a later age than those of the poor, and the only limitation we know of is indicated by the Athenian custom that boys in their 17th or 18th year were enrolled in a sort of cadet corps to which real patrol duties were assigned, incompatible with the continuance of school education. We shall return to this cadet corps, the famous body of “Ephēbi” or “lads who have just become men,” in speaking of the aims of Greek education and of its later development.

Thus it would appear that for the whole of his boyhood, say from the age of seven or eight to that of fourteen or sixteen (though unhappily we have no warrant for these or any other precise figures), the Greek lad was mainly occupied with the

three "R's," with singing and playing the lyre, and with training in bodily exercises. We do not really know how these occupations were distributed in the day's work, though we have certain general descriptions of Greek educational life, such as that cited above. But our question, at present, is what the boy was actually acquiring all this time. How was this elementary education handled, that it made so much out of so little? For almost the whole of what we think positive knowledge is here conspicuous by its absence. There are no foreign languages, no dead languages, no scientific grammar, no history nor geography, no Scripture teaching, and no natural science, still less the elements of any industrial or professional knowledge.

To avoid exaggeration in our answer to this question, we must remind ourselves of certain obvious points. The arithmetical notation in use was extremely cumbrous. Books, again, though quite attainable, were costly, and lessons dealing with them were no doubt largely carried on by dictation from copies in the teacher's hands. In Greek writing, the words were not separated, and the difficulty of dividing them must have been a great hindrance in learning to read. It seems probable too that instruction in the three "R's" only began when the boy entered on attendance at the day-school; in other words that it began late, perhaps at seven or eight years of age—Plato advises ten—and that no foundation was laid by home instruction except in the correct speaking of the mother tongue. We do not know what the school hours were, but probably they were not long, especially if the reading-school, the music-school, and the gymnasium (using the word in our sense) were all three attended on the same day. Thus the simplest educational processes may have extended over a longer period than would be the case with modern methods and appliances.

The tardiness so caused might indeed have its advantages, and in the age, for instance, of beginning to read, modern educators are returning to it. A boy, too, who had to struggle

with a clumsy notation, might be more likely to reflect on the nature and relations of number than we to whom it seems like a law of nature that numbers must be written and put together in a single and very facile way. There are intellectual dangers even in our uncompromising assumption that the word is the unit of language, which might be lessened by having to learn the practice of interpunction (dividing word from word within the sentence). And thus we may conceive that very simple matters might occupy time and also have educational value in the then condition of the human mind, which are now rapidly acquired as formulae, and serve merely as stepping-stones to real education.

But when we have allowed for all this, the scantiness of the educational scheme still excites our amazement, if we compare it with the work required from a moderately well taught public schoolboy to-day. How, we repeat, was so much made out of so little? The answer lies in what has already been implied. The education, however imperfect, was given as being the best. There was a comparative absence of distortion by pressure of practical necessities. And so the very simple subject-matters, by help of which the mind was trained, naturally expanded, so to speak, in the absence of external resistance, to their fullest range as influences on mind and character.

The study of letters, of reading and writing in the mother tongue, pursued in a persistent and leisurely way, came to involve a considerable knowledge of the ancestral classics of the Greek race, the Homeric poems, not merely by reading, but by committing to memory and by the habit of reciting. What this might mean to a boy in ancient Greece we possess little that can help us to imagine. If the heroes of Roman History or the personages of the Bible belonged to our own national past—were indeed our own reputed ancestors—had been celebrated by a Shakespeare in our mother tongue, and the poems so created were something like one half of the whole

literature accessible to us, they might then master our imagination as Homer mastered that of the Greeks. And when we look at the matter in this way, we come nearer to understanding the alleged Greek estimate of Homer as a teacher of life and morals. We are, no doubt, inclined to think, with Plato, that to make a poet, who sings of half-civilised times, your authority in morals and religion is absurd on the face of it. But whether we will or no, a literature from which we borrow more than half our ideas is in a very real sense authoritative for us. It acts on us by a "suggestion"—through an effect of "imitation," as Plato would say—from which we cannot escape. And we must not forget the influence of recitation under careful training in impressing suggestions on a boy's mind. So much for the study of "letters"—it secured for the boys their entrance into the common national world, gave them in general their first ideas and impulses regarding things human and divine, and was not interrupted, but continued and developed, as the mind expanded into later boyhood and early youth.

And the protracted exercises in playing the lyre and in singing followed the same lines. The boy was thoroughly familiarised with the older and accepted forms of music, a very simple music, for which perhaps our hymn tunes¹ afford the nearest modern analogy. And here again, in a persistent and leisurely way, the boy would receive into himself a great part of the best lyrical poetry of his nation; and the practice of singing and playing accompaniments, through which he was taught it, could not but foster in his mind some sort of characteristic taste and impulse; some preference as between different types of songs, their music, their sentiments and their heroes. It seems clear that as was the case in England not so long ago, but much more so owing to the absence of books, the school-boy was expected to sing and recite for the edifica-

¹ The comparison refers only to the simplicity and well-marked character of the music. I do not mean to suggest a strictly musical analogy between ancient and modern music of any kind.

tion of the home circle; and no doubt his taste and bearing in singing and reciting was just such a revelation of his character to his parents as a boy's favourite reading is to-day. And this importance given to the whole subject helps to explain why Plato thought so much about the characters in which boys were to recite, and the melodies and sentiments they were to sing. Not all parents, even to-day, would be delighted to find that their boy had surpassed himself mainly in acting Sir John Falstaff, or in singing opera bouffe; and we may argue from this how such matters would be regarded, and what would be their actual influence on the young, when singing, reading and learning by heart were among the chief instruments by which education was carried on. It is a striking picture which Aristophanes draws for us, writing late in the 5th century B.C., of the educational customs of an earlier and as he thinks of a better date. Of course we must remember that the account is a comedian's poetry and is not history. "The boys of the quarter had to march through the streets in good order to the music master's, all together, without overcoats¹, even if it were snowing like meal. Then he would teach them to rehearse a song sitting decently and in order, either 'Pallas I celebrate, sacker of cities, terrible goddess of war,' or 'The far-sounding cry of the lyre,' to the serious tune which our fathers handed down. And if any of them played the buffoon or turned any inflection like those troublesome inflections of the new music of to-day, he was visited with a sound whipping, for bringing the Muses into contempt."

The third, or if "music" includes both letters and singing, the second, branch of a Greek boy's training, had in practice as in Plato's theory, points of connection with the first. The gymnastic master in teaching the boys to dance must have

¹ The writer can remember when there was a strong tradition at Harrow, and at Eton, he believes, something like a school rule, prohibiting the use of overcoats, even when the boys had to go half a mile to school before 7 A.M. on a winter's morning.

come very near the province of the music master ; especially as Greek dancing was to a great extent dancing in character, so that different types of musical and dramatic expression were hardly less involved in it than in playing and singing or recitation. On the other side, the practice of dancing was connected with training in the use of arms ; for the dance with shield and spear was a display which the State expected from the young men on festival occasions, and was no doubt carefully learned and rehearsed with the gymnastic master. Besides dancing, the sports practised under the gymnastic master seem to have been jumping, the foot race, hurling the disc (not exactly quoit-playing, but throwing a heavy disc for a long distance), throwing the javelin, and wrestling. It seems true that this scheme of training was not calculated to foster the social and self-governing spirit which is embodied in the games of an English school. But as regards the question of a complete and serviceable bodily education there is something to be said on the other side. Mr Maclaren, I think, has pointed out, that our exercises in games and rowing leave the bodily development too much to chance, so that it tends to be unequal, and needs to be corrected by just such special attention under a master as the Greek system provided. And it might also be urged that on the Greek method the educational aim of the whole procedure was more easily borne in mind ; the lads would be kept in hand, so to speak, and the narrow semi-professional spirit which tends to grow up in our specialised and hotly contested games might be hindered from arising. If any definite bodily service was before the minds of the Greek youth during their gymnastic education, it would be that of war on behalf of their country, except in the case of the few who might decide to train for the Olympic or other games. And preparation for military service is a better all-round type of preparation for life than the devotion to games and athletic feats, which chiefly demand a highly specialised skill and peculiar bodily condition. Not that we must deny the possi-

bility of a system which should combine the excellences of the Greek and the English plan.

As we saw, the close of the boy's education was marked at Athens by his being enrolled at 17 or 18 in the cadet corps of "those who have come to manhood." This corps, the "Ephēbi," had garrison and patrol duty assigned them within the borders of Attica, and had a certain place and importance at public festivals. The elaborate organisation of it as a sort of undergraduate body belongs to a later date than that of which we are speaking; and almost seems to mark the end of its practical service as a feature in the self-defence of a free State.

It may be of interest here to cite the oath of the Ephēbi; the confirmation vow, as we might call it, of an Athenian citizen, which marked his entrance upon civic manhood and the end of his school education. At the age of 17 or 18, immediately after being entered upon the citizen register of his district, and being about to receive the soldier's shield and spear in presence of the assembled citizens, he made oath to the following effect: "I will not dishonour my sacred arms; I will not desert my fellow-soldier, by whose side I shall be set; I will do battle for my religion and my country whether aided or unaided. I will leave my country not less, but greater and more powerful, than she is when committed to me; I will reverently obey the citizens who shall act as judges; I will obey the ordinances which have been established, and which in time to come shall be established, by the national will; and whosoever would destroy or disobey these ordinances, I will not suffer him, but I will do battle for them whether aided or unaided; and I will honour the temples where my fathers worshipped; of these things the gods are my witnesses."

The schools for letters and music and the schools for gymnastic, as teaching institutions, were private enterprises. Public gymnasia existed, and were much visited by the citizens; but they were not schools of gymnastic. There was a certain

amount of variety and experiment even in the school education, especially just about and after the greatest days of free Greece. Drawing was introduced, in some cases, at a slightly later time; and a noteworthy ground is alleged for the practice, "to make the scholars apt to appreciate the beauty of objects." We have a curious history of flute-playing, on good authority. It became a fashionable study just in the great time, when the Athenians were eager for novelty, but its ethical influence was thought bad, and it was discarded again. Plato's feeling about it is noteworthy in this connection (see *Republic*, 399 D, E). There was something in the wind instrument that seemed barbaric to the Greeks. And other teachers, being perfectly free to do so, no doubt offered classes which boys might be sent to at their own or their parents' wish. We hear in this way of "scholars," who could do more for the explanation of the classics than the elementary schoolmaster, of geometricians, and of teachers of military tactics.

There remains a difference of principle worth observing in the gymnastic education of different States. In some the training was more specialised to feats of strength and skill, accenting certain special muscles and actually spoiling the figure; in others the idea of general serviceableness for the ends of life, and with it of beauty or complete development, was more effectively retained. It is as a type of this latter kind that fitness for military service was considered by the theorists a fair test of a good all-round bodily training. Sound health, not easily shaken by hardship and accidents of diet, and supporting a vigilant and spirited frame of mind with adequate bodily activity, seemed to them a better foundation for life than the power of achieving special muscular feats under highly artificial conditions. It is for this reason, and not from blood-thirstiness, that the theorists think highly of a bodily training designed on the whole to ensure fitness for military service. Sparta is praised for her educational system, looked at in this light,

though blamed in that the higher ends of life were not super-added by her to the training for war.

Girls, it will be observed, are not mentioned in this discussion. They learned enough reading and writing, it would seem, to manage the household accounts; but their education must have been carried on within the household, which was almost Oriental in the seclusion of its women. This state of things both emphasises and explains the violence of the revolution which Plato advocated, in demanding for women (in the later books of the *Republic*) an equal share in the pursuits and the education of men.

When we compare the ancient Greek education with our own, whether primary or secondary, as a training of the whole man, we are surprised to find ourselves put upon our defence. We suffer from an *embarras de richesses* in the intellectual world; and we can hardly see the wood for the trees. We teach one thing after another, or a number of things at the same time, rather as the most convenient way of making room for all that seems necessary to be learned, than with the aim of bringing before the growing mind as much and no more of the best experience as it is able to appropriate with advantage to its growth. We think of education, on the whole, as an intellectual process, as a process of learning a number of things, each of which, on separate grounds, is necessary to be known. The Greek thought of it, on the whole, as a moral process; or rather, he would not have understood you, if you had asked him which of the two he supposed it to be. He would have said that the best experience, if due time and opportunity is given for assimilating it, necessarily enters into the tissue of the mind, and determines its feelings and desires no less than its views and ideas. We are all aware, probably, that the word "school" is derived from a Greek word meaning "leisure." This conception of "leisure" is one of the greatest ideas that the Greeks have left us. It is not that of amusement or holiday-making. It is opposed both to this and to the pressure

of bread-winning industry, and indicates, as it were, the space and atmosphere needed for the human plant to throw out its branches and flowers in their proper shape. "To have leisure for" any occupation, was to devote yourself to it freely, because your mind demanded it; to make it, as it were, your hobby. It does not imply useless work, but it implies work done for the love of it. In the modern world leisure is a hard thing to get; and yet, wherever a mind is really and truly growing, the spirit of leisure is there. It is worth thinking of, how far in education the idea of the growth of a mind can be made the central point, so that the things which are considered worth teaching may really have time to sink into and to nourish the whole human being, morally and intellectually alike. [In as far as this problem is solved we shall attain a higher result than was attained by the Greeks, in proportion as our resources for appealing to human nature are more varied and profound than theirs.

2. EDUCATION IN PLATO'S *REPUBLIC*.

i. *Education of the Young in Plato's Republic.*

In the part of the *Republic* which we have here before us Plato's proposals are based on the existing education of the young. He does not condemn the system of his day, but is of opinion that its originators builded better than they knew. They followed, indeed, not theory but experience; yet experience—"the great length of time"—has on the whole guided them well. Of the true principle, however, which underlay their work, they themselves were unconscious, and such a principle he is attempting to point out, much as a sympathetic critic to-day will attempt to explain the true theory of classical or "scientific" education or of open air games and

sports, admitting certain defects and suggesting certain amendments. His views are fully before us in the portion of the *Republic* which we are to study, and a word or two of additional information is all that is needed here. When Plato looks back on the education of the young from a later point in the *Republic*—from a point at which his fuller conception of human life has been developed—he adds one or two details to that treatment of it which we have before us in Bks. 11—14. He makes clear the time for which it is to last, viz. from the beginning of the boy's school-days to about the age of 17, or if we include the period of serious and exclusive devotion to bodily exercises, to the age of 20. This period, 17 to 20, in which no intellectual work was to be attempted, corresponds to the time spent by an Athenian youth, or "Ephēbos," in preparatory military duty within Attica. He also makes it clear that the education by Music and Gymnastic is not to exclude the elements of arithmetic, geometry, and perhaps other mathematical sciences. The boy is to "play" with these, not to be hard worked at them; the object is not for him to master them during his boyhood, but that later on he may find himself prepared to pursue them seriously, without having had his interest crushed by hard labour before his powers are matured. At the age of 20 a selection is to take place of those who are fitted to enter upon a further education, great regard being had to character as shown in the bodily exercises. Here then is the point of junction between the education of the young Greek citizen as we see it in Bks. 11—14 of the *Republic*, and the education of a human mind to the fullest practical and theoretical efficiency, as Plato has tried to sketch it in the later books. In the former we were dealing with the highest theory of the traditional Greek education. But in the latter we are face to face with Plato's attempt to conceive how the very best may be made of a human mind and a human society. The education of the young by music and gymnastic now appears as a stage preliminary to true

education, a stage in which feelings, opinions and habits undergo a discipline necessary for social life, but in which there is no real attempt to open up to the mind the completest expansion of which it is capable. It falls into its place, to speak in modern language, as a scheme of prolonged primary education, on which, for all who may be capable of it, an elaborate university education is to be superadded. Like many things in later civilisation, the elaborate academic routine of the Alexandrian and the Greco-Roman time—and even that which survives to our own day—reads very like a misunderstanding of Plato's suggestions. It is impossible to suppose that these had no influence on a movement, which, beginning so soon after them, so strangely caricatures them. It is worth while to point out in a few words the gist of Plato's larger ideas of education.

ii. *The Higher Education in Plato's Republic.*

He has declared that there is no chance of a good time coming either to States or to mankind unless political power and the best and highest intelligence can somehow be brought together, to the exclusion of mere empirics from statesmanship, and mere theorists from philosophy. In suggesting how this may be done, how the forces of intelligence may be given due training and nurture, so that they may become useful instead of fatal to the State, he draws what may be called the general or ideal draft of a university education. By him, however, it is conceived as the combined education and experience of a lifetime, and the attempt to reproduce it in the curriculum of a few years, while the mind is still immature, turns it into something essentially different, though, of course, serviceable in its way. We must not treat such suggestions as Plato's literally, which involves pronouncing them impossible, but try to master their spirit. (See Bk. VII for details; v and vi lead up to VII.)

The education of the young would leave the boy of 20 (or girl, for we know by this time that Plato's women are to share the education of the men) a hardy, active, and disciplined young creature, versed in the best literature and music, and fairly though slightly grounded in the mathematical sciences. From 20 to 30, if worthy of further education, he was, while not by any means neglecting his military and official duties as a citizen, to enter upon the serious study of the whole range of sciences known in Plato's day, beginning with arithmetic or the nature of number, and proceeding, on a scale of increasing concreteness, through plane and spherical geometry, theoretical astronomy, and physical harmonics or acoustics. The method of study is to be specially directed to demonstrating as it were the "reign of law"—the general connection and affinity of these subject-matters with one another—and to test in the student the power of grasping such a connection. For a student who has the gift of apprehending a general connection is capable of the higher forms of knowledge; but one who has not, is hopeless. And then, and not till then, those who have excelled in all these tests, both practical and theoretical, are from the age of thirty to that of thirty-five to be admitted to the highest and most complete of all possible studies—a study such as philosophy would be if it fulfilled its best aspirations as an insight into the most important matters of life, and knowledge, and religion. The late age at which philosophy is to be approached is essential, in Plato's view, to ensure sufficient seriousness and steadiness in the student. For studies like these are apt to turn the head and shake the faith of boys and girls just leaving school. It needs formed character and experience of life to make them stages in the apprehension of truth instead of playthings in the game of disputation. From thirty-five to fifty they are again to busy themselves with the practical duties of public and citizen life, which, it must be borne in mind, have never been entirely broken off throughout their whole training except in the five years' interval after the

age of thirty. And after the age of fifty they are still to take their share of public business, in its higher branches, but are to devote themselves in a large measure to the deepening and completion of their philosophical or religious insight. It is time for them to be sure in their own minds what makes life worth living, and to carry out this conviction with authority and efficiency in the varied tasks of government and administration.

We must not take these as literal proposals, but we must feel what Plato means. He means that, in the sense of really doing the best with the human mind, education is a lifelong process, and has two inseparable sides. You cannot "complete your studies" at twenty-three or twenty-four¹, and then, leaving study behind, pass on to practice. The best kind of knowledge—the knowledge of what makes life worth living—cannot be won except by a mind and character trained and matured in the school of life; and again, no good work can be done in the arena of practice unless inspired by the highest spirit of study—the vital enthusiasm for truth and reality. Plato's formidable curriculum of the mathematical sciences—the mere prelude, as he carefully explains, to real knowledge—is for us simply a type of energetic determination to expand the intelligence by exercising it on the best that is known. He draws his suggestions from the intellectual experience of his day; we, in appropriating their spirit, have before us the whole resources of our own. We shall however catch his intention much more by bringing the true student's enthusiasm to bear upon our life work, than by a vain effort to learn the whole circle of the sciences. Knowledge ceases to be knowledge when it loses unity and relevance.

¹ "The truth is that at twenty-four no man has done more than acquire the rudiments of his education." Anthony Trollope, in *The Claverings*. Of course the very nature of true education as here suggested makes it necessary that school and college training should not be too much prolonged. The higher education demands responsibility and independence.

3. EDUCATION AFTER PLATO'S TIME.

We admitted above that the games and sports of the young among the Greeks had not the aspect of self-government and self-management which we are proud of in English school-life. Perhaps the discipline of the youths at Sparta, which has been compared to a sort of monitorial system, should be cited as an exception to this rule. But a consequence of some importance, in its bearing on the higher education, follows from this general state of things. We find in Greece no trace of the divorce between school-life and the life of home and of ordinary society which recent literature accents so strongly in England. The public school boy, we seem to be taught to-day, is a creature by himself, living in a world of his own, with no share in the manners, habits, or interests of the mature society around him. And allowing for caricature, there is yet too great truth in the picture. But the Greek, or at least the Athenian boy, was a product of home training, and the day school. Out of school hours, or in the leisure intervals at the gymnastic master's, he associated, on terms of due courtesy and subordination, with his older relatives and with his father's friends. There is no trace of his having been absorbed by a self-contained world of school interests and ambitions, and by a fierce *esprit de corps* colouring his entire view of life. As his intelligence expanded, questions of the public welfare and the topics and problems of the day must have come within his reach by natural growth and intercourse. The picture which Plato has drawn of Socrates conversing with the boys in the presence of their friends and relations represents no specific matter of fact, but the tone of these imaginary conversations cannot be wholly fictitious. It is the tone of eager-minded lads, pleased and proud to be admitted to the conversation of distinguished men, and to learn something of the ethical problems of the day.

It was out of this intercourse with older men that the higher education at Athens grew up by gradual organisation. "Please let these young men have the benefit of your society" is the request addressed to Socrates on behalf of his sons by the venerable merchant prince in the *Republic*. Socrates as we know took no payment for his social intercourse and conversation; other teachers and lecturers, whose work was no doubt more systematic in its form, initiated the habit of taking fees and enrolling their pupils for a more or less definite course. The whole arrangement was absolutely free and unorganised. A young man might if he pleased attend a course on geometry, or military tactics, or on ethical and philosophical problems, or on the duties of citizenship. There seem to have been two great points which distinguish the "sophists," or travelling professors of ancient Greece, from University teachers and University Extension lecturers of the present day, besides the fact that the "sophists" were appointed by no one and belonged to no institution, but simply opened a room and gave their lectures, as e.g. Auguste Comte did in Paris when a young and unknown man. First, they were not as a rule citizens of the state in which they taught. Hardly any famous "sophist" was an Athenian citizen. There was nothing morally wrong in this; but it affected their point of view. It is difficult to lecture on ethical and political subjects to an audience whose life you do not thoroughly share; and the best men to-day will sometimes refuse to attempt it. A modern University teacher, on the other hand, is or may be a citizen of the citizens, the very incarnation of the national and municipal spirit. Socrates, who had fought more than one severe campaign for his country, may well have found it difficult to believe that those brilliant aliens were sound guides for the Athenian youth. And secondly, the absence of a classical tradition in science and philosophy made a great difference. A lecturer to-day has done much if he has animated his audience to appreciate any one of the great standard writers of the

world. There is a great deal known, we may say, of which we may be confident that it is worth knowing. And in fact, an average lecturer seldom delivers himself of a brand-new system, and would rightly be suspected if he did. He is but a show-man in the great museum of science and letters. But the "sophist" of Socrates' day had no such firm foundation to rely upon. He taught for the most part a kind of general culture, and although if he was a great man, his ideas might be valuable and original, if yet he was not, they could hardly avoid being superficial and commonplace.

Such, however, was the form assumed by the higher education at Athens in the lifetime of Socrates, that is, in the latter half of the 5th century and before the beginning of Plato's literary activity. It was an outgrowth of the free intellectual intercourse of young men with their seniors, and gradually assumed the shape of regular lectures or conversational teaching, for which a fee was paid, wholly and entirely by private arrangement.

Plato's lifetime forms a convenient era from which to date the introduction of more systematic organisation; and this for two reasons. First, we have seen that Plato has handed down the earliest ideal sketch of an education, intended to express the needs of the human mind, and their satisfaction, in the fullest possible form. Not but what the air was full of educational schemes and theories, outside and independent of Plato's writings. But we may take Plato's as a type of the rest, and as the most influential and comprehensive. Secondly, it was Plato's bequest which first instituted an educational endowment, by leaving certain pieces of land, at the place where he was accustomed to teach, to a successor whom he named. His example was followed by others, and a set of endowed day-colleges thus grew up at Athens.

By the side of the philosophical schools which were thus passing into endowed colleges, another subject was claiming an important place. This was Rhetoric, the art of convincing

expression: the opposite and complementary side of that "art of discourse" which had been understood to include the reasonings of Socrates. Of course the importance of Rhetoric is connected with the part played by public speaking in Greek life; but it is not so far removed as we might think from what is acquired at our Universities to-day. The actual knowledge which men attain in their University course is hardly their principal or permanent possession, excepting when it leads up to a student's life. What they are expected to have acquired and to retain is a power of mastering a subject, and giving a clear and reasonable account of it, treating its parts in their proper order, with due subordination to the whole, and with a certain sense and judgment. To gain this power they must have pursued a study which is by no means purely verbal, and an ancient rhetorician would not have admitted that Rhetoric, the art of order and suitable expression, was a mere matter of words. To us the study of Rhetoric may seem to set the shadow before the substance; but after all, if we thus put the objection at its strongest, we may recall that most of us have spent a great part of our educational life in the practice of "composition."

This art of expression, then, seems to have worked its way into the educational course as a stage subsequent to grammar, and supplanting the older Music or lyre-playing. And the demand expressed by Plato, and no doubt by many others, for an ampler grasp of organised knowledge, seems to have resulted in the recognition of a University course bearing a strange relation to his scheme of higher education. The names of the arts and sciences which formed the regular curriculum in Graeco-Roman times are given as Grammar, Rhetoric, Dialectic, Arithmetic, Geometry, Astrology¹, Music. The three first of these studies form the Trivium, the four last the Quadrivium, of mediaeval education. Looking at this list,

¹ Including I presume what was known of Astronomy, but very possibly with unscientific additions.

which represents the educational tradition, as we may say, of the civilised world, we cannot but observe that the last four sciences correspond exactly to the mathematical sciences of Plato's higher education, if we divide geometry into plane and solid geometry, and take music, as its position suggests, to be the equivalent rather of harmonics or acoustics than of playing the lyre or singing. Rhetoric, as we saw, has thrust itself in after Grammar or letters, which is still considered as the natural education for a boy. And Dialectic¹, which in Plato's theory was to be the crown and climax of all studies, as philosophy and religious insight at their best, has found a place as a continuation of Rhetoric, presumably consisting in the study of certain trivial elements of formal logic. The entire course might occupy from five to eight years; but ordinary students probably took little beyond grammar and rhetoric, and spent a comparatively short time at the University. Under the Roman Empire professors were paid by the Emperors, and practically appointed by the Roman governor. Education had now become a training chiefly in Rhetoric and philosophical generalities for the gentlemen of the Roman Empire, and the Ephēbi had become in effect an undergraduate body, with all the customs and mannerisms of such a body, to which aliens who visited the University were admitted. We still hear nothing of foreign languages being taught at Athens, though the Romans had their sons taught Greek by means of Greek teachers.

Small as the positive value of such a course² may seem to us to have been, it preserved to the modern world that comprehensive idea, of an intelligence at home in the whole sphere of knowledge, which Plato's genius had devised. It preserved it in a shrivelled and distorted form; but this, like many ideas

¹ The name "Dialectica" came to the Middle Age through Latin writers from the Stoics. It indicated, not the philosophy foreshadowed by Plato, but a Logic derived at secondhand from Aristotle.

² The mathematical sciences indeed long retained their vitality, but it may be doubted whether ordinary students profited by this.

of the ancient world, seems capable of renewed life when brought in contact with modern conditions. On the other hand, the education of the young as described in Plato's *Republic* is a monument of the actual life of a great people in the day of their greatness, and the simple principle which Plato shows to underlie it—the principle of the growth and nourishment of a living creature, not a body *plus* a mind, but a unity in which the physical life passes upwards into the mental—can never cease to be significant.

4. THE OPENING ARGUMENT OF THE *REPUBLIC*.

Book I of the *Republic* discusses first the nature of justice or morality, and then, as an extension of this discussion, how far it is essential to human life. The arguments, though highly suggestive, turn largely on the meanings of words, and the important idea that justice or morality has to do with men's obligations in society is put in the mouth of the disputant who denies that it is the true principle of human life.

In the opening of Book II Glaucon expresses discontent at the generalities which have been accepted as decisive in favour of justice in Book I, and, in order to draw a refutation, restates the opposite case from the point of view of those who say that justice or morality is purely artificial, a restraint submitted to for selfish ends, and that man's true inward impulse is always towards the egoistic and immoral course. Adeimantus chimes in, for the same purpose, by the supplementary observation that the ordinary preachers of morality are practically in agreement with its enemies, seeing that they lay all the stress of the argument not on goodness, but on the rewards which follow a reputation for it; as if goodness in itself were not defensible. Our text begins with the closing paragraphs of Adeimantus' speech.

It should be noted that Socrates, in attempting a more thorough answer than that of Book I, accepts the challenge of

Thrasymachus, repeated by Glaucon, and sets to work to examine justice or morality as a social phenomenon, the ultimate question being, whether, because it is certainly "conventional," it need therefore be artificial and unreal, or, in short, other than "natural." It should be remembered that even in Books II—IV the "social" explanation of morality consists in treating the Commonwealth as a structure in which the true inwardness of the human soul is up to a certain point revealed. It does not rest on any such idea as that the greatest number of persons is always to be most regarded in moral action. And in the later books of the *Republic*, when the nature of the mind and that which will satisfy it is more profoundly examined, we see more and more clearly that there are other tests of what is highest in human nature than the mere fact of fitness for living in a given society, though this remains a necessary condition of the best life.

THE *REPUBLIC* OF PLATO.

BOOKS II 366—END OF IV.

NOTE ON THE FORM OF THE "DIALOGUES" AND THEIR RELATION TO SOCRATES.

Plato's genuine writings are in the form of conversations or "dialogues," in nearly all of which Socrates is represented as taking part, generally as the principal speaker. The other speakers are also, as a rule, given the names of real persons who might have been present, and in some cases probably were present, at such conversations as Plato professes to report. Socrates we must remember was put to death in 399 B.C. when Plato was only twenty-nine. This fact, combined with the obvious growth of original and constructive views throughout the succession of Plato's writings, is enough to show that Socrates' utterances in the dialogues are not to be treated as the expressions of ideas entertained by the real Socrates. On the other hand, the nature of Plato's loyalty to Socrates, and the character of the changes of view which his writings display, forbid us to suppose that Socrates' ideas in the dialogues were no more those of Plato, than the ideas of a character in a modern novel need be those of the author. In general it is pretty plain that Plato started from Socrates' method and principles, and while constructing a vast and original fabric of thought, believed himself on the whole to be loyal to the impulse and character of Socrates. Roughly speaking we may say that the earlier dialogues are ironical, tentative, and suggestive, but affirm no positive conclusion; and in this sense resemble what we are told of Socrates' way of thinking. The first book of the *Republic*, taken by itself, is a good example of a "Socratic" dialogue. Other dialogues again maintain through the mouth of Socrates a serious and positive thesis, as is the case in the main body of the *Republic*, and here we feel that we are losing hold of the real Socrates as he was "in the flesh." Some moreover of the latest dialogues are almost pure exposition, and drop out the person of Socrates altogether. Thus the conversational form of Plato's writings, though other writers of the time adopted it, seems connected with his admiration for Socrates, who, like the founder of Christianity, taught only by the living word, and left no written memorials. It was also a natural expression for Plato's tentative and undogmatic speculation, and it appeared to him to be the truest vehicle of genuine thinking, as the inward question and answer by which the mind advances from point to point.

The beautiful opening of Book I should be referred to for the place and persons of the dialogue. Glaucon and Adeimantus are Plato's brothers. The argument of the first book has been mainly conducted by other speakers.

BOOK II.

Argument. 366 B—367 E. *Conclusion of the appeal of Adeimantus for a deeper explanation and defence of morality, urging that its popular advocates are really on the same ground with its antagonists ; that is to say, do not expound it as the one inherent principle of life, but as a course of conduct which is the best policy ; in short, as a means to an end other than itself.*

What reason then remains for which we should prefer 366 B justice to the extreme of injustice? which if we take to ourselves with counterfeit propriety, we shall succeed to our heart's desire before God and before man, in life and after death ; so runs the argument of our leaders, one and all. What possibility is there, Socrates, in view of that which has just been spoken, that anyone should be content to honour justice, who possesses any force of mind or of money, of body c or of birth, instead of laughing to hear it commended? For indeed if there is anyone who is able to demonstrate the falsity of what we have spoken, and who has seen sufficiently that justice is best, we must suppose that he has a great leniency, and is not angry with the unjust ; being aware that except one keep himself from injustice through a godlike innate repugnance, or by the attainment of real understanding, no man is d just of his own will ; but it is either cowardice or age or some

other infirmity that makes men censure the injustice which they lack force to do. Evidently it is so; for the first of them to get power is the first to commit injustice, and that as much as he can.

And the reason of it all is that and nothing else, from which our whole argument with you, Socrates, took its rise—my brother's here and mine. We are surprised, my dear Sir, we E said, that among you all who profess to be champions of righteousness, beginning from the heroes of old, as far as their ideas are recorded, down to the men of to-day, no one has ever yet censured wrong-doing nor lauded righteousness for anything but the reputation and the honour and the profit which arise from either; but what each of them is in its own potency, within the mind of the possessor¹, unknown to God or man, no one ever yet either through poetry or through everyday speech has sufficiently pursued the enquiry, proving that the former is the greatest of all evils which a mind can entertain within
367 A itself, and righteousness the greatest good. For if this had been the doctrine of you all from the beginning, and you had been urging it upon us from our youth up, we should not now have been guarding one another from evil-doing, but every man would himself have been his own guardian, fearing, should he do injustice, that the greatest of all evils would dwell with him. All that², Socrates, and perhaps more than that would Thrasymachus tell you, and others too, no doubt, about justice and injustice, distorting their true potency—grossly, as it seems
B to me; but I, for I need not hide anything from you, am putting the case with my whole force, because I want to hear you maintain the opposite. Do not therefore merely demonstrate to us in your argument, that justice is better than injustice, but show us too what it is that each of them does to its possessor whereby itself and for its own sake the one

¹ See 443 for the fulfilment of this suggestion.

² Viz., about the extraneous motives to justice and injustice.

is an evil, and the other a good; and strike out their reputations, as Glaucon demanded. For if you do not strike out the true reputation on either side, and attach the false¹, we shall say that it is not justice which you are praising, but its appearance, and not injustice that you are blaming, but its appearance; and that your advice is, to be unjust but secret; and that you agree with Thrasymachus, that Justice is another's good², the interest of the stronger, whereas Injustice is expedient and profitable for oneself, but against the interest of the weaker. Since, then, you have admitted that Justice is one of the greatest goods³, which are worth possessing both for their results, and also far more for what they are in themselves, like sight and hearing, consciousness, and health too, and all other goods that are profitable in their own nature and not in mere appearance, so now we want you to praise this very quality in Justice, whereby itself, and by reason of itself, advantages its possessor, and in the same way Injustice harms him. And leave it to others to extol rewards and appear-

¹ To comply wholly with this requirement would involve pessimism, as it would mean that goodness is a feeble thing, unable to win acknowledgement in the world. This is the absolute opposite of Plato's conviction. Goodness for him is simply the life of the soul in as far as it really lives. But it is still the life of the soul, "eternal life," even if and when it does fail to win acknowledgement in the world, cf. 361 E. The very fact that Plato constructs a social whole as the true arena of Goodness shows that he does not in principle dissociate it from outer recognition. On the contrary, the whole social scheme is a symbol of it, see 443 below.

² The doctrine bears a misleading verbal resemblance to our "altruism." It was criticised in Bk. I. Its point is in the assumption that all men's interests conflict, and that every man pursues his interest to the uttermost of his power. "Justice," then, is the interest of "another," viz. the "stronger," say the ruling power in a state, *as enforced upon* the "weaker," or subject class. "Injustice" is the pursuit of one's own interest, which by the hypothesis is opposed to some one else's; and one can only achieve it in as far as some one else is "the weaker." If the subject evades the law, made in the ruler's interest, the ruler is "the weaker" so far as the evasion is successful.

³ See beginning of Book II.

ances. For all the others I can tolerate when they praise Justice and censure Injustice in this way, glorifying and vilifying the appearances and reputations which attach to them; but you I will not, unless you bid me, because you have spent your whole life long in this study and no other.

Argument. 367 E—369 B. Transition from the individual by himself to the individual as member of a commonwealth, in which context the traits of the mind are to be read more completely and on a larger scale. For example, what may have remained an undeveloped impulse in a particular person's mind—say religion, art, education, industrial capacity, or sport, will be revealed at once as a factor in human life when we turn our eyes upon society, in which the trait in question is vouched for by huge complexes of institutions.

Now I had always admired the nature of Glaucon and Adeimantus, but when I heard them on this occasion I was really quite delighted and I said: That was very appropriate
 368 A to you, you sons of him who is named in the ode, that beginning of the verses which Glaucon's admirer composed when you distinguished yourselves in the battle at Megara, calling you

Sons of Ariston, godlike offspring of an illustrious sire.

This, my friends, seems to me to be very fitting; for it is something really godlike that has come to you, if you are not convinced that injustice is a better thing than justice, when you are so well able to speak on its behalf. Yet you appear to
 B me in good truth not to be so convinced. I am judging from the rest of your behaviour, since from your actual words I should have doubted you; but the more I believe in you, the more am I at a loss what to do; for on the one hand, I have no way of coming to the rescue; I seem to myself to be powerless; and the proof is, that what I said to Thrasymachus, thinking

Best Image
Available

it a demonstration that justice is a better thing than injustice, you have not accepted from me; on the other hand I do not see how I am not to come to the rescue; for I fear lest it be an actual sin for one being present when justice is disparaged, to give in and not come to her aid, so long as breath is in him, and he is able to utter a sound. The right course is, then, to aid her as best I can.

So Glaucon and the rest besought me with all urgency to come to the rescue and not let the argument drop, but to investigate both what each of them is, and which way the truth lies about their advantageousness. And I said what I thought as follows.—It is clear to me that the problem we are attacking is no trifle, but demands a keen eye. Now, as we are not expert, I think we might make our enquiry into it in some such way as this.

If it had been enjoined upon people who were not very keen-sighted to read some small letters  long way off, and then one had found out that there are  same letters elsewhere of larger size, and on a large  field, it would have been thought a lucky find, I imagine,  begin by reading the latter, and then to study the small  letters, and see if they turned out the same.

Certainly, said Adeimantus; but, Socrates, what do you see of this kind in the enquiry respecting justice?

I will tell you, I replied. Justice, we should say, may be of one man, or it may be of a whole city²?

Yes, he replied.

Is not a city larger than one man?

It is larger, he said.

¹ For a development of this illustration, see 402. We shall lose its meaning if we do not bear in mind the course of the thought as indicated there and throughout. The point is, that the same qualities stand written in individual and in social life, and to separate the study of them is impossible—not that social life exists somewhere else than in individual life.

² I.e. simply we may speak of a man as just, or of a city as just.

Best Image
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Perhaps there may be more justice¹ in the larger whole, and
 369 A easier to discern. So, if you are willing, let us begin with the
 cities, and enquire what it is like in them; and then according
 to our plan let us examine it in the single individual, studying
 the resemblance of the greater in the form of the less².

Why, he answered, I think you say well.

Well then, I continued, if we were to observe in thought
 the genesis of a city, should we at the same time see the
 genesis of its justice and of its injustice?

Perhaps so, he said.

B So when it is done we may hope to see more readily what
 we are looking for?

Much more.

Then do you think we should try and accomplish it? for I
 fancy it is no small labour; so please consider.

Oh, we have considered, cried Adeimantus; pray do not
 waste time.

Argument. 369 B— *The economic genesis of a com-*
monwealth, that is, the sketch in outline of what must come
to pass and go on in order that a commonwealth, as understood
in western civilisation, may hold together. The growth of peoples
through each stage of kinship and pre-industrial conditions would
not here be to the point. Plato was quite aware that there had
been such a growth. The account here given is summarised in

¹ In Plato's deepest arguments there is apt to be a touch of humour or irony. Here his apparent naïveté tends to make us smile, for our first thought is "Surely social or general morality is far below that of a good man," and it is only perhaps after following his argument to the end that we see the true force of his appeal, viz., that apart from the social whole, moral qualities can neither be manifested nor explained. There is or may be more injustice in a city than in an individual, as well as more justice.

² I.e. trying to recognise in the less (the individual) the moral qualities with which we have made ourselves familiar in the greater (social life and structure).

Aristotle's epigram : " *The State arises for the sake of life, but is for the sake of good life.*"

Now a city, I began, comes into being, as I suppose, because each of us is not self-sufficing, but is deficient in many ways¹. Or what cause but this, do you think, can set up a city?

None but this, he replied.

When each of us calls in another to supply his need of one thing, and yet another to supply his need of another thing, the needs being manifold, we thus having collected associates and co-operators into a single place of habitation give the resulting group of neighbours the appellation of "city²." Is this it?

Just so.

Then one gives a share to another, if he does so, or accepts a share from him, because he believes that this is best for himself.

Certainly.

Come then, I said, let us make a city from the beginning, in our speculation. And what will make it, as it seems, is our need.

Undoubtedly.

But the first and greatest of our needs is the supply of sustenance with a view to existence and life.

¹ We have needs both bodily and spiritual (cf. 519 E, 590 C and D) which are rooted in our human nature, and which only society can supply. How far and in what sense man is or ought to be self-sufficing is a radical problem of ethics and religion.

² Cf. Rousseau, "It is the houses that make the town, but the citizens that make the city." It would not be true to say that "Polis" to a Greek never meant a town, or that town life was not a predominant feature in Greek civilisation. Still, the actual Greek "Poleis" or "City-states" were districts like Swiss Cantons, containing a great deal of pure country, and

Quite so.

Second comes the need of housing, and third that of clothing and the like.

That is so.

Come now, I said, how is the city to suffice for all this supply? Will it be by one man being a farmer, another a builder, and a third a weaver? Or shall we add to these a shoemaker too, or some more of those who attend to our personal wants?

That is the way, he answered.

Then the minimum¹ city will be of four or five men?

E So it seems.

What then? Is each one of these to contribute his own product² as common to all; for instance, the farmer, being one person, to prepare corn for four, and devote fourfold time and labour to the provision of corn, and share it with the others? Or is he to disregard the rest, and provide for himself alone the
370 A fourth part of that corn in the fourth part of his time, and of the other three parts to spend one in providing himself with a house, another on clothing, and the third on shoes, and save himself the trouble of sharing with others by doing his own business³ for his own purposes?

And Adeimantus said, Why, Socrates, probably the common way is more convenient than the other.

I should not be surprised, I answered him. For I myself

many country villages and residences. They were thought of rather as politically centering in towns than as consisting wholly of towns and townsmen.

¹ Minimum both in quantity and quality—supplying only the bare needs of life.

² The same Greek word serves for the function and the product—the “work.”

³ The phrase “doing his own business,” which is the key of the whole political and ethical structure of the *Republic*, is here applied to a way of life just the opposite of what it afterwards comes to mean.

too notice, now that you have suggested it¹, that, to begin with, people are born² not quite like each other, but with different natures, one apt for one function, and another for another. Do not you think so?

I do.

Well then; would it be the most effective way for one man to ply several arts, or one man one art?

One man one art is best, he said.

Moreover I imagine this to be quite clear; that if one lets slip the right moment for any work, it is ruined.

Clearly.

For, I suppose, that which has to be done will not await the leisure of him who has to do it, but it is needful for the doer to attend upon what is being done, and treat it as no secondary matter.

Inevitably.

It follows, then, that every kind of product is produced in greater number and better and more easily when one man does one thing according to his natural powers and at the right moment, being at leisure from all else.

Unquestionably.

Then, Adeimantus, more than four citizens are required for the supply of what we were speaking about; for the farmer, as it seems, will not himself make his own plough, if it is to be a good one, nor his mattock nor other farming implements;

¹ It is, of course, Socrates' fun to attribute to Adeimantus' suggestion the rather subtle remark he is about to make.

² The verb "are born" or "grow" retains in Greek its close connection with the substantive which we render "nature." Plato's language throughout the *Republic* bears the stamp of his idea that man forms the social whole by a growth or growing which is his "nature," as it is the nature of a plant to bear flowers and fruit. Thus the economic "division of labour" which he is about to describe is for him not a mere rule of expediency, but an elementary expression of man's tendency to be a member in an organism, which in its highest form is the law of righteousness. See 443.

nor the builder his tools, and he again needs many ; and so too the weaver and the shoemaker.

True.

So carpenters and smiths and many other artificers, becoming associates in our little city, will make it of some size.

No doubt they will.

Still it will not yet be quite a large one, even if we should add to them oxherds and shepherds and other kinds of herds-
e men, that the farmer may have oxen for ploughing, and the builders, as well as farmers, may have cattle to use for draft¹, and weavers and shoemakers may have hides and wool.

Nor again, he replied, can it be quite a small city if it contain all these.

Moreover, I continued, it is pretty nearly impossible to plant the city itself in a region where it will want no imports.

Quite impossible.

Then there will be need of others too who will bring to it from another city what it requires.

There will.

But if the intermediary go empty-handed, taking with him
371 A nothing that those others want, from whom our citizens obtain what they need, he will come back empty ; will he not ?

I imagine so.

Then they must produce at home not merely sufficient for themselves, but in quality and quantity adapted to those on whom they depend.

They must.

Then we require for our city yet more of the farmers and of the other kinds of workers.

Quite so.

And besides we need the intermediaries who will import and export the different kinds of things ; and these are merchants, are they not ?

Yes.

¹ n.b. not yet for food.

Then we shall want merchants too.

Certainly.

And if commerce is carried on by sea, a good number of B
others will be wanted, who have skill in the industry of the sea.

Yes, a good number.

And now within the city itself—how will they share with one another what each set of them produces? For it was actually in framing an association for this purpose that we established our city.

Obviously, he said, they will do it by buying and selling.

Then out of this will arise a market and a coinage by way of token for the purpose of exchange.

That is so.

C

Then if the farmer, or one of the other workmen, brings some of his produce to the market, and gets there at a different time from those who want to exchange their goods for his, is he to give up his own work and sit in the market?

By no means, was the answer; the fact is that there are people who notice this want and set themselves to the service in question, in well-managed states pretty much the weakest in body and incapable of discharging any other function¹. For they have to wait on the spot in the market, and take things in exchange against money for those who want to sell², and D
exchange them away again for money to those who want to buy.

This want then creates shopkeepers in our city. Or is not "shopkeeper" the name we give to those who do the service

¹ A combination of aristocratic prejudice, mischievous fun, and social insight. To the Greek aristocrat the shopkeeper was a sedentary, unathletic and unwarlike person; while the Greek thinker suspected him, the middleman, of somehow getting wealth without producing anything. This is an anticipation of modern problems. Plato however, in the present passage, clearly indicates the shopkeeper's function and the public need of it. Cf. 370 B with the sentence "Then if the farmer..."

² I.e. buy things from those who want to sell.

of buying and selling, seated in the market, while those who travel to other states we call merchants¹ ?

Quite so.

Then further, as I imagine, there is another class of serving men², who in their intelligence are not quite capable of an associate's part, but have bodily strength equal to hard work ; they, selling the service of their strength, and calling its price hire, take as I imagine the name "workers for hire"³.

That is it.

Then workers for hire, too, belong to the equipment of a city.

I think so.

Well then, Adeimantus, is our city by now so far grown as to be complete ?

Perhaps so.

Wherever then in it will its justice and injustice be ; and implanted along with which of the features which we have scrutinised ?

372 A I for my part, Socrates, he replied, have not a notion, unless it be in some dealings of these very persons with one another.

Why, I said, I daresay you are right ; at any rate we must pursue our enquiry and not shrink from it. First then let us consider what sort of life they will lead who have so been

¹ The word is "emporos," "a passenger," probably with the idea of supercargo. "Traveller" might be a fair equivalent. Our word emporium is derived from it.

² This term, ministers, messengers, or intermediaries (diaconoi, from which our "deacon" is derived) does not imply slavery, but seems to be used with more or less intention for kinds of work which Plato thinks comparatively unskilled. We have no mention of slaves so far ; their presence seems to be presupposed later on.

³ The Greek word might apply to "wage-earners." But Plato seems intentionally to separate these "unskilled labourers" who have only strength to sell, from artisans and mechanics. He is thinking perhaps of porters and the like, who are hired in the street for casual jobs.

furnished forth. I suppose they will be producing corn and wine and clothing and shoes, and will have built themselves houses; and they will work in summer as a rule lightly clad and barefoot and in winter with good clothes and shoes? And B for food they will prepare meal from the barley, and flour from the wheat, baking some and kneading some¹, and serve up splendid scones and loaves upon rushes or clean leaves, lying on couches spread of yew and myrtle boughs; so they will feast, they and their children, drinking of their wine, garlanded and singing praises of the gods, living pleasantly together, not C begetting children beyond their means, dreading poverty or war².

Argument. 372 C—376 E. Civilisation, war, the need of guardians and their qualities; the knowledge of good and evil.

And Glaucon broke in: You seem to be setting the men to banquet on dry bread³.

You are quite right, I answered. I forgot that they will be

¹ I am aware that this gives no clear distinction. I imagine the words to point in some way to the difference between bread and scones or damper.

² War, see below 373 E, is held to arise from enlargement of territory. To appreciate the double-edged humour of the above picture, we must bear in mind that the "return to Nature" found favour with theorists then as in Rousseau's day and now. Plato, in the innocence which he makes Socrates assume, is amusing himself at the expense both of those who think that civilisation consists in luxury and artificial life (see just below), and of those who think it a disease which can be cured by vegetable diet and a life of patriarchal routine. He does not find righteousness in a state of innocence; it arises, in his construction, along with war and the evils of an advanced society.

³ Lit. "without a relish." The Athenians eat their fish and other delicacies to a great extent as a condiment or relish to their bread, something like hors d'œuvres. Only a gourmand, according to Greek ideas, would eat hors d'œuvres or savouries without bread, but it would be a poor meal to have dry bread by itself. In what follows, Socrates is poking fun at the young man about town.

having relishes ; salt, no doubt, and olives, and cheese, and they will boil truffles, and cabbage, as people do in the country. And we shall set before them a dessert of figs, and pease and
D beans ; and they will parch myrtle berries and beech nuts at the fire, taking their wine moderately ; and so passing their life in peace, with good health, they will die most likely at a great age and hand on such another life to their children.

But, Socrates, he cried, if you had been establishing a city of pigs¹, is not this just what you would have fed them on ?

Why, Glaucon, I said, how ought they to live ?

As respectable people do, he answered ; if they are to be comfortable they must have sofas to lie on and tables to dine
E off and savouries and dessert, just as we have to-day.

Well, I see, said I ; it appears that we are not merely studying a city in its way of coming to be, but something more, that is, a city of luxury. And very likely it is just as well ; for by examining even such a one we shall perhaps discern justice and injustice, and how they become implanted in states. Now I think that the genuine state is that which we have described, being, so to speak, a healthy one² ; but if you like to go on and look at a city in a fever, there is nothing to prevent you. For it seems that there are people who will not be satisfied with these arrangements nor with this way of life ; but there
373 A will be sofas too, and tables and all the household apparatus, and relishes no doubt, and unguents and perfumes, and courtesans and confectionery, a great variety of each ; and

¹ See note 2 on p. 39. Plato enjoys the horror of the young plutocrat, but he has also a meaning in letting him speak in this way of the Utopias of the time, as described, e.g. probably by Antisthenes the Cynic. Voltaire said of Rousseau in a similar sense, "He makes one long to go on all fours." It is in the State which has purged itself (399 E), not in the State which has never known evil, that Plato finds righteousness.

² Still with a double meaning. It might be innocent in comparison with a more artificial society, but the full expression of the human mind was not to be found in it. The form of transition "by examining even such a one," as if it were a *pis aller* to go on to the "city of luxury," is ironical.

moreover the supply which first we spoke of must no longer be taken in its simple¹ forms—houses, clothing, shoes—but we must set to work the art of painting and procure gold and ivory² and all that kind of thing. Must we not? B

Yes, he said.

Then again we must make the city larger? For the healthy city as we described it will no longer be sufficient, but it must be swelled out with masses and multitudes, which are in cities for purposes outside the necessary¹; for example hunters of all kinds and all the imitative artists², many of them working in form and colour, and many dealing with music and letters, such as poets and their subordinates, reciters, actors, dancers, contractors³; and makers of all sorts of apparatus, including C that of women's toilet⁵. And we shall want more personal

¹ "Simple" or "necessary"; a word with very various and subtle associations in Greek; usually with an echo of the allusion to means as contrasted with end, and so suggesting a minimum—what you cannot do without. It may have a disparaging tone or the reverse.

² The great gold and ivory ("chryselephantine") statues of Pheidias the Athenian sculptor were the most costly marvels of Greek art in the century before Plato wrote, against which he is to some extent in reaction. They were of delicate structure besides being of precious materials; and no fragment remains from which we can tell what they looked like.

³ Plato has a mischievous enjoyment in this classification. *Prima facie*, "hunters" means the people who catch game and fish for the rich men's dinner; but there is a second intention. For elsewhere Plato includes under the term hunters such "hunters of men" as pirates, thieves, lawyers, rhetoricians and popular lecturers, with a reference partly to their making profit out of men, partly to their "capturing" their minds by one-sided persuasion. Plato ranks the "imitative" artist, lit. "imitator," along with the hunter, pretending to regard him as trying to take people in by likenesses instead of real things. Plato's true attitude to art is a very large and difficult subject. But in moments of antagonism he ranks the "imitators" as frauds with the "hunters" as cheats. They are mostly turned out of the city again later on.

⁴ Having to do with the production of plays.

⁵ Not grammatically under the head of imitation, but Plato means it to be analogous.

servants. Or do you not think we shall need children's attendants¹, wet-nurses, dry-nurses, tire-women, barbers, and again, relish-makers and cooks? And we shall want swine-herds too; in our first city² we had nothing of the kind; for we did not need them; but in this they will be wanted; and cattle, too, will be needed in great numbers, if they are to serve as food³. Is it not so?

Of course.

D And then shall we not be in need of physicians much more when living in this way than as before?

Much more.

And the territory which then sufficed to support its population will be no longer sufficient, but too small? Must we not say so?

Yes, he said.

Then we must cut off a slice of our neighbour's country, if we are to have enough to pasture and till; and they will have to do the same to us, if they, like us, let themselves go in the unlimited⁴ acquisition of wealth, overleaping the bounds of the necessary.

E It is quite inevitable, Socrates, he said.

Then we shall go to war, Glaucon, or how else?

Just so, he said.

¹ Fathers will not look after their sons themselves; mothers will not suckle their own children. Jowett and Campbell in loc. Plato's allusion here again suggests Rousseau.

² Swine were not kept in "the city of pigs." They are only kept for food.

³ And not merely for draft as above.

⁴ "Unlimited" or "unbounded." Wealth, for Plato, is a collection of instruments or resources, the "end" of which is to promote good life. If wealth or riches is treated as worth having for its own sake, as is apt to be the case when trade has become a distinct factor in the community, it seems to the Greek thinker to be a means which has lost connection with its end, and therefore he calls the acquisition of it "unlimited," i.e. there is no reason for stopping at any particular point, because there is no point at which anything, which he calls an end, is attained.

And, I continued, let us not yet say a word on the question whether war does good or harm, but only this much, that we have discovered the origin of war, in those conditions from which chiefly mischiefs arise to cities, when they arise at all, both in private and in public relations.

Quite true.

Further then, my friend, the city must be augmented by no 374 A
small amount, but by a whole army¹, which will march out and do battle with invaders in defence of its entire possessions and of all those whom we were just now describing.

Why, he said; are they not sufficient by themselves?

No, I answered, not if you and all of us were right in our assumption, when we were modelling our city. For we assumed, if you remember, that it was impossible for one man to practise several arts well.

You say true, he replied.

What then? said I; does not the strife of war seem to you B
to be of the nature of an art²?

¹ The whole educational and ethical scheme of the *Republic* centres in this army and the qualities of its members. We cannot tell whether Plato was aware of any paradox in thus seeming to elicit the highest spiritual good from the need of physical self-defence. In any case, it gives him occasion for a remarkable portrayal of the continuity of human nature from almost animal pugnacity and fidelity to refinement, loyalty, the citizen spirit, and ultimately the great soul of an ideal statesman.

² A reflection suggested by the growth of a mercenary and professional soldiery in the 4th century B.C. The citizen forces of the free States of Greece were more like a militia than a regular army, except where, as at Sparta, the whole state was organised for military purposes. Plato's idea is that you must have a trained professional soldiery, but it must not be alien, but the best blood of the citizens, and educated for peace and freedom no less than for war, which the Spartans were not. The argumentative passage which follows is the expression of a very serious feeling. Plato was twenty-five when Athens was occupied by her enemies, and her famous "long walls" were pulled down to the sound of music; and he seems to have been impressed with the idea that a state's first duty was to be strong—inherently strong in the fibre of her people, not merely rich and "powerful."

Very much so.

Then are we to treat shoe-making as more important than war?

Certainly not.

But did we not bar the shoemaker from taking in hand to be at the same time either a farmer or a weaver or a builder, in order that our shoemaker's work might be properly brought to pass; and of all the others in the same way did we not assign to each one a single thing, to which his nature led him; and for which having leisure from all else, working upon it his whole life long, letting no occasion slip, he was likely to perform it well¹? Or is it not of the highest import that matters of war should be well performed? Or again, is it so easy a thing, that a man can carry on the tillage of the ground and be a skilled soldier besides, or go on with his shoe-making or working at any other craft whatever? and yet no one could possibly become a competent draught-player, or chess player, if he did not practise that one thing from his boyhood up, but treated it as a matter by the way? And is it so, that if a man takes up a shield or any other of the arms or instruments of war, he will become within the day an accomplished champion of fence in heavy armour, or of any other that war may demand; but of all other instruments there is none which by just being taken up will make any man a workman or a player, or will be of use to one who neither possesses the science of it, nor has been submitted to a sufficient training?

Instruments would be precious indeed, he answered, if they could do all that.

Well then, I continued, the greater the guardian's² work,

¹ Or "beautifully."

² Thus, without special remark, is introduced the appellation with which the great ideas of the *Republic* are inseparably associated. It has been partly anticipated, in its more spiritual sense, by the remark of 367 E that a man duly trained is his own guardian against wrong-doing, and so far has no need of external guardianship. The choice of such a title is in

the more complete liberation from all else will it demand, and E moreover the profounder craftsmanship and application.

Indeed I think so.

Then does it not also need a nature suitable to the nature¹ of the calling?

Of course.

Then it will be our business, apparently, if we are able, to select what natures and of what kind are suitable for the guardianship of a state.

No doubt it will.

By Zeus, then, I said, it is no trifling business that we have taken upon us; still, we must stand to our work, as far as our strength will stretch.

So we must, he said.

375 A

Now do you think, I went on, that the nature of a well-bred dog² is different for the purpose of keeping guard from that of a noble young man?

What sort of thing do you mean?

Each of the two, for example, ought to be sharp to notice, and light-footed to pursue when he notices, and strong, moreover, in case he should have to fight when he has caught something.

It is so, he said; all this is necessary.

itself a step beyond the idea of an army, in the ordinary sense, which seemed to be contemplated in 374 A. It prepares us for the discovery that the chief war in which the guardians are engaged (though their duty of fighting is a reality) is a Holy War, as in Bunyan's allegory, and that the city is the city of Mansoul.

¹ Lit. to the calling itself—to what it is as distinct from others.

² This famous comparison is a leading instance of Plato's humour in its combination with a perfectly direct and serious meaning. He begins the psychology of the guardian with the psychology of the watch-dog, i.e. he takes up the mental dispositions required in their simplest form, and traces their development up to the higher ranges of the human mind. The procedure is essentially modern, such as we have in comparative psychology.

And he must be brave¹, if he is to fight well.

Of course.

Now can any creature be brave which is not spirited—either
B a horse, or dog, or any other animal? or have you not observed
what an irresistible and unconquerable thing is spirit², making
every soul that has it fearless and unyielding in face of every-
thing?

I have noted it.

So in bodily qualities it is plain what the guardian should be.
Yes.

And thus much too, as to his soul, that it should be spirited.
That too is clear.

But then, Glaucon, I said, how are they to escape being
savage to one another and the rest of the citizens, if they are
like this in their natures?

C By Zeus, he answered, not easily.

They ought, however, to be gentle to their own people, and
dangerous to the enemy, else they will not wait for others to
annihilate them, but themselves will do it first.

Quite true.

What shall we do, then? I said. Where are we to discover
a disposition at once gentle and great-hearted³? for I presume
that a gentle nature is the opposite of a spirited one.

¹ The Greek word usually rendered brave etymologically="manly," so that when applied as here to a dog, it at once makes a link between human and animal qualities.

² Cf. Sophocles' *Electra*. "For just as a noble horse, though he be old, when in peril does not lose spirit but pricks up his ear." In English usage, the adjective "spirited" corresponds to Plato's meaning better than the substantive "spirit." Whatever word we adopt must be carefully interpreted with reference to the context in Plato, and not merely by its current English associations. The fact which Plato starts from is the "pluck" of the thorough-bred that makes him "go till he drops" and fight till he dies.

³ A different word, pointing to a further step in bringing out the meaning of "spirit." Mr Greatheart in the *Pilgrim's Progress* is in many ways a fair

It appears so.

But yet, if one be destitute of either of these, whichever it be, there is no hope that he will prove a good guardian; and what we want looks like an impossibility; and so the conclusion is that for a good guardian to come into being is impossible.

Something near it, he said.

Then I was perplexed, and thought over what had gone before, till I exclaimed, My dear friend, we deserve to be puzzled, for we have abandoned the comparison which we set before us.

How do you mean?

We did not notice that in fact there are natures, such as we thought there were not, possessing these opposite qualities.

Where are they?

One may see it in other animals too, but most of all in *E* that which we were comparing to the guardian. You know that well-bred¹ dogs naturally have this disposition, to be as gentle as possible to those whom they are accustomed to and whom they know, but the opposite to strangers.

I know it.

What we want, then, is possible, and our quest for a guardian like this is not contrary to nature.

Apparently not.

Then do you not think that anyone who is to be of the guardian type stands in need of this further quality, in addition to being spirited to be also a lover of wisdom² in his nature? 376 A

modern parallel for Plato's guardians, the bodily warfare being for him as for them at once actual and symbolic.

¹ Lit. "noble," indicating a pleasant sympathy with the dog's fine qualities, and anticipating the deepening of the argument. Glaucon is a sportsman and breeder (see 459 A), and the argument about fine dogs and horses is appropriate to him.

² Lit. "philosopher," which etymologically = lover of wisdom. Another of the subtle steps in the transition from the animal to the higher human mind, and an anticipation of the later argument. The "gentleness" of the

How? he said. I do not see.

This again, I answered, you will observe in dogs; a trait which we may well admire in the animal.

Of what kind?

If he sees anyone he does not know, he is angry, though the stranger has never hurt him; but if he sees anyone he knows, he welcomes him, even though he has never received a kindness from him. Or have you never been struck by this?

I never particularly attended to it before; but it is plain that the dog does act in this way.

Well, but this attribute of his nature is quite a pretty phenomenon and genuinely philosophic¹.

B In what way?

In as far as, I said, he discriminates the sight which he likes and that which he hates on no other ground than that he recognises the one and does not know the other. And yet how can he be other than fond of knowledge, if he distinguishes what he is at home with from what is alien to him by his apprehension and his ignorance?

It is impossible that he should not be so.

Well, but, I went on, fondness for knowledge and the love of wisdom² are the same thing?

The same, he said.

Then we may boldly take it for truth of a human being too, that if he is to be of gentle bearing to his kinsfolk and acquaintance³, he must be by nature philosophic and fond of knowledge⁴.

noble or well-bred dog is traced up into the general quality which makes creatures kind and social—the love of what we live with, of what is familiar, of our belongings, of what we can recognise and understand, or, in the widest sense, feel at home with.

¹ See note on previous page.

² Lit. "the philosophic." See below, note 4.

³ Lit. "his belongings and those whom he knows," keeping up the connection with the previous argument.

⁴ The quality mentioned in 376 A is here defined by a term which

We may take it so, he replied.

Then of one who is to be a perfect¹ guardian of a city we shall demand that he be by nature philosophic and spirited and swift and strong².

Absolutely so.

Him then we will take as our starting point. But in what way are these to be nurtured and educated? and will it be any gain to us to examine the question with a view to discerning what is the object of our whole enquiry, in what way justice and injustice come into being in a state? that we may not omit a relevant discussion, or complete an excessive one.

So Glaucon's brother broke in: Most certainly I anticipate that this enquiry is of value for our purpose.

By Zeus, I said, my dear Adeimantus, then we must not let it drop, even if it turn out to be rather long.

Of course not.

Come, then, let us make a fable of it, story-telling at our leisure³, and so in fancy educate our men.

Yes, we must do so.

Argument. 376 E—383 C. The beginnings of education. What sort of ideas about divine beings should be conveyed to the young through tales and poetry.

Then what is the education to be? Or is it difficult to find a better than that which the ages have discovered? It

indicates its fuller scope—the impulse to unity in one form is gentleness, love, or public spirit, e.g. in a family or a state; in another is the passion to apprehend, understand, to see the world as a harmony, which is what Plato means by philosophy or the love of culture.

✓ See above 375 A.

✓ Lit. "beautiful and good," the Greek idiom to express a perfect gentleman, or knight *sans peur et sans reproche*.

³ i.e. away from the everyday world.

is, I imagine, Gymnastic¹ for the body, and Music² for the mind.

So it is.

Now shall we not begin to educate them by music before gymnastic?

Certainly.

And when you say so, you include stories in music, do you not? And there are two kinds of stories, the one true and the other false?

377 A Yes.

And in education we have to use both, but the false ones first?

I do not see your meaning³.

Do you not see, I said, that we begin by telling fables to children; and they, to speak of them as a whole, are fictions, though there are in them some elements of truth. And we tell children stories before we teach them gymnastics.

It is so.

This is what I meant by saying that we must set to work with music before gymnastics.

You are right, he said.

Now you know that in every enterprise the beginning is

¹ "Gymnastic for the body." Plato starts from the fact as currently accepted, and leads up to a deeper view, see 411 E; for what the bodily training in the widest sense includes, see 412 B. Cf. also 467 C—E.

² Music: the peculiar meaning of the word in Plato must be gathered from Plato. It had of course for the Greeks no such separate application to the mere art of sound as it has for us, but would usually imply something of the nature of poetry, with or without singing or instrumental music. For Plato, as an educational instrument, it is almost equivalent to our "art," including fiction and poetry, music, painting and plastic art.

³ Often an indication in Plato that the thought will be new to the average mind. Of course, even if Nature is taken as the story-book (cf. Longfellow's *Birthday of Agassiz*), it is impossible to convey what is truth for a mature mind to an immature one. Plato is about to point out what can and must be done.

the main thing, especially in dealing with a young and tender ^B nature. For at that time it is most plastic, and the stamp sinks in deepest which it is desired to impress upon anyone.

Just so.

Shall we then quite lightly give licence for our children to hear any chance fables imagined by any chance people, and to receive in their souls impressions opposed to those which, when they have come to maturity, we shall think that they ought to possess?¹

We must not permit it in the smallest degree.

To begin with, as it seems, we must control the composers of fables, and select any good² ones which they compose, and ^C reject what are not good. And we will persuade the nurses and mothers to tell the children those fables which we have selected, seeing that they mould their souls with the tales they tell, far more really than their bodies with their hands³; and we must throw aside the greater part of what they tell to-day.

Which? he asked.

In the greater fables, I answered, we shall see how to judge the lesser. For both greater and lesser must be of the same stamp and have the same bearing. Do you not think so?

Certainly, he said; but I do not see even which are the ^D greater ones which you speak of.

¹ They shall at least have as little to unlearn as may be. Cf. 402 A on the relation of mature insight to the earlier right training in particular emotions and experiences.

² Lit. beautiful, but probably in a very general sense which is best rendered by our word good.

³ Campbell quotes from Plutarch, *On the Education of Boys*, "For just as it is necessary to mould the limbs of children's bodies from birth onwards, that they may grow straight and undistorted, in the same way it is necessary to discipline their character from the beginning." But one fears that Plutarch may be following this passage, in which case he is no independent witness for the notion of "moulding the children's limbs." I am told that among the poor to-day, the women try to modify the shape of the children's heads by pressing them with their hands.

Those which Hesiod and Homer used to tell us, and the other poets too. For they, I imagine, put together false fables which they told and are still telling to mankind.

Which are they, said he, and what fault do you find with them?

The primary and most serious of all faults, especially when the lie¹ is an ugly lie.

E What is this fault?

When anyone imagines badly² in his story about gods or heroes³, what they are like, just as a painter whose picture has no resemblance to what he wished it to resemble.

Why indeed, he said, things like that ought to be censured. But what do we mean, and which are they?⁴

First, I said, the greatest lie about the greatest things, an ugly lie to tell, that Uranus did⁵, what Hesiod says he did, and what vengeance Kronos took upon him, and the doings of
378 A Kronos⁵, too, and his treatment by his sons; even if it had all been true, I should not have supposed it ought to be told as a matter of course to the young and immature; but if there

¹ The primary defect is the falsehood, and it is worse when it is an ugly falsehood. As the whole passage is about fiction, these two degrees of faultiness tend to come together, i.e. the fiction is both false and ugly when its main ideas are unsuitable to its subject.

² Or, makes a bad likeness. The Greek fuses the ideas of "image" and "likeness" in a way English cannot render.

³ "Heroes" were men one of whose parents was a god or goddess, which was thought to have been possible only in the earlier generations of the human race. Some heroes were supposed to have become gods after their death, but all partook of divinity through their parentage.

⁴ The difficulty with which the interlocutor takes up the criticism is probably meant to illustrate the difficulty of seeing anything wrong in stories to which we are accustomed. Parts of the Old Testament might be a case in point.

⁵ Indecent stories of a type common in savage mythology. We are inclined to say, "But no one in Plato's day would take these things seriously as a part of religion." Plato however thinks that the child's mind would be stained by them.

was some need to tell it, it should be a religious secret, for as few as possible to hear, having to sacrifice not a pig¹, but some large and extravagant offering, that the smallest possible number might have come to hear about it.

Why yes, he said, these are unpleasant stories.

Yes, indeed, Adeimantus, and they absolutely must not be told in our state. We must not tell a young listener that B in committing the extreme of outrage he would be doing nothing extraordinary, nor again in using the uttermost means to punish his father's transgressions; but that he would be doing the same as the first and the greatest of the gods.

No, by Zeus, he answered, I myself do not think them suitable to be told.

Nor, said I, in any case whatever, that gods make war upon gods, and plot against them, and fight with them—for neither is it true—at least if those who are to guard our city C ought to believe it most disgraceful to be lightly at enmity with one another; least of all should we tell them stories and paint them pictures of battles between gods and giants, and other hostilities, many and various, of gods and heroes with their kinsfolk and families. But if in any way we are likely to convince them, that never yet was any citizen at feud with his fellow², and that to be so is a sin, this is rather what must be D told them from earliest childhood by old men and women, and as they grow older we must compel the poets who compose tales for them to keep pretty near to this. But bindings of

¹ The offering required at the Eleusinian rites, which were very widely attended.

² One of the first simple lessons to young children; the duty of gentleness and friendliness to their circle. It might be said that we have the "heathen" gods and goddesses as a sort of *corpus vile* about whom any stories may be told without inciting to imitation. Whereas to the Greeks these personages were in a more intimate relation, bound up with the traditions of the national past, even when no longer very seriously taken either as divine or as ancestors. Still, all suggestions are suggestive.

Hera by her son, and hurlings into space of Hephaestus by his father because he was going to defend his mother when beaten, and battles between gods which Homer has composed, we must not receive into the city¹, whether the poet had an allegorical meaning² or had not. For the young are not capable of judging what is an allegory and what is not, but whatever one of that age has received among his impressions is wont to become indelible and immutable. For which reason, perhaps, it should be treated of the first importance that the earliest tales they hear should be invented most beautifully in their bearing upon goodness.

Yes, he said, it is reasonable. But if any one were to put to us this further question what these inventions are, and which are the right fables, which should we then accept?

379 A And I replied, Adeimantus, you and I at the present moment are not poets, but founders of a state. Now it is the founder's business to know the canons within which the poets ought to invent their fables, and which they are not to be permitted to transgress in their composition; but they themselves are not to compose stories.

Quite right, he said; but on this very point—the canons of theology³—what may they be?

Somewhat of this kind surely; God must always be repre-

¹ Another early lesson inculcated here and just above—respect for parents.

² An under- or secondary meaning. There are many motives for finding an allegory in poetry, when nothing of the kind was intended; and one of them is the desire to explain away traits that jar on the moral feeling of a later time. Before Plato's day the criticism of Homer and the ancient mythology had taken this shape on the one hand, while it took that of frank censure on the other. Both are superfluous if we understand what poetry is; and Plato's next sentence is irony aimed at the allegorical interpretation.

³ Or of stories or discourses about the gods, or, about God. I believe this is the first time that the word theology, "Theologia," occurs in literature.

sented such as he is, whether the representation be in epic poetry or in tragedy.

He must.

Now is not God in reality good, and to be so spoken of?

Of course.

But no good thing is harmful, is it?

I think not.

Then can what is not harmful, do harm?

By no means.

And can that which does no harm, do any evil?

No, again.

And what does no evil, cannot be the cause of any evil?

Of course not.

Well, now ; is good advantageous?

Yes.

Then it is the cause of welfare?

Yes.

Then good is not the cause of everything, but it is the cause of all that is well, and not of what is ill.

Exactly, he said.

Then God too, seeing that he is good, will not be the cause of all things, as the common opinion is, but he must be the cause to mankind of few things, and of many not the cause ; for we have far fewer¹ good things than evil. Now what is good we must impute to none but him ; but for what is evil we must seek out some other causes, and not God.

What you are saying appears to me to be perfectly true.

We are not, then, I continued, to assent to Homer or

¹ This passage sounds as if it admitted an evil and thwarting principle in the world independent of the Deity ; and ideas of this kind were not entirely alien to ancient thinkers. But, whatever the difficulties, modern thought would in the main assent to Plato's chief intention in the argument, which is, as we see below, that evil *as evil* absolutely must not be ascribed to the Deity.

another poet when he insanely runs into this error about the gods, and says that

“two casks lie at the threshold of Zeus
Full of lots, the one of good, the other of evil ones¹.”

—and he to whom Zeus mingles and gives of the two, “at one time meets with good, and at another with ill,” but he to whom it is not so, and the one is given unmingled

“Him an evil plague harries over the divine earth,”

or again that “Zeus is dispenser for us of good *and ill*.”

And the violation of the oaths and the truce², which Pandarus violated, if any man allege to have been brought to pass by Athene's means and Zeus', we shall not approve; nor the strife and altercation of the gods³ by Themis and Zeus; nor must we permit the young to hear how Aeschylus says
380 A that “God implants guilt⁴ in mortals when he intends to bring utter woe upon their house.”

But if any one shall make a poem on the fate of Niobe—it is in such an one that these verses occur—or on that of the House of Pelops⁵ or the Trojan war or any other subject of

This and the following quotations down to “good and ill” are apparently cited from memory, from *Iliad* xxiv. 527 ff.

² “The violation of the oaths” is part of the title of Book iv. of Homer's *Iliad*, and is described in the opening lines of that book. Hera, Zeus, and Athene are all agreed in arranging it.

³ Homer's *Iliad* xx.

Zeus sends Themis to summon the gods to an assembly, and there suggests to them that they should go and fight for Greeks and Trojans respectively, at their pleasure.

⁴ The idea of Aeschylus here referred to may be read in the sense of Heracleitus' saying that “Character is fate.” Plato is striking at current opinion, and for the moment does not care whether a higher rendering is possible. He is concerned with the actual common feeling which influences the young.

⁵ The royal house of Mycenae, to which Agamemnon and Clytemnestra, Menelaus, Orestes and Electra, some of the principal figures in Greek poetry, belong.

the kind, either we must not permit him to say that it is the doing of a god, or if it is the doing of a god, they must find out some such principle as we are now seeking, and they must say that all which the god did was just and good, and the others were gainers by being punished. But that those who pay a penalty are miserable, and that he who brought it about was a god, we must not allow the poet to say; but if he should say that the mortals were in need of punishment, because the wicked are miserable, and in paying the penalty they were being done good to by the god, we may allow it; but as for affirming that God¹, who is good, can prove the cause of evil to any one, we must fight to the death by every possible means that none shall say it in our state, if it is to be a well-ordered one, and none shall hear it, neither young nor old, whether the story be in verse or in prose; for it would be a sin to say it, if it were said, and inexpedient for us, and contradictory to itself².

I vote with you, he said, for this law, and I approve it.

This, then, I said, will be one of the laws and canons respecting the gods, within which the story-tellers must narrate and the poets must compose, that God is not the cause of all things but only of good.

It is quite satisfactory.

And what of this for the second? Do you think that God is a wizard³, and as of malice prepense makes appearance first in one guise and then in another, sometimes changing in himself and transmuting his form into many forms, and at

¹ The language of this entire passage is on the whole that of polytheism, implying a plurality of gods with definite shapes. It is intentionally dealing with the mythical or imaginative expression of religious ideas. Nevertheless its principles are really fatal to polytheism, and in places the nature of God as such is so strongly insisted on that the form in which we are accustomed to speak of the Deity seems to be the best rendering of Plato's meaning.

² Because "the good" cannot be the cause of evil as such.

³ A 'quick-change artist' seems really to be the idea.

other times deluding us and making us think of him to that effect¹; or that his being is single, and of all things least tending to depart out of his own form?

I am not able to say on the spur of the moment.

What do you think about this? Is it not necessary, if anything departs from its own form, that it be transmuted either itself by itself, or by something else?

It is necessary.

Now that which is in the best condition is least altered or disturbed by anything else? Take the body as affected by food and drink and work, or any plant by heat and wind and such influences; is not the healthiest and the strongest that which is least altered?

381 A Certainly.

And is it not the bravest and wisest soul which an external affection has least power to distract and alter?

Yes.

Well, and surely all artificial things also, all utensils and buildings, follow the same rule; those which are well-made and in good condition undergo the least alteration by time and other influences.

It is so.

Then everything which is in a good condition, whether a
B work of nature or of art or both together, is capable of the least alteration from without.

It appears so.

But God and the state of God is in all ways the best.

Doubtless.

Then in this point of view² God is very far from having many forms.

¹ Ancient poetry and mythology are full of stories to this effect, often in connection with the loves of the gods, or with their taking part in the warfare of mortals, both of which ideas would appear improper to Plato.

² Contrasted with the idea of the next paragraph, that God might change himself.

Very far, he replied.

But will he transform and alter himself?

Plainly it is so, if he changes at all.

Whether then does he change himself into something better and more beautiful than before, or into something worse and more ugly?

Necessarily he must change for the worse, if he changes at all; for surely we shall not affirm that God is lacking in beauty or excellence.

What you say, is perfectly right, I replied; and this being so, do you believe, Adeimantus, that any one, either of gods or men, would willingly make himself in any way worse?

It is impossible.

Then, I said, it is impossible for a god to wish to change himself, but as it seems, each of them¹ being the best and most beautiful that is possible remains for ever simply in his own form.

This, I think, is a sheer necessity.

Then my good Sir, let none of the poets tell us that²

D

“gods in the likeness of strangers from foreign lands, becoming of all forms, roam from city to city,”

nor let any one slander Proteus³ and Thetis⁴, nor again in tragedies or any poems introduce Hera transformed as a

¹ Here Plato is clearly using the language of polytheism.

² *Odyssey* xvii. 485. Plato omits the following line “to oversee the lawlessness and the lawfulness of mankind.” It is an argument against ill-treating a wandering beggar, like the more familiar “entertaining angels unawares,” Hebrews xiii. 2.

³ The old man of the sea, whose transformations, when violent hands were laid on him, are recorded in the *Odyssey*.

⁴ Thetis: supposed to have taken various forms to escape from her nuptials with Peleus.

priestess, collecting alms "for the lifegiving sons¹ of the Argive river Inachus." And there are many such lies which we must not let them tell; nor again must the mothers be perverted by them to terrify the children, telling the fables badly; for example, that there are certain gods who go about by night taking the shape of all sorts of strangers; that they may not at the same time slander the gods, and make their children cowards².

They must not.

But, said I, is it that the gods are in themselves incapable of change, but make it seem to us that they appear in various forms, deluding us and playing the wizard?

Perhaps, he said.

382.A What? I answered; would a god be willing to lie either in word, or in act by presenting a false appearance?

I do not know.

Do you not know that *the true lie*, if it is possible to use such a phrase, is hateful to all, both gods and men?

What do you mean? he asked.

This, I said, that to be false in their sovereign part about matters of sovereign concern is what none consent to with their good will, but above all things they dread that a lie should be seated there.

Even now, he replied, I do not understand.

B Because you think that I am saying something abstruse; but I only say that, to be false in one's soul about realities³, and to be deluded and in ignorance about them, and in that place to have and to hold the lie, is what all would repudiate

¹ The children of Inachus are the other rivers of Argolis on whose waters the fruitfulness of the plain depended.

² To prevent children from being frightened with stories of ghosts and bogeys was, I suppose, found difficult in quite recent years in England.

³ The soul is "the sovereign part"; "realities," a clumsy modern phrase compared to the "what *are*" of the original, are the "matter of sovereign concern."

at any cost, and they loathe the thing superlatively in such a case.

Very much so.

But, to come back to the phrase I used just now, this is what may most correctly be called *the true lie*, namely, the ignorance seated in the soul of the deluded person ; for the lie which is spoken is a sort of copy and subsequently generated image of the affection seated in the soul, and not a pure and absolute falsity¹. Is it not so? C

Certainly.

The real lie then is loathed not only by gods but by men.

I think so.

But for the lie in words², when and to whom is it expedient, so as not to merit hate? Is it not in communication with the enemy, or with any of our so-called friends who owing to insanity or some form of unreason endeavour to do mischief, that it proves useful on such occasions as a medicine for the prevention of harm? And do we not in the story-telling D which we were speaking of just now, by reason of our not knowing how the truth stands about matters long ago, assimilate the falsehood as far as we can to the truth, and so make it useful?

Exactly so.

Now in which of these ways can a lie be of use to God?

¹ This passage is paradoxical to us. In order to grasp it, we must appreciate what "ignorance" means to Plato. It means what we might call a vicious or distorted view of the world, a delusion as to where the best things, and the things that can be relied on in life and death, are to be found. Immorality, including "the spoken lie" so far as immoral, is for Plato either identical with or a consequence of this blindness or depravity of the soul, which is the true (real or fundamental) lie. Plato's expression recalls such a fact as that the greatest liar will resent being deceived ; i.e. the soul never willingly surrenders truth for itself, even if, for one cause or another, it denies it to others.

² The point is to show that the occasion which makes deception pardonable in man cannot exist for a god.

Would he use fiction to imitate fact from ignorance of matters long ago?

Why, he said, that would be ridiculous.

There is no lying poet in God, is there?

I fancy not.

But would he tell lies from fear of his enemies?

Far from it.

E Or because of the unreason or madness of his friends?

No, he said, no one mad or void of reason is a friend of God.

Then there is no ground for which God should be false?

None.

Then the superhuman¹ and the divine is wholly free from falsehood.

Absolutely so.

Then we may safely say that God² is a simple and true being in deed and word, neither changing of himself nor deluding others, neither in words nor by sending of portents, neither when men wake nor when they dream.

Thus it seems to me too, he assented, when I hear your argument.

383 A Do you agree then, I said, that this is the second canon, within which men must both tell tales and compose poetry about the gods, that neither are they themselves wizards in metamorphosing themselves, nor do they mislead us by falsehood of word or deed?

I agree.

Then, while approving much in Homer, yet this we shall

¹ A word including all spirits and superior beings, such as the "heroes" above mentioned, who were not considered in the full sense deities. It would be used in the widest sense for the supernatural including the divine. It is the same word which is used for the supernatural sign of which Socrates used to say that he was aware.

² The use of the word "God" here is probably generic, as we might say "the child as such." It is very close upon the use as a name.

not approve, the sending of the dream by Zeus to Agamemnon¹; nor in Aeschylus², when Thetis says that Apollo singing at B her bridal

“dwelt on her happy motherhood
And long years free from sickness.
And having told that my lot was in all things blessed of God
He sang a strain of triumph, comforting me.
And I was deeming that Phoebus' divine mouth
Was infallible, alive with prophetic art;
But he that himself sang the strain, himself was present at the
feast,
Himself spoke those words, himself it was that slew my son.”

When anyone tells such tales about the gods, we shall be angry, and shall refuse him a chorus³, and shall not permit the teachers to use his work for the education of the young, if our guardians are to prove god-revering and god-like⁴, to the greatest degree possible for man.

I entirely assent to these canons, he answered, and I should adopt them as laws.

¹ The sending of a dream by Zeus to deceive Agamemnon is described in the opening lines of Book II. of the *Iliad*. Cf. the story in *2 Chronicles* xviii. 20.

² The sentiment here noted in Aeschylus is just such as, more vehemently insisted on, constituted one of the greatest offences of Euripides against tradition. It is remarkable that Plato chooses the poets of least questionable reputation to assail.

³ The chorus for a drama at Athens—the chief expense of its production—was provided at the cost of some wealthy citizen, for whom this was a necessary and public duty, undertaken in a certain rotation. Not to grant a chorus meant to forbid the representation of the play.

⁴ Two sides of the same idea, for Plato. The soul becomes like that which it worships. See 395 c and especially 500 c, “Do you think it possible not to imitate what we are familiar with and admire?”

BOOK III.

Argument. 386 A—392 C. *Passing from fables about gods to fables on the whole about persons rather nearer humanity, and dealing with young people of a more advanced age than in the last book, Plato points out how Courage, Truthfulness, and Temperance, in elementary forms, may be promoted or the reverse through the imagination.*

386 A So far as regards the gods, I continued, it would seem that something like the above should be heard and should not be heard from early childhood by citizens who are to honour the gods and their parents, and are to pay no small regard to friendship with one another¹.

And I imagine our opinion is just.

What next? If they are to be brave, must not what they are told be of that nature, and what will make them have the least possible fear of death; or do you think that any one could ever be brave, while having this fear in him?

By Zeus, he answered, certainly not.

How then? Do you suppose that one who believes the world of Hades² to be real and to be awful will prefer death to defeat and slavery?

¹ A summary of the passage just completed.

² The quotations below show that Plato has mainly in mind not the other world as a place of reward and punishment, but the more primitive idea of a feeble and dreary prolongation of life, similar to life on earth.

By no means.

Then, as it seems, we ought to attend to these fables too and supervise those who take in hand to tell them, and request them not, as they do, to pour absolute contumely on the world of Hades, but rather to speak well of it; as what they say is not true, and does no good¹ to men whose duty it will be to be valiant.

No doubt we must.

Then we shall erase everything to that effect, beginning with the following verses :

“Rather would I live above ground as the hireling of another, with a landless man who had no great livelihood, than bear sway among all the dead that be departed²,”

and [the ruler of Hades feared lest]

“The mansions should be displayed to gods and men, grim and mouldering, which even the gods abhor³,”

and

“Ah me ! Surely there is even in the mansions of Hades a ghost and a phantom, but no mind in it at all⁴,”

and

“That he alone should have understanding ; but the other souls sweep shadow-like around⁵,”

¹ “Not true and does no good” are for Plato two sides of the same idea. Truth is the nourishing of the soul upon realities ; what starves and dwarfs the soul cannot, so far, be truth.

² *Odyssey* xi. 489 ff. The words of Achilles to Ulysses in the world of departed spirits.

³ *Iliad* xx. 64 ff. In the description of Poseidon striking the earth with his trident (an earthquake?). The mansions of the dead are here thought of as an extended grave.

⁴ *Iliad* xxiii. 103. Achilles after Patroclus has appeared to him in a dream. The ghost or soul or wraith is thought of as “a faint material effluence” of the man, not as “spiritual being.” See Leaf on the passage in Homer.

⁵ *Odyssey* x. 495, of Teiresias the great prophet or soothsayer when in Hades.

and

“The soul flitting from his limbs went down to Hades lamenting its fate, leaving manhood and vigour¹,”

387 A and

“The soul went beneath the ground like smoke, with a twittering cry²,”

and

“Even as bats flit twittering in the secret place of a wondrous cave, when one has fallen down out of the rock from the cluster, and they cling each to each up aloft, even so the souls twittered as they fared together³.”

B All this, and everything like it, we shall entreat of Homer and the other poets not to be indignant with us if we cancel, not that they are not poetical, and pleasant to the common crowd to hear; but because the more poetical⁴ they are, the less they are fit hearing for children or for men whose duty it is to be free⁵, dreading slavery more than death.

Certainly.

Are not moreover all the terrible and alarming names connected with that world to be put aside, Cocytuses, and

¹ *Iliad* XVI. 856, of Patroclus when slain by Hector.

² *Iliad* XXIII. 100, of the soul of Patroclus, seen by Achilles in his dream. For the twittering or chirping cry, the unmusical and unintelligible utterance of a feeble frightened creature, such as young birds, or bats, see next quotation.

³ *Odyssey* XXIV. 6—9, of the souls of Penelope's suitors whom Ulysses had slain. (Rendering modified from Butcher and Lang's translation.) Plato's objection to these passages does not touch the question of a future life either one way or the other. Ideas like these of a continued existence would affect his mind as some “spiritualistic revelations” affect ours, with a sense of futility and degradation.

⁴ I.e. the more they lend attraction to the sentiments they express. To be poetical is not yet a vice *per se*, though in Book X. it may become so.

⁵ Free, cf. 395 C. Freedom, the absence of obstruction within and without, is the key-note of the *Republic*.

Styxes¹, and ghosts and vampires, and the rest of that type, the names of which make all who hear them shudder in the extreme? And this may be well for another purpose²; but we are afraid for our guardians lest such tremours may make them too hot and yet too soft³.

We do well to be afraid.

Then we reject them all?

We do.

And our stories and poetry must be of the opposite type to these.

Clearly.

Then we shall remove also the wailings and lamentations of illustrious men? D

Necessarily, he answered, if we remove the others.

Consider, said I, whether we shall be right to remove them or not. We affirm that a good man will not think death terrible to a good man, whose comrade also he is⁴.

He will not.

Then he will not lament for the other's sake as if some fearful thing had befallen him.

No indeed.

Well but we affirm this too, that such an one is pre-eminently sufficing⁵ to himself in living well⁶, and is least of all men dependent upon others.

¹ Cocytus, the river of wailing, and Styx, the river of hate, rivers of the underworld. The plural is contemptuous.

² Poetic effect; the "making our flesh creep."

³ A metaphor from metal-working or from wax; the idea is, "badly tempered"—overheated and having lost tenacity.

⁴ And so can be sure of his constancy of character. The comradeship is thus a reason for not grieving, instead of being one for grieving.

⁵ A hint which anticipates Stoicism, and *seems* opposed to the principle on which society rests. See 369 B and note. Of course a man *may* be able to stand alone, just because he has the true social spirit so strongly. Christianity has the same apparent antithesis, say, between the love of God and the love of man. ✓

⁶ This phrase is exceedingly pregnant in Plato, and indicates the root

True.

Then it is not terrible to him to lose a son or brother or money or anything else of the kind.

It is not.

Then he is the last man to lament when some such disaster befalls him, but will bear it most patiently.

Very much so.

So we should be right in taking away the laments of
388 A illustrious men, and assigning them to women, and those not the best, and to inferior men, that those whom we affirm we are rearing to the guardianship of our country may feel repugnance¹ to behaving like them.

Quite right.

Again, we shall entreat Homer and the rest of the poets not to represent Achilles the son of a goddess

“Lying first on his side, then again on his back, and then face downwards, and then rising to his feet and sailing along by the shore of the unfertile sea²,”

B nor taking in both hands the yellow dust to pour it over his head, nor weeping and lamenting³ on other occasions, when

of his and of Aristotle's ethics. See 353—4 above. Life, or that by which we live (see below 445 A), for the Greek thinker is the soul. Thus, in the largest and at the same time the simplest sense, to live well is to have a soul which is at once efficient (good in the Greek sense) and happy, just as to see well is to have eyes which work effectively and with comfort.

¹ “Repugnance.” The same word as in the great passage 401 E where the theory of this part of education is summed up. The boy or girl is first of all to be trained by habit and imitation to shrink from what is wrong, vulgar, or ugly, and to be attracted by what is right. When the basis of life is thus moulded, the reason of it all will come home easily, though at a later stage.

² *Iliad* xxiv. 10 ff., of Achilles in his agony of sorrow for Patroclus. The words “sailing along” are put in to make the passage ridiculous.

³ Plato is insensibly passing from courage (386 A) to temperance (389 D). The affinity of these two qualities, in self-mastery or the power of resisting the onset of emotion, is a favourite conception with Plato.

and as Homer represents him ; nor Priam, by descent near to the gods, supplicating and rolling in the dung-heap,

“ Calling loudly on each man by name¹. ”

And far more earnestly still we shall entreat them at least not to represent divine persons as wailing and crying

“ Ah me unhappy ; ah me, poor mother of the best², ”

C

or at the very least, if it must be so with the gods, not to dare to portray with so little likeness the greatest of the gods as to make him say

“ Alas, I behold with my eyes a man whom I love being chased round the city, and my heart laments³, ”

and

“ Ah me ! that it is fate for Sarpedon, dearest to me of men, to be subdued by Patroclus, Menoetius’ son⁴. ”

For if, my dear Adeimantus, our young people were to listen seriously to all that, and not to despise it as an unworthy invention, then a man would be slow to think that himself, a mere human being, was above it, and to chide himself if it should but cross his mind to say or do anything of the sort⁵ ; but, more likely, without shame and without endurance he would whine out many a plaint and lamentation over trivial misfortunes.

¹ *Iliad* XXII. 414, of Priam praying his people not to prevent him from going to beg Achilles for the body of Hector.

² *Iliad* XVIII. 54. Thetis, the divine mother of Achilles, lamenting over his griefs and his short life.

³ *Iliad* XXII. 168. Zeus, watching Hector pursued by Achilles.

⁴ *Iliad* XVI. 433.

⁵ The Greeks needed this advice more than we do. According to Plutarch, even a man like Solon, the great statesman, on hearing of his son’s death, is naturally described as “ beating himself on the head, and doing and saying the other things which belong to strong emotion. ” I have observed the women crying loudly and demonstratively at a funeral in Greece. Perhaps we are in some ways too stolid. Yet we know that restraint in the signs of emotion is the first step to self-control.

E What you say is very true.

But this is wrong, as our argument indicated just now¹, which we must obey, until someone convinces us by another and a better one.

It is wrong.

Again, they ought not to be fond of laughter². For it is pretty much the case that when anyone gives way to violent laughter, it demands a violent reaction.

I agree.

Then we must not approve when men of importance are
389 A represented as overcome by laughter, and still less when gods are.

Much less.

Then we must further reject such passages as this in Homer,

“And unquenchable laughter arose among the blessed gods when they saw Hephaestus bustling through the banquet-hall³,”

according to your rule.

If you like to call it mine, he said; we certainly must reject them.

B Again, we must set a high value upon truth⁴. For if we

¹ 387 E above.

² This does not come home to us. Contrast Carlyle on Teufelsdröckh's laugh. The dangers of our temperament are in many ways opposed to those which threatened the Greeks—a people of southern blood, liable to emotional storms, in spite of their extraordinary intellectual endowments. See last note but one. We may illustrate the meaning by the need of stopping fits of laughter in hysterical persons, or by the appearance of a want of self-control and self-respect which is produced by violent laughter in public places.

³ *Iliad* 1. 599, of Hephaestus, the lame god of fire and of the smithy, acting as waiter at the gods' banquet, to restore their cheerfulness.

⁴ We must understand that Plato treats the good qualities of a man from different points of view according to the stage of education, the level of mind, with which he is concerned. Here truthfulness is introduced between courage and self-control, as the duty of a pupil or subject to his teacher

said right just now, and falsehood is in reality useless to gods, and to men useful only as a medicine, it is plain that such a thing must be committed to the physician, and laymen must not touch it.

Quite plain.

Then the rulers¹ of the state, if anyone, have the duty of telling lies whether in dealing with the enemy or with fellow citizens, for the good of the city; but the rest must not meddle with such a thing; since for a private individual to lie to such rulers as these we shall say to be the same offence², and a greater too, with that of a patient who should tell his doctor, or an athlete who should tell his trainer, what was not true about the affections of his own body; or of a man who should tell falsehoods to the pilot about the ship and the sailors, as to how himself or his mates were faring in their work.

Most true.

Then if a ruler catches anyone else in the state telling falsehoods, any of those who are craftsmen³,

or ruler—one *ex hyp.* wiser than himself. But this of course is not Plato's ultimate view of the ground or nature of the love of truth. See above 382 C.

¹ No one but the government may tell lies. Partly Plato's fun, partly an anticipation of such real difficulties as are raised to-day about the ethics of diplomacy and public action in general.

² What *is* the offence from Plato's present point of view? It seems to be disloyalty, with strong emphasis on the stupidity which is really implied in disloyalty. The act is self-contradictory; you refuse information to the very people whose business it is, in your interest, to have it. As he says, it is like not telling the truth to your doctor. We all know how trying this secretiveness in persons under authority can be. Truthfulness to fellow-citizens and to other human beings seems not to count; but we are here speaking of persons under authority whose main duty is to the rulers. The love of truth for its own sake, which comes in at a later stage (and see 382 C), is really a further case of the same principle—loyalty to the system in which you are a member.

³ Etymol. "workers for the public"; in Athenian time = artizan. Homer's inclusion of "professional" men in this class is interesting. *Odyssey* XVII. 383.

"Soothsayer or physician or carpenter,"

he will punish him as introducing a practice tending to upset the state, like a ship, and disastrous.

Yes, he said, if our act is to follow our word.

But further, will not temperance¹ be necessary to our young men²?

Of course.

And are not the following the chief elements of temperance, where a number of persons are concerned, to be obedient to the rulers, and themselves to rule³ the pleasures of drink, and love, and food?

I agree.

Then we shall affirm that things like this are well said, when in Homer, for example, Diomedes cries

"Friend, sit in silence, and obey my word⁴,"

and the passage which goes with it,

¹ "Temperance"; whatever rendering we adopt we shall need some effort to seize Plato's meaning. The etymology of the Greek word suggests soundness or sanity of mind. "Self-control" conveys too much the idea of a struggle. "Temperance" has the fault of suggesting to us merely the opposite of one or two vulgar vices. The temperate man in Plato (fuller account, 442 C) is one the elements of whose whole nature work heartily together in the service of reason—of law, that is, or intelligent purpose. A Greek statue of the great time, a figure, say, from the frieze of the Parthenon, might give us the best perception of what a Greek meant by temperance.

² "Young men." We have here insensibly passed beyond the stage of childhood.

³ Obedience to authority and command of self. The relation of these two sides of "temperance" will be further explained in Bk. IV. They are the main aspects which would strike anyone, dealing, as Plato says, with "a number" of persons in course of education, which is the present point of view.

⁴ *Iliad* IV. 412. The following parts of lines come from passages (*Iliad* III. 8; IV. 431) different from one another and from this. Plato's memory has associated them.

"The Greeks came on, breathing courage,...in silence, fearing their officers,"

and any other like them.

390 A

They are well said.

But what about such as

"O heavy with wine, dog-faced, with the heart of a deer¹,"

and the following lines, are they well said? And so of all the impertinences of individuals to rulers which are recounted in stories or in poetry?

They are not right.

No, for I imagine they are not suitable for young men to hear, if temperance is our aim; but it is no wonder if apart from this they produce pleasure. Or what do you think?

I agree.

Once more; to represent the wisest of men as saying that he thinks it the finest thing in the world when the tables are loaded

"With bread and flesh, and a wine-bearer drawing the wine serves it round and pours it into the cups²,"

does this appear to you to be conducive to self-restraint in a young man? or the words

"To die and meet doom by hunger is the most pitiful thing³?"

or to represent Zeus, after he had been deliberating, when the rest of gods and men were asleep and he alone was awake, as readily forgetting it all because of the passion of love, and C

¹ *Iliad* I. 225, addressed by Achilles to Agamemnon, the king of men. Violence of this kind is not rare in Greek poetry; and though it does not disprove what is commonly told us about the fine self-restraint of Greek art, yet it shows the boundaries of expression in it to be less rigid than is often supposed. We are not surprised that Plato found such lines shocking.

² *Odyssey* IX. 8. As Professor Campbell remarks, Plato leaves out the minstrel, whom Homer mentions first.

³ *Odyssey* XII. 342.

as so smitten at the sight of Hera that he would not go away, but wanted to stay there and make love to her, and telling her that he is so possessed by love as he had never been, even at first when they used to meet

“Without their parents’ knowledge¹,”

or the binding of Ares and Aphrodite by Hephaestus² for similar reasons?

No by Zeus, he said, I do not think this appropriate.

D But if there are passages of endurance in the face of extremity, whether spoken or acted by illustrious men, these should be looked at³ and listened to, such as the lines

“Then he smote upon his breast and rebuked his own heart, saying, ‘Endure, my heart; yea, a harder thing thou didst once bear⁴.’”

By all means, he said.

E Certainly we must not permit our men to be venal or avaricious⁵.

No.

So it must not be sung to them how

“Gifts convince gods, and convince reverend kings⁶,”

nor must we approve of Phoenix⁷ the attendant of Achilles as

¹ *Iliad* XIV. 296. These words occur in the story, but are not used by Zeus.

² *Odyssey* VIII. 266. A story in a comic vein, which strikes the reader at once as unlike Homer.

³ Strictly implying “seen on the stage.” Later on, Plato rejects the drama from his commonwealth.

⁴ *Odyssey* XX. 17. Plato thought the former line very significant, and recurs to it 441 B below.

⁵ Still under the general head of Temperance. Avarice and sensuality are for Plato extremes which meet; they both mean preponderance of commonplace desire over intelligent aim, and in fact often go together. See 442 A.

⁶ Said to be a quotation from Hesiod.

⁷ *Iliad* IX. 432 ff. In this as in several other allusions, explained above, Plato does great injustice to the intention of the Homeric poet. The ancients were, by our standards, extraordinarily uncritical in their use

giving reasonable advice, when he counselled his master to defend the Greeks if he got gifts, but without gifts not to abandon his wrath. Nor shall we think it right, nor admit the fact, that Achilles¹ himself was so covetous as to take presents from Agamemnon; and again, to give up a dead man for 391 A a ransom, but not without.

No, he said, it is not right to approve such passages.

And, I continued, from respect for Homer I hardly like to say that it amounts to a sin to speak thus of Achilles, or to believe it when others speak so; and again that he said to Apollo,

"You have hindered me, far-worker, most mischievous of the gods; surely I would take vengeance on you, if I had the power²,"

and that to the river, who was a god, he was rebellious, and B ready to fight him; and moreover we must not believe that, speaking of his hair, which was sacred to the other river, Spercheius, he said,

"Let me offer it to Patroclus the hero, to take with him³,"

he being a dead man, and that he did so. And the dragging of Hector round the tomb of Patroclus, and the slaughter of the captives over the funeral pile⁴, all of this we shall deny to

of authors; and Plato, who is quite as hostile to the popular misuse of poetry as an ethical guide (see 600 E) as he is to the poetry itself, does not much mind how he caricatures the vulgar method of arguing from texts. See, e.g., the passage on Homer's medical views, 405 E. It is true that he also thinks there might be a kind of poetry of a loftier form, and less easily misapplied—say, like Wordsworth or Milton.

¹ *Iliad* XIX. 278; cf. 147—8, and see previous note.

² *Iliad* XXII. 15, 20.

³ *Iliad* XXIII. 151.

⁴ Many sentiments and actions included in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* appear to belong to different ethical worlds, and it is hard to suppose that they ever co-existed. Plato represents on the whole the complete formation of a European or civilised sentiment—a marked stage in a process the beginning of which can be traced within the Homeric poems themselves.

be true, and we shall forbid our men to believe that Achilles, C the son of a goddess, and of Peleus most temperate of men and grandson of Zeus, and himself bred up by Cheiron, famous for wisdom, was filled with so great distraction as to possess within himself two contrary vices, meanness joined with avarice, and presumptuousness against God and man.

You say right, he replied.

And then, I pursued, there is more which we must not believe, nor permit to be told ; that Theseus, son of Poseidon, D and Peirithous, son of Zeus, set out to perform such horrible outrages¹, or that any other hero, son of a god or goddess, would have endured to do such awful and impious acts as are now slanderously laid to them ; but we must compel our poets either not to affirm that the deeds were theirs, or not to affirm that they were sons of gods ; but never to affirm both at once², or to set about convincing our youths that gods produce evil E offspring and that heroes are no better than men. For as we were saying above³, such stories are sinful and untrue ; for we proved, I think, that bad things cannot spring from the gods.

Unquestionably.

And in truth they are harmful to the hearer ; for everyone will feel indulgence for his own badness, when he is convinced that such are and have been the doings even of the close kindred of the gods, of those near to Zeus,

“Whose altar to ancestral Zeus is on the hill of Ida, in heaven⁴, and the blood of deities has not yet perished out of them.”

¹ Peirithous aided Theseus in carrying off Helen, and Theseus joined Peirithous in his attempt to steal Proserpine away from Pluto.

² All this is in part humorous, indicating that Plato here feels himself in the region of myth and anthropomorphism—of the “false,” 377 A above, i.e. fiction and fancy ; so that as long as the right effect is got it does not much matter how you get it. It is, too, a parody of the popular method which will get moral instruction out of poetical texts at all hazards.

³ 380 c.

⁴ The hill is supposed by the poet to reach up into heaven. The quotation is from the *Niobe* of Aeschylus, a lost play.

For which reasons such fables must be stopped, lest they generate in our young men a great facility of viciousness. 392 A

Surely, he said.

And now, I said, what kind is left for us to treat of in determining what stories are to be told and what are not? We have stated how gods are to be spoken of; and also about spirits and heroes and the world of Hades.

Quite so.

Then what remains is to treat of human beings.

Obviously.

My dear Sir, it is impossible to ordain that at the point where we are.

Why?

Because I suppose we shall say that, as we hold, both poets and story-tellers go very far wrong in speaking of human beings, when they assert that there are many who are unjust yet happy, and many just yet miserable; and that injustice is advantageous if it is not found out; and that justice is another's good and one's own loss¹; and all this we shall forbid men to say, and shall enjoin on them both to sing and to tell the contrary of it all. Do not you think so?

Nay, he said, I know it well.

Then if you admit that I am right, I shall say that you have admitted what we have all along been discussing?

Your rejoinder is right. C

Well, then, we will not finally agree that statements about human beings are to be such as I suggest until we have found out what justice is, and that it is by nature advantageous to the possessor, whether he is thought to be just or no.

Most true, he answered.

¹ These were the themes of an argument in Bk. I., and were re-asserted, in order to draw a refutation, by Glaucon and Adeimantus in Bk. II. beginning. That Justice is another's good and one's own loss is more particularly the doctrine ascribed to Thrasymachus. See 367 C.

Argument. 392 c—398 B. *Discussion of the permissible form of narration or representation, i.e. how far it is right to "imitate" for imitation's sake, and how far a reserve should be exercised as to what characters and sentiments we throw ourselves into by "imitating" them.*

And now, I went on, we may close our treatment of narratives; and the next thing to study, as I imagine, is the form of narration; and then we shall have completely considered both what is to be said, and how to say it.

And Adeimantus broke in, I don't understand what you mean by this¹.

D Well, but you ought to, said I; perhaps you will know it better if I put it this way. Is not all that is told by story-tellers or by poets a narrative of things past or present or future?

What else should it be?

Then do they not execute it either in simple narrative or in narrative by way of imitation²?

This, too, he said, I need to understand more distinctly.

E It seems, I rejoined, that I am a ludicrously obscure instructor. So, as incompetent speakers do, I will try to explain to you what I mean by isolating a particular case of the matter,

¹ Indicating that Plato was saying something which he held to be new and important.

² This is the first introduction of the word imitation in the *Republic*. Plato uses it to begin with in a simple sense which he explains below (393 c), much like ours; then in the course of the argument it naturally expands to a wider meaning (e.g. 400 A and 401 A) analogous to that in which both he and Aristotle employ it to sum up the essence of the "fine" arts. Expression, representation, are fair equivalents for it in this sense, as when (400 A) the rhythms of verses are spoken of as "imitations" (expressions or representations) of ethical types of life. The fact that human beings are almost infinitely open to "suggestion" from one another and their surroundings has recently been much insisted on in Psychology and Sociology. See Prof. W. James, *Talks on Psychology and Life's Ideals*, p. 48.

and not in general. Now tell me, do you know the beginning of the *Iliad*, in which the poet says that Chryses entreated Agamemnon to release his daughter; and he was angry; and Chryses, when he did not obtain his request, prayed to the god 393 A to bring harm upon the Achaeans?

I know it.

You know, then, that down to the lines

“And entreated all the Achaeans, but chiefly the two Atridae, orderers of the people¹,”

the poet himself is the speaker, and does not even attempt to turn our thoughts in any other direction, as if anyone else were speaking but himself; but in the lines after those he speaks as if he were Chryses himself, and endeavours so far as possible B to make us think that the speaker is not Homer, but the priest, who is an old man; and he has composed in pretty much these proportions² the rest of his narrative about what took place at Ilium, and events in Ithaca and throughout the *Odyssey*.

Exactly so.

Now it is narrative³ both when he is repeating the speeches made on each occasion, and in the parts between the speeches.

Of course.

But when he is recounting a speech as if he were someone C else, shall we not say that then he is assimilating his way of speaking as much as possible to the person whom he has named beforehand as about to speak?

No doubt we shall.

Then to assimilate oneself to another, whether in voice or in figure, is to “imitate⁴” that person to whom one assimilates himself?

¹ *Iliad* I. 15, 16.

² With the same relative amounts of pure narrative and of “imitation.”

³ Or perhaps “discourse,” a very neutral word.

⁴ This simple and primary meaning of “imitation” should be borne in

Yes.

In such a case, it appears, both Homer and the rest of the poets conduct their narrative by way of imitation.

Certainly.

But if the poet were never to conceal his own person, the whole of his poetry and narrative would have come into existence without any imitation. And that you may not say that again you do not understand I will point out how this might be done. If Homer, after saying that Chryses came bearing his daughter's ransom and as a suppliant to the Achaeans, but chiefly to the kings, had continued the story from that point, not as having turned into Chryses but still as Homer, you know that it would not have been imitation but simple narrative. It would have been something like this—I will give it without metre, for I am no poet—The priest, when he had come, prayed that the gods would grant to the Greeks to take Troy and get safe home themselves, and to release his daughter, accepting the ransom and reverencing the god. And after he had said this the rest were for respecting him and assenting, but Agamemnon grew furious, ordering him to depart at once and not to come again, lest the sceptre and fillets of the god should fail to protect him; and before his daughter was released she should grow old in Argos with Agamemnon; and he commanded him to depart and not to provoke him, that he might reach home in safety. And the old man, when he heard it, was afraid and departed in silence, but, having left the camp, made many prayers to Apollo, rehearsing the titles of the god

mind all through Plato's discussion of its admissibility in the training of the guardians. It is to throw off your own characteristics and adopt those of someone or something else. As remarked above, imitation has for the Greek thinker also a wider meaning in which all "fine" or expressive art and therefore the whole of Homer—and indeed everything capable of expression, is imitative. In Book X., where Plato is assailing the weak side of fine art, he applies a meaning akin to the first in the sphere of the second, i.e. he treats art and poetry not as expression but as copy-making.

and reminding him and entreating a recompense if ever he gave him grateful offerings either in the building of temples or in sacrifice of victims; in return for which he prayed that the Achæans might pay for his tears through Apollo's arrows¹. This, my friend, is an instance of plain narrative without imitation.

I understand, he said.

B

Then you must understand, I continued, that the opposite case occurs, when we take away what the poet puts in between the speeches, and leave the dialogue.

This again, he said, I understand; tragedy is something of the kind.

You apprehend me perfectly. And now, I think I can make clear to you, what before I could not, that part of poetry or story telling is altogether in the medium of imitation, being, as you suggest, tragedy and comedy; part consists of narrative told by the poet himself; you will find the clearest case perhaps in dithyrambs²; and part again uses both together, as in the composition of epics, and many other instances, if you follow me.

Yes, he said, I see now what you meant to say³.

And you must recollect what went before, that we said we had finished describing *what* was to be told, but had still to consider *how* it should be told⁴.

Yes, I remember.

D

Now this was the very question on which I meant that we must come to an agreement, whether we are to permit our poets to compose their narratives in imitative shape, or partly in imitative shape and partly not, and then of what kind⁵ each part should be, or whether they are not to imitate at all.

¹ *Iliad* I. 11—42, turned into oblique oration.

² A kind of lyric poem.

³ 392 D.

⁴ 392 C.

⁵ 395 C ff.

I predict, he said, that you are considering whether we shall receive tragedy and comedy into the city or not.

Perhaps, I said; and perhaps something even more than this¹; for I myself do not yet know, but wherever the argument, like a wind, may carry us, there we must go².

E Why, that is well said.

Then, Adeimantus, you have this to consider, whether our guardians are to be imitative³ or not; or is this a further consequence upon what has been said before, that each one person can practise one vocation well, but not several; and if he attempted it, would become "Jack of all trades and master of none"?

Of course he would.

And does not the same rule apply to imitation, that the same man cannot carry on several imitations successfully, as he can one by itself?

Certainly he cannot.

395 A Then it will be quite out of the question for him at the same time to practise any vocation worth speaking of, and to carry on several imitations and be an imitative person, seeing that the same persons are unable to carry on at once even the

¹ This sentence may indicate that the question is not primarily one of literary classification, but of dealing with an ethical and educational factor, not confined either to literature or to any department of literature, the factor of imagination or suggestion, the entering into other lives and minds.

² "The wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh or whither it goeth; so is every man that is born of the spirit (breath or wind)." Plato here touches the analogy on which the idea of "spirit" rests. The wind seems a type of freedom and activity; it is invisible, you cannot stop it, or control its direction, or know, except by going with it, where it will take you. This is part of the reason why mind is called spirit; no doubt there is also a reference to the "breath" as the invisible means of life.

³ This is the real question, of which the issue about literature is only a sub-case.

two forms of imitation which are supposed to be akin, as in composing tragedy and comedy¹. Or did you not call these two forms of imitation²?

I did; and you are right in saying that the same person cannot compose both.

Nor do the same men succeed as rhapsodes³ and as actors. True.

Why, we do not even have the same actors in comedy and tragedy; and all these⁴ are cases of imitation, are they not? B

Yes, of imitation.

And further, Adeimantus, I believe that human nature is subdivided into smaller pieces as regards inability to imitate many things well, than to do those real things of which the imitations are resemblances⁵.

Very true.

Now if we are to maintain our earlier principle, that it is right for our guardians, freed from all other craftsmanship, to be consummate artificers of liberty⁶ for their State, and to c

¹ In the "Supper Party" (*Symposium*), 223 D, Plato represents Socrates as maintaining the reverse of this, viz., that the same poet ought to compose tragedy and comedy. Very likely that was meant to be a paradox; at any rate no Athenian poet of the great time did compose both tragedy and comedy.

² 394 B, C.

³ Public reciters, who recited poetry, especially portions of Homer, on occasions such as festivals or games when crowds were in search of entertainment. The "rhapsodes" (song-stringers) have been credited with a considerable influence in making the Homeric poems what they are. Undoubtedly the poems were long preserved without writing.

⁴ I.e. actors and reciters are "imitators," no less than dramatic poets.

⁵ "Imitation" is so absorbing, that it is less possible to combine different modes of it, say, different arts, than it is to combine different kinds of action in real life; which of course we all must do to a great extent.

⁶ A modern reader may find some difficulty in understanding where, in Plato's commonwealth, liberty is to be found. It is however a most striking fact that so convinced an antagonist of democracy as vulgarly understood

practise nothing but what bears upon this end, then it will be right for them neither to do nor to imitate anything else; but if they imitate, they should imitate from earliest childhood what belongs to such a part, brave, temperate, religious and free men, and all such like characters; but what is unfree they should neither do nor be skilled to imitate, nor anything else that is ugly¹, that they may not from the imitation be infected with the reality. Or have you not perceived that imitations, if they continue far on from our young days, become habits and a nature both in body, in speech, and in intelligence?

Very much so.

Then, I went on, we shall not permit persons whom we say we are taking care of and intend to become good men, being men to imitate a woman², whether young or old, either abusing her husband or contending and vaunting herself against the gods, thinking herself in high good fortune, or again concerned in disaster and griefs and lamentations; and as for one in sickness or in love or in travail, we shall be very far from allowing it³.

should yet proclaim that he held liberty to be the end of the State. What he means by liberty is a condition in which all selves are at their best and all made the most of, and there is no baffling of action and will by jarring elements. This is the purpose of the commonwealth, whether we agree or not with the means adopted to secure it. Cf. 387 B, and 577 C and D. This passage gives quite simply, though emphatically, the basis and point of his view about the power of imitation in education.

¹ We may think of the recognised evil of letting boys run wild among servants; see below on not imitating slaves.

² As they would have to do in acting or reading tragedy. The position of women was perhaps the weakest side of Athenian society; the intensity of political life, in which they had no share, seems to have made them even less important than, e.g., the Homeric poems represent them. It must be borne in mind that if Plato saw their weaknesses in a strong light, he also advocated the remedy. See Bk. V. of the *Republic*.

³ Cf. 396 D, a parallel prohibition about men. The felicity with which these censures strike the subject-matter of modern novels is at least amusing and suggestive.

Certainly, he said.

Nor again, slaves, whether women or men, doing what belongs to slaves¹.

Nor that either.

Nor again inferior men, cowards, and behaving in the contrary way to what we said but now², reviling and satirising one another³, and calling ugly names, whether drunk or sober, and otherwise transgressing as such persons do both by words and 396 A deeds against themselves and others alike. I imagine too that our guardians are not to be trained to assimilate themselves to madmen in word or deed. For they must learn to recognise* both madmen and vicious men or women, but they must do nothing in such a character nor imitate them.

Very true.

Well then, I asked, are they to imitate men working at the forge or at other artisan's work, or rowing galleys or giving B time to the rowers, or anything else of the kind?

¹ Moderns are apt to resent expressions like these, and to recall the facts that slaves were human beings, and that Christianity was the triumph of the "servile virtues." And this is a fair criticism of the hard and unsympathetic side of the Greek mind. But it would be foolish to deny that the "menial" has typical vices, though not confined to the "menial" class; and the Greeks, rightly, had an intense repugnance to them. With slaves, as with women, Plato would give every capacity its development (433 D), the only means by which the vices he felt so strongly could be cured.

² 395 C.

³ Lit. "putting one another into comedies." Aristophanes' attacks on Socrates by name in the *Clouds* had much to do with Socrates' unpopularity, and in that way, probably, with his trial and condemnation. At the close of the 5th century B.C. a law was passed at Athens to forbid "putting people into comedies under their true names," to avoid the aggravation of civic discord by this means. The comedy of Aristophanes is abusive and audacious to a degree for which Swift would be a modern parallel, if his worst language had been used of living statesmen by name. All this of course accords with the fact that the drama is one great form of the imitation which Plato is deprecating.

⁴ See 409 on the further solution of the problem involved.

Why, how can they, he replied, when they will not be allowed even to let their attention dwell on any of these things¹?

Well, and neighing horses and bellowing bulls and sounding torrents and the roaring sea and thunder and all that kind of thing²—shall they imitate this?

Why, he answered, we have forbidden them either to be mad or to copy madmen.

¹ Here we touch perhaps the hardest of all paradoxes in Plato for the modern educationist. He, with the Greeks in general, seems to see no ethical or educational value in industrial occupations; on a level with which he puts rowing (!), the function at Athens of the slave, alien, or poorer citizen. Rousseau's enthusiastic recommendation of carpentering as an educational pursuit (*Emile*) seems directly opposed to Plato's views, as is also the modern advocacy of "manual occupations" which dates, perhaps, from Froebel. We may note some points to diminish the difficulty. (i) A Greek gentleman's life was in some ways comparable to that of an English country gentleman. It was not a town or study-bred life, but simple, social and athletic, with much management of farming, horses, and probably simple industries (vine-culture, tree-planting, etc.). The need for a "return to nature"—for renewed contact with earth and industry—was less pressing than now. (ii) Plato and the Greeks loathed any occupation that disfigured the man, physically or mentally. Of course this feeling is in the main quite just—and if art, war, politics and literature, the occupations open to a gentleman in Greece, disfigure the man, as they may, this was an evil the Greek was only just beginning to experience, though Plato indeed is in this work devising and providing against it. We should admit that all occupations must "mark" the man, and should try to make this mark a development and not a disfigurement. (iii) It is therefore perhaps not in actual industrial practice, but in carefully organised training with wider aims, that the best educational result is obtained from "manual" occupations, when their discipline is gained without cramping mind or body. The great passage, 401—2, shows how well Plato knew what the principle of plastic industry could do for the mind, and elsewhere he often shows (602 D, cf. *Philebus* and *Apology*) his appreciation of workmanlike skill and accuracy, and of the workman's recognition that he has a task in life (406 D).

² Refers to entertainments which were coming in with the new music of Plato's day.

Then, I said, if I understand what you tell me¹, there is one kind of speaking and narration in which a man who is genuinely good and noble will recite when he has to do so²; and there is another, unlike it, in which one will recite who has been bred and nurtured in the opposite way³.

What are they?

I think, I answered him, that a *good* man, when he comes in his narrative to a saying or doing of a good man, will be ready to recite it as if he were that person himself, and will not be ashamed at such an imitation; preferring no doubt, to imitate the good man when his conduct is steadfast and rational, but to a less amount and in a less degree, when upset by attacks of sickness or of love or even by drink or some other misfortune; but when he comes to someone unworthy of him, he will not consent seriously to assimilate himself to an inferior, except for a moment when he is doing something good; but he will be ashamed to, both because he has no training in imitating such persons, and also because it is repugnant to him to squeeze and stamp himself into the mould of his inferiors; as the whole thing seems despicable to his understanding, except for the sake of amusement⁴.

Naturally, he said.

Then he will employ the sort of narrative which we de-

¹ The important and decisive conclusion is ascribed with Plato's usual irony to the innocent interlocutor.

² Lads were often told to sing or recite before company at Athens, just as young people are expected to-day to sing if they can. The father cursed with an enlightened son, in Aristophanes, calls on him to sing as a matter of course, and is shocked at the music and poetry he chooses.

³ This is plainly true. We have only to think of different people's choice of songs, or of books for reading aloud, and the ways in which they sing or read.

⁴ This large exception should be noted. There can be little doubt that great harm is done to-day by making trivial and vulgar characters and situations, as e.g. in commonplace novels, the principal nutriment of the mind. It is quite a different thing, as Plato implies, to take up such reading occasionally "for fun."

scribed a little above¹ in the case of Homer's epics; and his way of speaking will partake of both—of imitation and of ordinary narration; but the imitation will be little in proportion to the length of the recital; or am I wrong?

That is just what must be the type of such a speaker.

And so, I continued, the other, who is not like him—the
 397 A poorer creature he is, the readier will he be to imitate everything, and will think nothing beneath him, so that he will set to to imitate everything intentionally and before large audiences; both what we mentioned just now, such as thunder and the noise of wind and hail and of axles and pulleys and trumpets and flutes and panpipes and all sorts of instruments²,
 B and moreover the noises of dogs and cattle and birds; and the whole of his mode of speaking will be by way of imitation with his voice and gestures and contain but a small part of mere narration.

This too is inevitable.

These, then, I said, are the two kinds³ of speaking which I referred to.

They are.

Then the one of these has but slight transitions, and if a suitable inflexion⁴ and rhythm be adapted to his mode of speaking, the result is, with proper utterance, that he employs

¹ 394 C.

² Imitating musical instruments with the human voice.

³ See 396 B and C. Considering 397 B and 401 B "we must not regulate only the poets," we may take these two types or kinds of speaking as ultimately a classification of poets. Some poets observe a proportion in dealing with life, and a reserve in touching its lower aspects; others revel in the latter. Poetry was regarded in Greece much more as something spoken or sung than something written. So the poet and the occasional reciter are hardly kept apart in this passage; though the following sentence seems to explain how the reciter should adapt himself to the poet.

⁴ Understanding the word *Harmonia*, which in a context dealing with music means scale or key, to be here used of the inflexions or transitions of the voice in reading or reciting without music.

just about a uniform mode of speech and simple inflexion—for the transitions are slight—and in a rhythm too of much the same character.

It is absolutely so, he said.

And what of the other's type? Does it not need just the contrary—all inflexions and all rhythms—if it is in turn to be suitably uttered, because it has the most varied forms of transition¹? C

That is precisely the case.

Then do not all poets and narrators either hit upon the one of these types of utterance, or upon the other, or upon one which they compose by mingling the two?

Necessarily so.

What are we to do then? I asked; are we to receive all these into the city², or one of the two unmixed types, or the mixed type? D

If my view conquers, he said, the unmixed imitator of the good.

¹ It does not really matter whether in interpreting this contrast we think mainly of character, language, metre or music. It is Plato's fundamental principle that all these must go together. We might compare it with the contrast between Wordsworth and Byron or with that between Händel and Wagner. From one point of view Plato may be criticised as failing to distinguish the complex from the confused or disorderly—the former having in truth a higher unity than the simple, and only the latter a lower. We might suggest, perhaps, that our modern great men from Shakespeare to Wagner, might very roughly illustrate Plato's "mixed" type—i.e. a type in which great characters are greatly drawn, but all kinds find expression; while the unmixed second type would correspond to a variety entertainment or at best to *opéra bouffe*.

² We have insensibly enlarged the question from that of the training of the young to that of the ethical system of the State. The transition was practically made in 394 E and 395 B and C, where we saw that the true problem is, what the fundamental character of the guardians is to be—and the guardians are, as becomes clearer and clearer in the course of the book, just ourselves conceived as at our best—the measure of the stature of the fulness of manhood. So their life naturally becomes one with the standard of the State.

But in truth, Adeimantus, the mixed type too is pleasant; and by far the most pleasant to children and their attendants¹ and the bulk of the crowd is the opposite² type to that which you select.

Yes, it is the pleasantest.

But perhaps, I said, you would affirm that it is not in harmony with our institutions, because with us there is no double nor multiple man, seeing that each does one thing.

No, it is not in harmony.

Therefore for this reason it is only in a State like ours that you will find a shoemaker a shoemaker, and not a helmsman in addition to his shoemaking³, and the farmer a farmer⁴ and not a judge in addition to his farming, and the soldier a soldier and not a money-maker⁵ in addition to his soldiering, and so with

¹ Nurserymaid's art, as we might say. When we wish to prove Plato to be narrow and perverse, we talk grandly of modern art—Shakespeare and Beethoven. But if we were to take downright views of the facts—say a census of the London theatres, concerts, and music-halls for any one night, noting the quality of the entertainments, we should find Plato's estimate of what people like to be pretty literally true.

² I.e. the unmixed imitation of variety, probably something like a pantomimic entertainment.

³ The Athenian fleet employed large numbers of the poorer citizens as rowers, and no doubt as steersmen. It was their energy and skill that secured the power of Athens, by giving her a nucleus of reliable sailors such as no other Greek state possessed. As the fleet when fully manned would employ 60,000 men, and there were not more than 20,000 adult citizens all told, it is plain they could only be a nucleus. Plato was in violent reaction against much that seems to us really splendid in the vigorous life of the old democracy. The whole system seemed to him to have meant "meddling and muddling" and disaster. We should compare his feeling with that of Ruskin or Carlyle about nineteenth century achievements.

⁴ The poorer Athenian citizens acted as paid jurymen or judges in enormous courts of 500 or more with no presiding judge to control them. The system was supposed to be a democratic abuse, though it did not work altogether ill.

⁵ In allusion to the mercenary soldiery which was a phenomenon of Plato's time. An immortal type of the soldier who is a man of business as

all of them? Thus, as it seems, were there to be a man of such cunning that he was able to make himself into anything 398 A and imitate all objects, if he should come into our city desiring to make an exhibition of himself and his poems, we should prostrate ourselves before him as a sacred being and marvellous and delightful, but we should say to him that there is no such man in our city, nor is it lawful that one should come there; and we should dismiss him to another State, having poured perfumes over his head and garlanded him with wool¹; but we ourselves should employ the severer and less delightful poet², B for the sake of his profitableness; who should imitate for us the mode of speaking of the good man, and tell us what he has to tell within those outlines, which we enacted at the beginning³, when we were taking in hand to educate our guardians.

Certainly, he said, that is what we would do, if it were in our power.

well—the mercenary in all ages—is to be found in Walter Scott's Captain Dugald Dalgetty in the *Legend of Montrose*.

Here again a modern at once objects, "but is a man to have no versatility, and no citizen duties and activities outside his daily trade?" But this is to want to write like Shakespeare before you have learned the alphabet. Plato is fighting to establish the principle—the neglect of which he believed to be ruining his world—that each man is rooted in the commonwealth through some service which he, better than anyone else, can render to it; and it implies to begin with, that, with a loyalty and rationally good will, expressed in one definite duty, he has in principle what his humanity requires. When that law is admitted as a foundation, then whether a man may single-heartedly prove himself capable of a many-branched function, as in fact Plato's guardians do, is a problem of actual capacity.

¹ Fillets, or garlands of wool, which to us do not seem very tempting, were used on sacred occasions by the Greeks because in that hot climate flowers wither almost as soon as plucked.

² After all reservation this remains right for all time in its central meaning. Great art makes a great demand. It is the paradox of art as of life that to get the higher or even the intenser pleasure you must not take up with that which comes easiest to hand.

³ E.g. the "outlines of theology," 379 A ff.

So now, my friend, I said, it seems likely that the part of music which includes stories and fables¹ is completely finished; for we have laid down what is to be said, and how.

I think so too, myself, he answered.

Argument. 398 C—401 A. *Modes and Rhythms express character.*

c After this, then, there remains the subject of the character of song and of tune²?

¹ Note that "fable," Latin *fabula*, Greek *mūthos* (from which "myth" is derived), is the technical word for the "story" or plot of a drama. So that the above discussion has included a reference to the drama, though the point considered has not been the difference between dramatic and other poetry, but the general influence of poetry on the tendency to indiscriminate impersonation. In the beginning of Book X. Homer and the dramatists seem to be treated as of one ethical type, and it is assumed that the present discussion has had the result of banishing them all.

² Greek music is a difficult subject about which important questions are still in controversy. We will set down some simple points which may help to make Plato's suggestions intelligible.

(a) Music was thought of as an accompaniment to words and dancing. Its independent development, which was just beginning, seemed to Plato to be wrong. As a rule, a note went to a syllable, that is, a musical note to a subdivision of the metre. The composer could not stretch out the words as he liked.

(b) Harmony, in the modern sense, was but little used. The Greek word *Harmonia*, below rendered "mode" in compliance with custom, may have meant a "scale," a certain sequence of intervals. If so, the modes differed from each other in the same sort of way as our major scales differ from our minor scales; this is the older view, and according to it there were seven modes, one for each note of the scale. We get them by playing on the white notes of the piano as follows: Hypo-Dorian or Æolian, A to A; Mixo-Lydian, B to B; Lydian, C to C; Phrygian, D to D; Dorian, E to E; Hypo-Lydian, F to F; Hypo-Phrygian or Ionian, G to G. According to another view the difference between the modes was a difference of pitch, a difference, in short, of "Key"; see *The Modes of Ancient Greek Music*, by D. B. Monro, or, for an interesting quotation

Clearly.

Now everyone can see at once what we have to say that they must be like, if we are to harmonise with what we have already said.

So Glaucon smiled and said, Probably then, Socrates, "everyone" does not include me; at least I am not able at the moment to infer adequately what we ought to say. However, I have a suspicion.

At any rate, I answered, presumably you are equal to affirming this, that a melody consists of three parts, words, μ mode, and rhythm¹.

Yes, I can say that much.

Now the part of it which is "the words," I suppose, in no way differs from words which are not being sung, in respect that its matter should be within the outlines which we laid down, and its form be what we prescribed².

from this work, Butcher's *Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art*, p. 130. In any case the different modes were commonly recognised as being definitely suitable for different kinds of poetry and music. E.g. the "Dorian" was "manly," "stately," "forcible," "sombre," and so on.

(c) The music was very simple, and the definiteness of the effect ascribed to it must have been due to its simplicity. Hymn tunes, march music, and dance music—the two latter intimately associated with the movements which accompany them—may give us some notion of the characteristics which Plato has in mind.

(d) Whether or not we can understand in detail the sort of effect and expression which Plato ascribes to the "modes," we may appreciate his ardent conviction that it matters intensely to our life what kind of music, poetry and dancing we accustom ourselves to like, and that in all these utterances we are imitating, i.e. making our own, certain mental tendencies to which others have given shape.

¹ On rhythm see 399 E and notes. The word suggests movement, and dancing is to the Greek the typical case of it. Dancing again is connected with acting, through the peculiarly Greek art of imitative or pantomimic dancing, in which the performer "danced Medea," say, or "Ajax."

² The two elements, (α) the narrative itself, and (β) the form of narration. See 392 C.

True, he said.

And further, the mode and rhythm ought to follow the words¹.

Of course.

But we said that we did not want wailings and lamentations in our narratives.

Certainly not.

E Then which are the mournful modes? Tell me, for you are musical.

Mixo-Lydian, he said, and syntono-Lydian², and some of that type.

Well, then, these, I said, ought to be abolished; for they are useless even to women who are to be good, not to speak of men.

Quite so.

Again, drunkenness is a most unbecoming thing to guardians, and so are softness³ and indolence.

No doubt.

Which of the modes, then, are soft and convivial?

Ionian, he said, and Lydian, which are called the relaxed modes.

Could you make any use of them for military men?

399 A Not at all, he replied; probably the Dorian and Phrygian are what you will have left.

I am not acquainted with the modes⁴, I said, but leave me

¹ The whole work of art, with its different aspects, must be penetrated with the ideas and emotions of the words which express its substance. Of course even Plato does not mean that the music adds nothing. But what it adds, must carry out further the idea which inspires the text.

² Not identical with any of those in the enumeration given above (p. 92), but probably akin to the other Lydian modes. The name of the "mode" has in Greek a peculiar adverbial ending.

³ The opposite of spiritedness in Plato's sense; see 375 and notes; effeminacy.

⁴ Plato's way of indicating that the subject is too technical to be gone into in a general work, and that the principle concerned could be made clear

that mode which will properly imitate the tones¹ and inflexions of a brave man in the act of war or in any inevitable duty, and failing, or going to meet wounds, or death, or having B fallen into any other disaster, and in all this confronting fortune with discipline and endurance; and another mode for one in the acts of peace, acts not compulsory but voluntary, either persuading and entreating someone, whether a god in prayer or a man with instruction and admonition, or again, on the contrary, giving attention to another's prayers or instruction or persuasion; and in the sequel succeeding in his wish and not being presumptuous, but in all these matters behaving temperately and reasonably, and accepting the issue². These two modes, the compulsory and the free, which will best imitate the tones of men faring ill and of men faring well, of men temperate and of men brave, these you must leave me. C

Yes, he said, those which you ask to have left are no others than those I mentioned but now.

Then we shall not want instruments of many strings or of all the modes in our songs and melodies.

I am sure we shall not.

So we shall not maintain artificers of three-cornered lyres and of lutes or of any instruments which have many strings and D can be played in many modes.

Clearly not.

But now shall you admit flute-makers or flute-players into

without further detail. Cf. "we will refer it to Damon" in the discussion of rhythm, 400 C.

* ¹ Note the expression "imitate the tones of," viz. imitate sound by sound. We soon arrive at the idea of sound imitating (uttering or representing) moral qualities (399—400).

² Plato elsewhere (*Laws* VII. 814 E) describes the two desirable forms of dancing, substantially as he here describes the two desirable modes of music—one of war and endurance, the other of peace and happiness. This shews how near the movement of the dance is to his mind when he speaks of music. Cf. "the dancers dancing in tune," i.e. the tunefulness goes through their whole bearing and gesture.

your city? Or is not the flute, if I may say so, the most many-stringed of all¹, and the instruments of many modes themselves are imitations of the flute?

Obviously.

Then you have the lyre left, and the harp, for use in the town, and some kind of panpipe for herdsmen in the fields.

E That, at any rate, is what the argument indicates.

At least, my dear Sir, we are doing nothing extraordinary in preferring Apollo and his instrument before Marsyas and his.

Indeed, I think not.

And, by the dog², I said, without noticing it we are purging again the State which but now we said was luxurious.

The more temperate we, he said.

Come, then, I resumed, and let us finish the purgation. Next after modes we must treat of rhythms³, deciding not to

¹ I.e. capable of producing the greatest variety of notes. The mode of expression is an intentional paradox. There was always a feeling among the Greeks, expressed by the story (see below) of Marsyas the Faun, who contended with Apollo (the flute against the lyre) that the flute represented a barbaric element in music, and the lyre was the instrument for civilised peoples. It seemed a confirmation of this view to the Athenians that flute-playing disfigured the face. Compare the remarks on Gabriel Oaks' appearance in *Far from the Madding Crowd*.

² Elsewhere in Plato "by the dog, the Egyptian god." A humorous variety of the current Greek oath.

³ See note on 398 C. The idea of rhythm is derived from movement, and is usually understood of it. It requires (a) a succession of equal units, (b) a recurring stress or change to bind them together into larger systems. The ticking of a clock, if unvarying, has not the latter; the song of birds, as a rule, has not the former, and neither of these is a really complete rhythm, though we seem to find a simple one in the clock's ticking or in soldiers' marching. In a wider but kindred sense, all perceptible form has some sort of rhythm, or binding of members into systems; e.g. the word can be used of architectural effects, such as the way in which the windows of a house are set in its wall-surface. The proportion of a man's limbs, too, may be called a "rhythm." All speaking has a stress or accent, both of the sentence and of the word, and metre or verse is merely an elaboration of this, taking a beat or short syllable as a unit, and combining them into

aim at elaborate ones nor very varied movements¹, but see what are the rhythms² of an orderly and courageous life: and, having seen these, to compel the foot and the tune to follow 400 A words of such a character, and not the words to follow the foot and tune³. But which these rhythms may be, it is for you to point out, as you did the modes.

By Zeus, he answered, I cannot say. I have indeed seen enough of the subject to affirm that there are some three forms⁴ out of which the metres are built up, as in sounds there are

feet by recurring stresses. In modern verse the stress is given by the loudness with which a syllable is pronounced compared to the others, but in Greek and Latin verse, as a rule, the stress was conveyed by quantity, viz. by the fact or convention that a normal stressed syllable took twice as long to pronounce as a normal unstressed one (as in *Tītȳrē*, a dactyl, the syllable *Tī* is supposed to take as long to read as the two syllables *tȳrē* together). Of course there is "quantity" in modern verse; some syllables take longer to pronounce than others, and this affects the movement of the verse. But we slur over the "quantity" as we please, and determine the rhythm mainly by accent, i.e. by relative loudness. Other recurrent changes mark off the verse, couplet, or stanza.

¹ Lit. "goings," i.e. the characteristic march or system of the metre in each case—the feature in which the versification of

"Achilles' wrath, to Greece the direful spring
Of woes unnumbered, heavenly goddess, sing..."

differs from that of

"Arethusa arose from her couch of snows in the Acroceraunian mountains."

² Here the rhythms begin to symbolise moral qualities directly.

³ Plato does not exactly say with Lewis Carroll, "Take care of the sense and the sounds will take care of themselves," but "begin by taking care of the sense, and then see that the sounds and 'tune' are suitable to it."

⁴ Three kinds of time, identified with our "four time," "three time," and "five time." In ancient metre (see note 3, p. 96) two short syllables were taken as = one long, and one short syllable as the normal unit of time. So four time gave the dactyl (— ~ ~), spondee (— —) or anapaest (~ ~ —), three time the iambus (~ —) or trochee (— ~), and five time the cretic or paonic (~ ~ —).

four¹, out of which all the modes arise, but which of these are imitations of which type of life, I cannot say.

B Well, then, on these points we may take Damon² into our councils, to consider what are the metrical movements appropriate to illiberality and insolence or madness and other viciousness, and what rhythms are to be left for their opposites. For I think I have heard him—but I did not grasp it clearly—speaking of a cretic³ metre which was compound, and a dactyl and heroic foot, too, arranging them somehow so that the up and down were equal⁴, being resolved into long and short; and I fancy he named an iambus, and a trochee⁵ too, and marked
C longs and shorts in them; and in some of them I fancy that he censured and approved the movement of the foot⁶ no less than the metres themselves; or perhaps it was their combined effect: I am not able to say. But all this, as I said, we must refer to Damon; for to make it distinct would need a considerable discussion; do you not think so?

Indeed I do.

But this at least you are able to state distinctly, that right

¹ Perhaps the four notes of the tetrachord; but the meaning is disputed.

² A famous musician, said to have been the teacher of Pericles: he was supposed to communicate philosophical ideas in his musical teaching. Very probably this was a popular misunderstanding, adopted by Plato in jest.

³ Cretic or paeonic — — — five-time, see above, p. 97, note 4. "Compound," because = a trochee — —, plus a long syllable.

⁴ "Equal kind," or in our terms "four time"; the dactyl — — — and anapaest — — — having the "up" or unstressed part (—) named *arsis* from the foot being raised, equal in duration to the "down" or stressed part named *thesis* from the foot being down (—). Modern writers reverse the use of *arsis* and *thesis*, making them mean the "raising" and "lowering" of the *voice*.

⁵ — — and — —; three time.

⁶ Possibly a phrase taken from dancing. Here it seems to mean the actual *tempo* of performance—the time occupied by the unit beat.

bearing and wrong bearing attend upon right rhythm and wrong rhythm?

Of course.

But right and wrong rhythm attend upon and retain the likeness of the right form of utterance and its opposite, and right and wrong mode, in the same way; if, as we just now laid it down, the rhythm and the mode follow after the words, and not the words after them.

Surely, all this must be made to follow the words.

And what of the form of narrative¹ and the narrative itself? does it not follow the character² of the mind?

Of course.

And all else follows the form?

Yes.

Then reasonableness, harmoniousness, gracefulness, and good proportion³, attend upon a good character, not the foolishness which we call by the pet name of "goodnature," but the mind which has in real truth its character rightly and beautifully constituted.

Unquestionably.

Must not these qualities be pursued by our young men in every way⁴ if they are to do their duty⁵?

¹ See 392 c.

² *Ēthos* = "disposition," a different word from *ēthos*, "custom." It is the word from which we, through the Greeks, get the terms "ethics" and "ethical." We are very near its true and original meaning when we speak of the *ēthos* of a school or college or even of a nation—the habitual, and so characteristic, temper or disposition. It is used of an individual in just the same sense.

³ These attributes are here given a more general meaning, but their names refer back to the discussion just ended, "right speech," "right mode," "right gesture," "right rhythm."

⁴ Preparing the way for pointing out the above attributes of "music" in the whole sphere of plastic art.

⁵ See back 370 A and B and 395 B, and forward especially 433 A and note; cf. also 443 C and following. It is important for the rendering of this phrase, the key-phrase of the earlier portion of the *Republic*, that the

Undoubtedly they must.

401 A And painting, surely, and all similar craftsmanship, is full of them; and so too are weaving and embroidery and house-building, and besides, all manufacture of the objects of use; and moreover the growth of all living bodies and of all organic beings; for in all of these there is rightness and wrongness of form¹. And wrongness of form and bad proportion² and inharmoniousness are akin to bad thinking³ and bad character, while their opposites are akin to the opposite, a temperate and noble character, and are imitations⁴ of it.

Thoroughly so, he said.

Argument. 401 B—403 C. *Extension of the principles of "music" first to plastic art and then to life and conduct*⁵.

B Are we then to regulate the poets only, compelling them

difference between Greek and English idiom forces us to supply a substantive where the Greek has merely a neuter article. "To do their own," "Das ihrige zu thun," is all that Plato says. The principle is often thought by moderns to be something merely negative, like "minding one's own business." But we should get nearer the meaning if we brought in some such comparison as taking a part in a piece of music, for which a positive capacity and a complete training of it are required. What the training aims at is just being explained to us—a perfect and accurate but free and reasonable serviceableness—free, because the outer act is to be the very image of the thought.

¹ Or "gracefulness and its absence."

² Lit. "un-rhythmicalness."

³ Also = "bad speech" or "narration," in reference to the discussion of literature.

⁴ "Utterance," "expressions," "representations," "symbols," would be other ways of rendering the word "imitation."

⁵ This passage, taken in connection with the above, is perhaps the high-water mark of Plato's theory of fine art, and contains, as Nettleship observes, the pith of what is to be said on the subject. The best means of grasping the full bearing of the ideas involved would be found in a study of the life and works of the late Mr William Morris and of Mr Ruskin. Ruskin's chapter

to create in their poems the image of the noble character, on pain of not making poetry among us, or shall we also regulate the other craftsmen and put a stop to their embodying the character which is ill-disposed and intemperate and illiberal and improper¹, either in their pictures or in their buildings or in any other productions of craftsmanship, on pain of being debarred from working among us, if they cannot obey; that our guardians may not, from being nurtured among images of badness, as though in a poisonous pasture, gathering in the course of every day, little by little, many things to feed upon from many surroundings, collect before they know it a single huge evil within their soul? Shall we not rather seek out those craftsmen who are able, by a happy gift, to follow in its footsteps the nature of the graceful and beautiful; that as if living in a healthy region the young men may be the better for it all², from whichever of the beautiful works a something may strike upon their seeing or their hearing, like a breeze bearing health from wholesome places; bringing them unconsciously from early childhood both to likeness³ and to friendship or harmony with the law of beauty?

Yes, he said, this would be by far the best nurture for them.

Then, Glaucon, I said, is not this the reason why music⁴ is the most sovereign nurture, because nothing else sinks into the mind like rhythm and tune⁵, nor seizes it so forcibly as they, *Ar*

on "The Place of the Workman in Gothic Architecture" (*Stones of Venice*), and Mr Morris's lecture *On the History of Pattern Designing* (Joint Lectures on Art, 1882) contain the gist of the matter.

¹ More literally "formless" or "ill-formed."

² There is a distinct point in the comparison, viz. the feeling we have when we go, say, to the sea or to the mountains, that everything round us is delightful and does us good.

³ Likeness and friendship, closely akin for Plato. See 385 c and note.

⁴ Music including, as we have seen, every appeal to sense-perception in which beauty and ugliness can be discriminated.

⁵ To be understood in a larger sense corresponding to the larger sense

carrying gracefulness along with them and making the man graceful if he be rightly nurtured, and if not, the contrary? And because, once more, he who has been rightly nurtured therein will be keenest to perceive shortcomings—what is not beautifully wrought or not beautifully grown—and having a just repugnance for them will approve all that is beautiful, and enjoying it and absorbing it into his soul will grow up in the strength of it and become a good and noble man; whereas all that is ugly he will censure and loathe in his very youth, before he is able to apprehend a principle; but when the principle comes before him, he who is thus nurtured, above all others, will welcome it with the recognition due to that which is his own?

I certainly think, he said, that these are the reasons for which "music" is the right nurture¹.

Then, I said, it is just like this; we had finished learning our letters when we were able to recognise the letters of the alphabet, though their number is so small, in everything in

of "music." A picture or a house, or one's temper or manners, can be "out of tune."

¹ Cf. Aristotle's sentence which summarises the whole view of moral education, shared by him with Plato. "Wherefore they (persons who are to grasp the principle of morality) must have been trained from their youth up to be pleased and to be pained by what they ought." It is the deliberate view of the Greek thinkers that the young must be trained through the formation of their likings and dislikings by "suggestion" or "imitation" on a principle which they do not know, but which exists in society or in the teacher's mind. It is thus that they acquire a practical instinct or feeling which in all acts and incidents of life is attracted by the right and shocked by the wrong. On the basis of this moral experience they can apprehend an ethical principle when they come to years of discretion, and see their "acquired" instincts justified by a comprehensive purpose. Without such a training they would have nothing to go upon—no real hold of what is and what is not workable in life. We may think, in this connection, of the feeling which selfish and vulgar habits produce in anyone who has had a good home-training, when he first meets with them; a feeling that he simply could not live in that way.

which they are exhibited, and we never neglected them, as if B they need not be noticed, either on a small field or on a large, but we were eager¹ to discern them in every quarter, considering that we should never be scholars till we had that readiness.

True.

And so again, we shall not recognise the reflections² of letters, if they are to be seen anywhere in mirrors or in pools of water, until we have learned the letters themselves, but they belong to the same science or study?

Certainly.

Well then, to come to my point, in the same way again we shall not be "musical"³, neither ourselves nor the guardians⁴, whom we say that we have to educate, until we recognise the forms of temperance and courage and liberality⁵, and all akin to them, and again their opposites, everywhere that they are exhibited, and notice their presence where they are present, both themselves and their images, and neglect them neither on a small

¹ The identification of will or liking with intelligence in this place is an anticipation on a small scale of what Plato maintains throughout.

² Images or likenesses. This passage points back to the simile of the large and small letters 368 D and forward to the whole discussion of degrees of knowledge in Bk VII. and of imagination in Bk X. Plato is fond of the metaphor of shadows and reflections to illustrate a twofold thought: (a) That the highest truths have lower symbols and analogies by help of which ignorant people (i.e. pretty much mankind as they are) get a glimpse of them. (b) That these symbols or analogies, well enough if taken to be mere glimpses of truth, are no better than the shadow compared with the substance if we try to rely on them as really true. Apparently people used to look at eclipses in the reflection in water, as we look at them through smoked glass, and this gave him the idea of an image which tells you some of the truth, but only by weakening it. "Through" or "in a glass darkly." Fine art is for him a system of such symbols.

³ Just as in the case compared we were said not to be "scholars."

⁴ The guardians are obviously becoming ourselves—what we should like to be.

⁵ The character of the true freeman.

field nor on a large, but believe them to belong to the same art and study¹?

It is necessarily so, he said.

- D So then, I said, the most beautiful sight for him who has eyes to see is one who unites the presence of a beautiful character in his soul and qualities² in his form accordant and harmonious therewith, partaking of the same pattern³?

By far.

And the most beautiful is the most lovable.

Of course.

Then the persons most nearly like this will be those whom a cultivated⁴ man could love? but he could not love one whose nature is discordant.

No, he answered, not if the defect lay in his soul; but if it were something bodily he might put up with it so far as to be fond of him.

Does our discussion of music appear to you, as to me, to be now complete? for it has ended where it ought to end;

¹ This passage, modelled on the illustration of learning the alphabet, is a description of "musical" education as learning the alphabet of the moral world, or learning to read in the moral world. Where, for example, did we get our first recognition of courage, and what was it like? Perhaps from Richard Cœur-de-lion or Horatius Cocles; these would be "images," artistic likenesses of it, suggesting a quality rather remote from the uses of our life; then we should learn to read it or its opposite in some behaviour of our family and ourselves, and so come to form a certain rough recognition of it in daily life, probably *very* imperfect indeed. But such as it is, a very great deal depends upon it—what we admire and what we imitate under the name of courage, whether gentleness and resolution, or roughness and swagger; whether we know real courage when we see it, or not.

² "Qualities" supplied to meet the English idiom. Note that Plato does *not* say "a beautiful soul in a beautiful body," but "a beautiful soul with a body which expresses its beauty," which explains the true subordination much more precisely.

³ Type or mould; the word e.g. for the canons or outlines of theology, 379 A.

⁴ Lit. "musical."

since surely the end of music ought to be the love of the beautiful¹.

Argument. 403 D—412 B. *Training of the body, and relation of this training to mental qualities*².

After music the young men are to be trained in gymnastic?

Of course.

Then in this too they ought to be carefully trained from early childhood³ throughout life. And as I suppose, the 403 D matter stands thus; but you must help me to consider it. I do not think that the body, however good as a body⁴, can by any

¹ "The beautiful" being, as we have seen, the expression of law or character (character=a law manifested in our individual mind) in art, nature, actual life, and social intercourse. The last paragraph seems to indicate, what is often true in our day, that a lad's education may find its climax in devotion to some friend whom he thinks perfection. Cf. "and to have loved her was a liberal education." The young man, we may say, at this stage has by no means a complete science or experience of life, but has a real devotion to what is great and good, and a highly trained instinct for distinguishing genuine qualities from false pretences. Schiller's *Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Humanity* are a very good modern elucidation of Plato's view.

² We have here a very important discussion on the relation between "body" and "mind." The central point of it may be contrasted with the saying common to-day, "body has its rights as well as mind." What this means is probably in a great degree true, as a reaction against useless asceticism; but the expression is incorrect in suggesting a double standard, as if bodily excellence were one separate thing, and mental another—as if you could first get the one right, and then go on to set the other in order. The result of such a view, as Plato shows, is to cut life in two and work without comprehensive aim, so that attention to the body will oscillate between brutal athleticism and nervous valetudinarianism, while preoccupation with culture will become mere effeminacy.

³ And therefore partly while the musical training is going on.

⁴ We hear to-day of *mens sana in corpore sano*, and are told, quite truly, that health is a great step to sanity and goodness. Is Plato saying the

excellence of its own make a good mind, but on the contrary I think that a good mind by its own excellence brings the body into the best state possible ; what do you think ?

I agree, he answered.

So if we adequately prepare the intelligence and then hand over to it the detailed care of the body, we merely laying down the outlines of the course to be followed, not to make a long story of it, we should be doing right ?

Undoubtedly.

Well, we said that they were to abstain from drinking¹; for a guardian, surely, is the last person who shall be allowed to be drunk, and not know where in the world he is.

Yes, he said, it is ridiculous for a guardian to need a guardian.

And what about food ? For the men are champions in the greatest of contests², are they not ?

Yes.

contrary of this ? Not if we see what he means. He means that we cannot state what we understand by bodily health, and consequently cannot secure it, without using standards and purposes dictated by mind. We sometimes speak, e.g. of a man as in perfect "animal" health, as if our standard was animal life taken apart. But the comparison will not work. If a man's health were really that of an animal he would be quite useless for the purposes of human life. He would always be asleep or just have over-eaten himself, when he was wanted to do anything. Sporting dogs and horses would be useless unless man's supervision regulated their food and exercise. Their relation to their master is a good example of the relation of mere body to mind. Health, for a man, is to be able to do and enjoy what a man has to do and enjoy, and his body must be disciplined and habituated, to make this possible, in view of the aims and activities which determine it. See for Plato's result 410 c.

¹ Note the wide meaning assigned to Gymnastic from the beginning. They are to be sober in view of their duty, not because drink is bad for men in training ; and this is the first rule of their "Gymnastic." Plato's thought is not far off the track of St Paul's.

² "Soldiers of the idea" or "Knights of the Holy Spirit" would express the underlying meaning.

Then would the habit of the men in training¹ whom we 404 A know be suitable to them?

Perhaps.

But, I said, this is a sleepy sort of habit, and the health is easily upset in it; or do you not see that these athletes sleep through their life and have serious and severe illnesses on the slightest departure from their established diet?

I do.

Then, I continued, we need a finer sort of training for our military² champions, since they have to be as wakeful as dogs, and to see and hear with the greatest acuteness, and, as on their campaigns they undergo all sorts of changes of drinking B water and food and summer heat and winter cold, not to be easily upset in health³.

So I think.

Then would not the best gymnastic be one akin to the music which we described just now?

How do you mean?

A simple and reasonable gymnastic; that preparatory for war would be the most so.

In what way?

Why, I answered, Homer⁴ is enough to teach us that. For

¹ Here occurs in its natural sense the word *askētai*, "practisers" or men in training, from which the fateful term "ascetic" is derived.

² War is their duty in defence of the city. It is also, as this sentence points out, a simple but effective type of subordination of the body to a general purpose of life, as opposed to the mere cultivation of muscular development or of some single feat of strength or skill. Sparta was com- V mended by Aristotle in that she trained her men suitably for war, but censured in that she trained them for no higher purpose. Plato means to profit by Sparta's example but not to stop there.

³ "We have no lack of the sleepy and brutalised athlete who probably could not serve on a campaign or a geographical expedition."

Nettleship in *Hellenica*.

⁴ Plato enjoys caricaturing the current use of Homer as a master of wisdom, necessitating of course the wildest interpretation of him.

you are aware that on the campaign, at the heroes' banquets,
 C he neither gives them fish for dinner, though they were on the
 seashore of the Hellespont, nor boiled meat, but only roast,
 which would be easiest for soldiers to procure; for everywhere,
 we may say, it is more convenient to use the fire itself than to
 carry pots and pans about.

Very much so.

Moreover, as I think, Homer never makes mention of sweet
 sauces; or even our everyday men in training know this, that
 to have one's body in good condition one must abstain from
 everything of that kind.

D Yes, he said, they are quite rightly convinced of it, and they
 do abstain.

And, my dear Sir, you seem likely not to approve of Syra-
 cusan courses and Sicilian multiplicity¹ of savouries if our views
 seem to you to be correct.

I am sure I do not.

Then you would disapprove of men having intimacy with
 grisettes from Corinth, if they are to be really sound in body.

Absolutely.

And the luxuries, as they are thought, of Athenian confec-
 tionery?

Necessarily we reject them.

For I suppose we should be right in likening such diet and
 E life as theirs to melody and song composed in all modes and
 in all rhythms.

No doubt.

¹ "Multiple" and "multiplicity." The Greek adjective *poikilos*, or
 substantive *poikilia*, seems to express the very essence of all that Plato
 censured in the civilisation of his day. They seem to mean, to begin with,
 any surface that shows varied lights or colours—a "dappled" stag, a
 painted or inlaid surface, or the arts of painting, inlaying and embroidery.
 Then they are used of the new music and new poetry, the new cookery,
 the new politics, always to indicate what Plato thinks an evil; something
bunt, as the Germans say, variegated, a sea of sensations without form or
 law.

Then as in that case multiplicity engendered intemperance, so in this it generates disease, while simplicity of music creates temperance in souls, and of gymnastic healthfulness in bodies.

Most true.

405 A

And when intemperance and diseases abound in the State, are there not opened many courts of law and doctors' consulting rooms, and the legal and medical professions put on an air of importance, because even free men¹ run after them in crowds and earnestly?

Of course they will, he said.

Argument. 405 A—408 C. *A subdivision of the discussion of Gymnastic or the relation of body to mind, dealing with Valetudinarianism as the complementary case to Athleticism in the vulgar sense. You may either make body an end, apart from mind, as mere muscular development or capacity for some one feat, or again as life in contrast to the uses of life. In either case the simple error is that you break up the unity of life, and take gymnastic as an end in itself instead of an element in the discipline which makes a man, i.e., in Plato's sense, take Body as an end apart from Mind.*

Now could you have a greater proof of the badness and ugliness of education in the State than the need of first-rate doctors and judges, not merely among the inferior people and the handworkers, but among those who pretend to have been nurtured after the fashion of freemen? Or do you not think it a shameful thing, and a great proof of uneducatedness, to be obliged to get our justice as an import from other persons, as masters and judges over us, and to have none of our own?

¹ A bitter satire, see following sentences. Even admitting that some poor unlucky servant might have to get honesty or health from a magistrate or doctor, you would have thought that a gentleman ought to possess them of his own. Again an anticipation of St Paul. Cf. 1 Corinthians vi. 1.

The most shameful of all things, he replied.

Do you think, I continued, that it is more shameful than this, that a man should not merely spend the greater part of his life in law courts as defendant and prosecutor, but even, by inexperience of what is noble, should be led to glory in this very thing, that is to say, in being a master of wrong-doing, competent in every twist and turn, able to find a way through every exit, wriggling out of reach to avoid submitting to justice, and all this for gains of little or no value, being ignorant how much nobler and better it is to arrange a life for himself that will have no need of a sleepy judge¹?

No, he answered, this is more shameful than the other.

But to need the doctor's art, I said, not merely for wounds or from being attacked by epidemic diseases, but from being filled with gales and currents like so many lakes, owing to idleness and the sort of diet we described, forcing the polite Asclepiadae² to baptise our ailments with names like flatulence and catarrh—do you not think it a shame?

Why really those are novel and ridiculous names for diseases.

Such as, I imagine, did not exist in Asclepius' day; and I infer³ it, because his very sons, when at Troy the nurse gave the wounded Eurypylus Pramneian wine with flour scattered into it and cheese grated over it, which one would think inflam-

¹ It is to be remembered that the love of litigation was one of the chief vices charged against the Athenian democracy by hostile critics. In the great time of Athenian supremacy the citizens of Athens had formed to a great extent the supreme court of justice for a large number of dependent states. Neither the motives nor the results of this system were altogether bad, but it gave a handle to hostile criticism.

² Descendants of Asclepius (Aesculapius) = "doctors."

³ Compare 404 B and C for this parody of the current way of appealing to Homer. While humourously illustrating the point of the present passage, Plato is suggesting, in his double-edged way, how absolutely unfit Homer is to give rules to a civilised society. He quotes from memory; it is Machaon, not Eurypylus, who is thus treated. *Il.* 11. 624.

matory, found no fault with her, and passed no censure on Patroklus who was in charge of the treatment.

Most certainly, he replied, it was a strange drink for a man in that condition.

Not, I said, if you reflect that up to that time the Asclepiadae made no use of our modern medical art, the nurse of diseases; not, as the story goes, till Herodicus lived; and Herodicus, who was a trainer¹ and became an invalid, mixed up gymnastic with the medical art, till he tormented first himself, and subsequently many others.

In what way?

By lengthening out his death, I replied. For attending upon his disease, which was a mortal one, while he was unable, I take it, to cure himself, yet he lived his whole life long undergoing treatment, with no leisure for anything, in misery if he departed a jot from his accustomed rule of life; and in one long death-struggle, so great was his cunning, he arrived at old age².

Then that was a fine reward which he won by his art.

And one likely to come, I said, to him who did not know that from no ignorance³ or inexperience did Asclepius refuse to c

¹ A trainer of boys and young men in athletics; such men formed a regular profession at Athens, and the attendance on them was a part of education.

² Jowett regrets that in the whole of this passage Plato seems to disparage attention to diet, which is one of the most effective means by which the soul can govern and aid the body. But we must bear in mind that Plato is asserting a fundamental truth as to man's whole aim and reason in existing, as the splendid sentences prove, which immediately follow. There is plenty of room for urging a reasonable carefulness and self-restraint in matters of diet, in the whole idea of "Gymnastic" as subordinate to the aim of life, which this very passage insists on.

³ This sentence, passing from sheer fun in the imagination of Asclepius' hidden wisdom, as shown by his leaving the Homeric doctor to approve of a wine-posset for a wounded man, to a white-hot passion and irony in the censure of our social blindness, is in Plato's most characteristic vein. We

reveal this type of medicine to his descendants, but because he knew that in all law-abiding commonwealths there is a certain work assigned to every man in the State which it is necessary for him to pursue, and none has leisure to be sick and under treatment his whole life long; which we, absurdly, perceive in the case of the working class; but do not perceive in the case of the rich and those who pass for prosperous.

How? he asked.

- D A carpenter, I answered, when he is ill, desires the doctor to give him a drug to drink that he may throw up the evil¹, or to rid him of it by a downward purge or by cautery or the knife. But if any man orders him a prolonged cure², putting felt packing round his head and so forth, he soon says that he has no leisure to be ill, and it is no gain to him to live in that way, giving his attention to his disease and neglecting the industry before him; and after that, saying farewell to such a physician, he returns to his customary mode of living, regains his health, and lives in discharge of his duty³; or, if his body is not strong enough to go through with it, he dies and is rid of his troubles.

Yes, and for a man in that position it is admitted that this is the right dealing with medicine.

- 407 A Is that, I asked, because he had a work to do, which if he did not discharge, he found life not worth living?

Plainly so.

But the wealthy man, as we affirm, has no such work set before him, from which if he is compelled to abstain he does not care to live.

shall often find it a good hint to interpret Plato as we should interpret Mr Ruskin.

¹ Lit. "the disease," thought of as a material thing. Of course there often may be a definite poison or growth in which the disease is embodied. Cf. 407 D, "some definite" or "isolable" disease.

² Lit. "diet," way of life.

³ Lit. "doing his own." See note above.

Certainly he is not said to have one.

No, for you do not attend to Phocylides, how he says that when one has got enough to live on, one should practise excellence¹.

And, I should think, before that.

Do not let us quarrel with him on that point, I said; but let us make it clear to ourselves whether the rich man has this² to practise, and apart from it, his life is not worth living, or whether valetudinarianism, though an obstacle in the way of attending to carpenter's work and the rest of the crafts, is yet no hindrance to what Phocylides exhorts³.

Yes, indeed, was the reply, there is perhaps no greater hindrance than this supererogatory care of the body, which goes beyond "Gymnastic"⁴; it is inconvenient both for the duties of estate management, for military service, and for sedentary offices⁵ in the city.

¹ The word might often be rendered virtue. But we must note that it has not the narrowness of our terms virtue or morality. See just below, the sentence beginning "it is inconvenient" for some recognised spheres of "excellence."

² Viz. excellence or virtue.

³ We should say, "Why no. You can be good on a sick bed; many of our types of religious and virtuous living are taken from such sufferers." But this does not meet Plato's point. (a) It is a great sin to be on a sick-bed if you could be anywhere else. (b) Much of our sick-bed virtue would seem a sentimental thing to a Greek, just as his notion of heroism seems narrow to us. Excellence, for Plato, means doing something well.

⁴ Gymnastic is taken to include all such diet and training as is *bona fide* necessary for physical serviceableness. See above on Jowett's criticism, note 2, p. 111.

⁵ Three ways of life in which "excellence" was open to a well-to-do citizen; the duties of household and estate management (lit. "economy"), of defending the commonwealth, and of justice and administration. As to the duty of military service, we should bear in mind that an Athenian's share in war did not consist in reading exciting telegrams at the breakfast table. Self-defence was a serious, constant and essential part of the business of every State, and military service was a duty which might fall any day on any man physically able to discharge it. Socrates was holder of what we

And the most serious thing of all is that it is constantly throwing difficulties in the way of study in any shape, and on any consideration or meditation with oneself, perpetually suspecting headaches and fits of giddiness, and imputing them to be produced by the pursuit of knowledge¹, so as to present obstacles at every point where excellence is practised and tested in that direction²; for it makes you continually think yourself ill, and never cease from being in pangs about your body.

It is likely, he said.

Then must we not say that Asclepius knew all this as well as we, and that he, thinking of those who by nature and conduct are healthy in body, but are suffering from some specific ailment, for them, and for their condition, revealed the medical art, and expelling their ailments by drugs and by the knife enjoined upon them their customary way of living, that he might not interfere with their citizen duties; whilst, on the other hand, in the case of bodies which are penetrated through and through with disease, he did not attempt by rules of diet, drawing off and adding in minute quantities³, to make such a man's life a long and wretched one, and to let him beget, as is probable,

should call the Victoria Cross, for gallantry in rescuing a comrade in action.

¹ Lit. "by philosophy."

² The pursuit of knowledge or wisdom, the life of the scholar, man of science, or any student with the true spirit of study, is another form in which excellence or virtue may be practised; it is higher than the civic excellences above mentioned, the hindrances to it being reckoned "the most serious," but does not of course exclude them. It is a large and interesting question what the great Greek thinkers really took to be the relation of study and science to life. We should be very careful to understand what they actually say, and not to run off with superficial notions, mostly borrowed from later ages, when the unity of life had been lost.

³ The metaphor is apparently that of keeping a fluid at a certain level by adding and drawing off; an image of the delicate balance to be maintained in a body always tending to go wrong.

offspring no better than himself¹; but he thought it wrong, we must say, to give medical treatment to any one who is unable to live in the common course of life, deeming him E an unprofitable person both to himself and to the State²?

Asclepius was a statesman by your account.

Obviously, I said; and do not you see how, because he was so, his sons not only proved good warriors at Troy, but adopted the treatment which I describe? Or do you not 408 A remember how in Menelaus' case, after his wound when Pandarus shot him, "they squeezed out the blood³, and spread soothing unguents upon the wound," but what he was to drink or eat after that they no more prescribed to him than to Eurypylus? for they held that their remedies were sufficient to cure men who previous to their wounds were of healthy and orderly life, even if at the moment they chanced to drink B a wine-posset; while as to people who were sickly by nature and intemperate, they thought it unprofitable both for themselves and for everyone else that they should go on living, and held that their art ought not to be for the benefit of these, nor ought they to have medical treatment even if they were richer than Midas.

You describe the sons of Asclepius as very clever people.

So I ought, I answered him. And yet the tragic poets and Pindar, flatly contradicting us, say both that Asclepius was the son of Apollo, and that he was persuaded by gold to restore C

¹ This anticipates the question, at the present moment a very urgent one, of the seclusion of certain classes of afflicted persons, and of the duty on the part of others to abstain from marriage.

² The ideas of abstinence and seclusion have now replaced the idea of extirpation, at which Plato hints here and in 410 A. Though we are ready to undertake the care and maintenance of the weaklings themselves, the central problem of hindering them from becoming a source of social degeneration is for us far more arduous than for Plato's age, just because of this greater scrupulosity.

³ I.e. drew the lips of the wound together (Campbell), *Iliad* IV. 218. A slight variation shows that Plato is again quoting from memory.

wealthy man who was already dead, for which reason, indeed, they say he was struck by a thunder-bolt. But we, in accordance with what we said before¹, do not believe both their stories, but, we shall affirm, if he was the son of a god, he was not meanly covetous, and if he was meanly covetous he was not the son of a god.

Quite right, he said, so far.

Argument. 408 C—410 A. *Comparison and co-operation of physical and moral therapeutic. In what sense the experience of evil is a factor in the knowledge of good.*

But what do you say about this, Socrates? Ought we not to have good physicians in the city? And they would be more especially such as have handled the greatest number of healthy persons and the greatest number of diseased; and in the same way the best judges would be those who had held intercourse with all kinds of natures.

Most certainly, I said, I recognise good physicians; but do you know whom I think to be such?

I shall know if you tell me.

Well, I will try, I said; but you have asked about two different subjects in the same sentence.

In what way?

We should get the most skilful physicians², I said, if from their youngest days, besides learning their art, they were to come in contact with the greatest number of most defective bodies, and were themselves to suffer from all ailments, and to

¹ See 391 D.

² In pressing the distinction he has in mind, Socrates seems, as Campbell observes, to decline answering Glaucon's point, which is that in the healthy state the physician will not find the required experience. The difficulty is a real one, and is met to-day by the collection and selection of cases which is the essence of the hospital system. In this way we so to speak make the most of the illness which we have.

be by nature not entirely healthy¹. For, I imagine, they do not treat the body with the body²; if they did, it would never have been allowable for their bodies to be or to become defective; but they treat the body with their mind, for which it is not possible, if it has become or is defective, to treat anything well.

True, he said.

But the judge, my friend, rules over mind³ with mind, for ⁴⁰⁹ A which it is not allowable to have been nurtured among evil minds from its earliest days, and to have been associated with them, and to have experienced all wrong-doings by having itself committed them, so as acutely to infer the crimes of others from itself, like diseases in case of the body; but it ought to have passed its youth apart from experience or contact of evil character, if it is to be good and noble, and to judge soundly in matters of right. Wherefore it is true that in their young days

¹ Jowett observes that there is something in the idea that a physician may be aided by some experience of sickness; may gain in sympathy, for instance.

² This distinction between bodily and mental contact, and the apparent admission that a man may be defective in body without being so in mind, may seem to run counter to Plato's main thesis in the relation of Gymnastic to Music, viz. that there is no such thing as bodily health or training apart from mental health or training. The fact is, Plato's view has two sides, which it is hard but necessary to hold together: (a) that body, health, strength, and the like, are factors in mind, having their value in the purpose and efficiency of life, e.g. 406—7; (b) that they are only factors, and that mind, i.e. the whole purpose and order of intelligent living, can do a great deal for and with even an imperfect bodily system. Cf. 403 D, and on bridle of Theages 496 B. And note that even 406—7 it is not so much your being sickly as your giving your whole mind to nothing else, that is the mischief. The extraordinary achievements of many people who have bad health seem partly due to the fact that in self-defence they cling to objects which take them out of their sickly selves; a confirmation, in substance, of Plato's view.

³ Hence, if contact with evil were of use to him, it would be contact of the mind with evil, which is *prima facie* unallowable.

B good men appear innocent and easily deceived by the wicked, as not possessing in themselves patterns of like affections with the bad.

Yes, he said, this is very apt indeed to befall them.

Therefore, I said, a good judge should not be young but old, having come late to the study of the nature of iniquity; not observing it as his own and seated in his own soul, but having practised through long years to discern its evil nature, outside him and in other souls, by the instrumentality of knowledge¹ and not of his own experience.

C Certainly such a judge is of the finest type.

Yes, and good too, to answer your question²; for he who has a good mind is good. But your clever and suspicious fellow, who has himself done many wrongs, and fancies himself so thorough and so knowing, appears clever in his precautions when among his likes, judging everything by the patterns he has in himself; but when he comes in contact with good men and men no longer young, then again he makes a poor appearance, being distrustful out of season, and not understanding a healthy character, because he possesses no pattern of the kind; but as he meets bad people oftener than good he seems to himself and others a wise man rather than a fool.

That is absolutely true.

Then it is not in a man like this that we must look for the good and wise judge, but in the former. For badness can never know both excellence and itself; but excellence, in a nature educated by time, will acquire knowledge of itself and

¹ Cf. 366 c.

² See 408 c. "Good" here, good both as a judge and as a man. The question then is practically, must not good judges have experience of bad men? Plato answers the point which he considers to underlie it, by saying, "The good judge must be a good man; i.e. it is *not* necessary that he should take badness into his own soul." He explains his answer further 409 D below.

of badness alike¹. So, as seems to me, it is this man, and not the villain, who learns to be wise.

I agree, he said.

Then will you not establish by law in your State such a medical art² as we referred to³, in conjunction with a similar judicial art², which together shall give treatment to those of 410 A your citizens who are well-natured in body and soul; but those who are not, if their defect be bodily, they shall permit to die, while those who are evil-natured and incurable in soul they shall themselves put to death⁴?

This has certainly been shown to be the best course both for the patients themselves and for the State.

¹ The idea here stated is one of great importance. It implies that badness is a narrowness in human nature, while goodness is its completeness. If you are really good, so to speak, you are all that a bad man is and something more. This is the radical answer to the difficulty which Plato has in mind all through this passage, and which we know in many forms, "Can one understand life and human nature, without being bad oneself?"

² The word "Art" is inserted by the translator to suit the English idiom. The words in the Greek, "medical" and "judicial," are, according to Greek usage, simply feminine adjectives, such as those from which our words logic, music, gymnastic, are derived. Mathematics, Ethics and Politics have a similar derivation, and I do not know why we have made plurals of them. The point is that the Greek does not decide whether the substantive is to be "art," "science" or "method," all of which could be joined with such adjectives, and probably the adjectives had come to be thought of as independent terms, in fact as substantives.

³ E.g. 407 D.

⁴ Note in this passage: (a) the suggestion of a co-operation between medical and judicial practice in the preservation of the physical and moral health of the community—a suggestion anticipating immense departments of administration and legislation, and whole provinces of social opinion at the present day; cf. notes on 407; and (b) the implication of a therapeutic and corrective theory of punishment, raising large problems which cannot be treated here. See too 380 B.

Argument. 410 B—412 B. *Final explanation of the aim of gymnastic and—almost—its inclusion in music.*

Then it is clear that our young men will take good care not to come in need of the judicial art, using that simple music which we affirmed to generate temperance¹.

No doubt, he said.

- B Then will not this same be the² track on which the man trained in music will pursue gymnastic and attain it if he chooses, so as not to need the medical art³, except on some special compulsion?

Indeed I think so.

His actual gymnastic exercises and tasks he will work at rather with a view to the spirited element of his nature, and as means of awakening it, than for bodily strength; not as ordinary competitors regulate their food and their tasks for the sake of muscular power.

Quite right.

- C Then those who institute an education in music and gymnastic do not institute it for the reason which some suppose, that they might treat the body by the one⁴, and the soul by the other?

How then?

It is probable that they institute both of them principally for the sake of the soul⁵.

¹ 404 E.

² Viz. that indicated by the "simple" music.

³ As the man *qua* trained in music did not need the judicial art.

⁴ See 403 D and note.

⁵ This is the climax of the idea suggested in 403 D. Body is subordinate to mind as an instrument to be moulded for its purposes; and further, bodily training actually is a part of moral and intellectual training, through the elements of character and intelligence which are concerned in all athletic activity, which is bodily activity *par excellence*. It is not easy to say exactly what we mean by bodily in this sense of "athletic"; reading and writing, for instance, are activities in which we use our bodies, but are not, as ordinarily

How do you mean?

Do you not notice, I said, what disposition grows up in the very mind of men who spend their whole life in gymnastic¹, and never touch music? or in those who are of the contrary temper?

Disposition in respect of what? he asked.

D

In respect of fierceness and hardness, and their contraries, softness and gentleness, I said.

I notice, he replied, that those who have devoted themselves to unmixed gymnastic² turn out fiercer than is right, and those who have done so with music become softer than is proper for them.

pursued, athletic. We mean exercise that makes serious calls on the body, needing both strength and skill; and it is all the better if it demands endurance, courage, and the spirit of co-operation. We are sometimes told that all fine art is athletic, i.e. a difficult bodily achievement, and indeed the principle of Plato's gymnastic would cover the theory of manual training and the educational value of handicrafts (James, *Talks to Teachers*, 147), though he has not so applied it. Here Music and Gymnastic obviously would have a meeting-point.

¹ Remark the wide meaning of Gymnastic, including war and field sport as well as the training for the great Olympic and similar competitions, which were to the Greeks more than the Derby or the international cricket matches or yacht races are to us.

² Plato writes here and in the next two sentences as if the relation of Gymnastic and Music consisted in their acting on different mental elements and in opposite ways; as if Gymnastic simply "strung up" the pugnacious and competitive "spiritedness," and Music simply "relaxed" further the refined and gentle "love of culture." But just below, 411 A, he says distinctly that "Music" acts on the "spiritedness" by tempering it, and it is plain also that Gymnastic must be thought of *both* as disciplining the "spiritedness," *and* as bracing up the love of culture. Indeed, interpreting bodily training, as above suggested, in the light of manual and artistic ability, not to speak of the discipline of games and dancing, it is quite clear that Gymnastic must be really continuous with Music and in fact a mere branch of the same educational influence. Plato of course adopts picturesque expressions which seem to break up the mind into parts; but we must remember that spiritedness and love of culture are only ways of behaving on the part of a single nature.

Well, I said, and their fierceness will be produced by the spiritedness of their nature, which if rightly nurtured will be courageous, but if strung up beyond the right point will in all probability become hard and intractable.

I think so.

E And again, their gentleness will belong to the culture-loving¹ nature; and if it is too much relaxed it will be softer than it ought, but being properly nurtured will be gentle and orderly.

It is so.

And we say that the guardians² ought to have both of these natures.

They ought.

Then ought not these to be brought into harmony³ with one another?

Not a doubt of it.

And he who has been brought into harmony has a soul both temperate and brave?

411 A Just so.

And the soul of the un-harmonised is both cowardly and clownish⁴?

Utterly.

¹ Lit. "philosophic," see 375 E.

² Who are in fact ourselves as we ought to be, a type of the complete man, the largest animal nature expanded into a spiritual being. Cf. 375—6.

³ I.e. is not this an essential of any education which can be called complete?

⁴ Lit. "rustic," which may seem to us a strange opposite for temperate. Temperance, gentleness, and orderliness are all the outcome of the culture-loving disposition, which strikes the right note, so to speak, on all occasions of conduct. Clownishness, the vice of the "churl in spirit," is conceived as the having no sense of law in oneself or of consideration for others. From this point, at which the idea of harmonising the sides of man's nature is introduced, it becomes more and more clear that whichever side is directly influenced, both are affected.

So when one surrenders himself to music, to let it breathe and gush over his soul through his ears, as if they were a funnel, the sweet and soft and plaintive modes which we were mentioning¹, and he passes his whole life long humming to himself and under the glamour of song², then to begin with, if he had any spiritedness, he softens it³ like iron, and makes it useful, instead of useless and hard; but when he goes on unremittingly till it⁴ is spell-bound, from that point onwards he begins to melt and dissolve it, till he has melted his spirit away, and as it were cut the sinews out of his soul, and made it but a soft⁵ warrior.

Exactly so.

And if he deal with a mind which from the beginning is by nature spiritless, he soon does the work; but if it is spirited, by weakening the spirit he makes it ill-balanced, quickly provoked and quickly extinguished on trifling occasions. Such people are made irritable and passionate in place of spirited and are full of ill-temper⁶.

¹ 398 D and E, 399 A.

² Campbell, *in loc.*

³ I.e. apparently, makes it "mild" as opposed to brittle.

⁴ His spiritedness.

⁵ "Softness" is here the direct effect of music on the "spirited" nature, but 410 E above it came from over-relaxation of the "culture-loving" nature. It is plain that Plato sees himself to be dealing with a continuous nature, just as his temperance and bravery tend to pass into one another through the idea of self-control. See 386—9.

⁶ Irritability and ill-temper, then, may arise in an ardent disposition from what would commonly be regarded as softening influences, i.e. from sentimental nurture, and an absence of action, strife and danger. It is a true and subtle remark, and makes us feel the reality of the Greek view that with the gift of self-assertion and resentment as with other gifts we need discipline and practice to teach us "how, when, and with whom, to be angry." Cf. Tennyson's Sailor-boy:

"God help me, save I take my part

Of danger on the roaring sea,

A devil rises in my heart

Far worse than any death to me."

Completely so.

And again, when a man works hard in the way of gymnastic, and feeds thoroughly well, and never touches music or the pursuit of culture¹, the first thing is, is it not? that in his good bodily condition he is filled with confidence and spirit, and becomes more valiant than he was.

Very much so.

Well now; when he does nothing else, and holds no sort of communion with the Muse², then, even if there was something of studiousness in his soul, since it is given no taste of study or research, and partakes³ of no discourse or "music" in any shape, it grows weak and deaf and blind, because it is never awakened nor fed nor are its senses purged⁴.

Just so.

Such an one, I imagine, becomes a hater of thinking⁵ and an uncultivated man⁶, and gives up making use of persuasion by means of reasoning, but carries through everything by violence and savageness like a brute, and lives in a state of unintelligence and plundering, full of inharmoniousness and ungraciousness.

It is absolutely so.

Then, for these two⁷, I shall say that—as seems natural—

¹ Lit. Philosophy.

² As goddess of Music.

³ "Tastes" and "partakes"—note the metaphor of food. The germ of studiousness in the soul is like a plant or young animal; it must have its food. This notion of the mind as an organism depending on nurture and atmosphere is at the root of Plato's educational theory. See above all 401 B and C.

⁴ His senses are not stimulated, and so never clear themselves of obstructions.

⁵ Lit. a hater of "discourses," i.e. of all shapes of coherent thinking or reasoning whether with or without writing or speech.

⁶ "Anti-musical," in Plato's sense of "music"; a Philistine.

⁷ I.e. the two parts, factors or sides of mind, just about to be mentioned.

two arts have been given by some god to mankind, music that is and gymnastic for the spirited and the wisdom-loving; not for mind and body, unless incidentally, but for those two¹, that they may be brought into tune with one another, being strung up and relaxed to the proper pitch².

It does seem natural, he assented.

Then him who best mingles gymnastic with music and applies them to the mind in most due measure, him we should most rightly pronounce to be absolutely the best musician and the greatest master of harmony, in a far higher sense than one who tunes the strings to each other³.

With good reason, Socrates, he said.

Then, Glaucon, will it not always be necessary to have some such controller⁴ in our State, if the polity is not to perish?

It will be necessary in the highest possible degree.

¹ The spirited and the wisdom-loving.

² The two arts were definitely introduced 376 E as music for the mind, and gymnastic for the body. In 410 B—E it becomes clear that both are really addressed to sides of the mind, and there is a tendency to recognise (411 A) that each of them affects the whole mind, which is of course the case. Still the original distinction is so far retained that the principal effect of "music" is to refine or "relax," and the principal effect of gymnastic to brace or "string up" the moral frame. This is true and important, because it removes any impression, which 386 A might have produced, as if literary teaching could confer the power of action, apart from the exercise of the active nature. In fact, music and gymnastic are ultimately parts in the greater music of life, 412 A, the one being on the whole the training in reflection, and the other the training in action. The true or ultimate music is elsewhere said to be Philosophy, which means for Plato the fullest expansion of human faculty, alike moral and intellectual.

³ "We have not yet found the best way 'to blend music with gymnastic and apply them proportionately to the soul' of the average schoolboy." Nettleship in *Hellenica*, p. 133.

⁴ The suggestion of "a controller" is of course a purely formal and incidental way of expressing the view that the maintenance of education on the lines laid down is a fundamental necessity for the State. Even if Plato held it to be important that there should be, so to say, a Minister of Education, the question on which Plato's voice is of value to us is what

Argument. 412 B—414 B. *Further selection of the guardians after or in the course of education, and the qualities determining it. Cf. for the first selection 374 E, and for a later one in the more developed educational scheme 535 A ff. and 539 D ff.*

The outlines of their education and nurture then will be these. For why should we describe their dances and field sports and hunting and contests in athletics and in horsemanship¹? For it is pretty clear that they must be in accordance with these outlines; and so not difficult to contrive.

Perhaps not.

C Well, I said, and what is the next distinction we have to lay down? Is it not which of these very men are to rule and to be ruled?

It is.

It is plain that the rulers ought to be the elder, and the ruled the younger?

It is plain.

And that the best of them must be the rulers?

Yes.

sort of education is to be maintained, not by what governmental machinery we can maintain it. Comments upon the particular form of State control in which Plato embodied his ideas are really beside the mark in dealing with the substance of those ideas.

¹ Note that all this is an explanation of the component parts of the gymnastic training, which in the dancing, as in other respects (see notes 401—2), runs into the music. We see then that we are not to understand by Gymnastic merely the feats of the gymnasium (in its modern sense) or the wrestling ring, but the whole round of active pursuits open to a Greek citizen, practised with an educational purpose. Some taste of war was clearly included, 467 D and 537 B, and the age set apart for the special gymnastic training, 18—20, shows that the garrison and patrol duty of the young men in Attica was in Plato's mind. Their "record" in all this, with their social conduct in scenes of pleasure and the like, was to determine their future, 413 E.

And so, since the rulers are to be best of guardians, they must be the most guardian-like of the city¹?

Yes.

Then they must be both sagacious and capable for that end, and moreover men who will care for the State.

It is so.

And a man will care for that more than all else, which it happens that he loves.

Necessarily.

And further he will love that more than all else which he thinks to have the same interests² with himself, believing that when it fares well he too, in consequence, fares well, and when it does not, the contrary.

It is so.

Then we must select from among all the guardians such men as shall appear to us above all others, when we look into the matter, likely to do all their life long with the fullest zeal what they believe to be advantageous to the commonwealth, and under no circumstances to consent to do what they think not.

Yes, they are the right men.

Then I think that a watch must be kept upon them at all ages, to note whether they are guardian-like³ of this doctrine, and neither by witchery nor by force can be brought to forget and to let go the opinion⁴ that they ought to do what is best for the commonwealth.

¹ I.e. have the quality of guardians-of-the-city in its strongest form. Guardian here again implies a special moral quality, as in 367 A.

² The word "interests" is apt to shock the modern reader, and make him think of self-interest, and of "interested" as opposed to "disinterested" conduct. Yet Plato is only saying "where your treasure is, there will your heart be also."

³ Cf. 429 C. Guardianship of the commonwealth implies moral and intellectual guardianship of a principle.

⁴ Opinion or impressions; by no means the highest or surest state of mind, according to the full doctrine of the *Republic*, but appropriate to the simple phase of education and discipline which is now being considered.

What sort of letting-go do you mean?

I will tell you, said I. An opinion seems to me to pass away from the intelligence either voluntarily or involuntarily; voluntarily when it is false and one learns better, but involuntarily in every case when it is true.

413 A I understand the case of the voluntary letting-go, he replied, but that of the involuntary I must have explained.

Why, I said, do you not think with me that men are deprived of good things involuntarily, and of bad things voluntarily¹? or is it not a bad thing to be deceived about the truth², and a good thing to be true³? or does it not seem to you that to think⁴ what *is*⁵, is to be true?

Yes, he said, you say right, and I think that men are involuntarily deprived of a true opinion.

Then are they not either robbed or bewitched or overpowered when this befalls them?

B Again, he said, I do not understand.

We may compare it to authority or rule of thumb as contrasted with original knowledge and thorough understanding.

¹ In other words, "seek the good voluntarily, and receive the bad against their will"; the doctrine that whatever is desired is desired *qua* good, so that the bad can be desired only through ignorance. This principle, propounded in too crude a form by Socrates, has been with necessary interpretations at the root of all sound systems of ethics. One such interpretation is furnished in the present passage, when Plato explains what sort of influence may cause one to lose one's hold of a vital truth. Aristotle opposed the principle in its crude form, but not substantially.

² We can hardly render the felicity of the Greek construction which is "to be deceived of the truth," i.e. to be defrauded of it: to have it taken from you by deception.

³ To be in state of truth, includes to speak truth and to have it. For the whole passage cp. carefully 382, the lie in the soul, i.e. the being in a state of falsehood or deception.

⁴ Not "think" in the emphatic sense of "understand"; merely in the sense in which "I think so" = "that is my opinion."

⁵ "That which *is*," a regular phrase for fact or truth in Greek writers, often and emphatically used by Plato.

I seem to be as difficult as a tragic poet, I replied. By those who are robbed I mean those who are over-persuaded and those who forget, because from the latter, time, and from the former, argument, withdraws something without their knowledge. Now do you understand?

Yes.

By those who are overpowered I mean those whom some pain or suffering causes to change their opinion.

This too I understand, and you say right.

And those who are bewitched, I imagine, you would say (yourself are those who change their opinion either under the charm of pleasure or at the alarm of fear.

Certainly, he said, everything which deludes may be said to bewitch¹.

Then as I was just saying, we must examine who are the best guardians of the opinion which has been imparted to them, that they must do that which at every moment they think it best for the commonwealth that they should do. So we must observe them from childhood up, setting them tasks² in which a man might most readily forget such a principle, or be deluded out of it; and him who remembers, and is hard to deceive, we

¹ Pain seems treated as an actual force; pleasure ranks with fear as a source of illusion. Pleasure probably is not sharply distinguished from desire. In giving these influences as causes of our loss of attention to a principle, Plato is deeply modifying the "Socratic" doctrine as commonly understood, viz. that badness is *intellectual* ignorance. Really no doubt Socrates meant his doctrine to re-define knowledge and ignorance quite as much as virtue and vice.

² See note on 412 A. All this language, which suggests a secret and despotic mechanism of education, belongs merely to the pictorial setting of the book, suggested perhaps in some degree by the Spartan system. Quite enough of such emergencies occur in ordinary life or at school and college, without artifice, and boys and men are judged by their behaviour in them. Cf. Rousseau's *Emile*, and the extreme artificiality which the "natural" system of education there seems to demand. But there again all this is only the *mise-en-scène*, and is not essential to the lesson of the book.

must select, and him who is not so we must reject. Is it not so?

Yes.

And again they must be given hard work, and pain¹, and contests, in which these same points should be noted.

Quite right.

Further there must be set up a test for them of a third kind—in witchery; and they must be observed, just as people lead colts up to noises and alarms, to detect if they are shy; so in the same way while they are young we must bring them to face some sort of terrors, and again we must transfer them into the midst of pleasures², testing them much more carefully than gold in the fire, to see if a man turns out witchery-proof and of proper bearing in it all, being a good guardian of himself³ and of the music which he was taught, and showing himself in all these matters to have an orderly and harmonious character, by which he will be most profitable both to himself and to the commonwealth. And whoever is tested both among boys and youths and men and comes out unstained is to be made a ruler and guardian of the State, and to be granted distinctions both in life and after death, having allotted to him the greatest honours both of sepulture and of the other memorials. And

¹ Plato may have had in mind the Spartan scourging trials. But it is not necessary to suppose that artificial inflictions are meant. School, college, or regimental life afford plenty of tests by annoyance, especially if a wise amount of *laissez faire* is observed by the authorities. The whole of this very significant passage is not as much emphasised as it should be, in comparison with the more attractive suggestions of 401—2. It certainly seems to imply some degree of self-government and freedom among the young men. The tests are arranged in the same order as the causes of non-attention, 413 A—C.

² To be borne in mind when we are tempted to accuse Plato of narrowness. They are to have their chances of enjoyment, like men at college or in society, and what they make of them will affect their "record," as of course it does to-day.

³ See 367 A. The argument has worked up to the point demanded by Adeimantus.

he who is not such is to be rejected¹. Something of this sort, Glaucon, I said, appears to me to be the selection and appointment of the rulers and guardians, speaking of it in outline and not with exactness.

To me too, he replied, it appears in some such way.

Is it not then in real truth most right to give these² the name of perfect guardians towards enemies without and towards friends within, that the latter shall have no desire, and the former shall have no power to injure; while the young men, whom but now we were calling guardians shall have the name of "auxiliaries" and defenders of the ruler's decrees?

Argument. 414 B—415 D. *The allegory of true competition.*

Now how can we contrive, if we tell one splendid falsehood of those convenient falsehoods which we spoke of but now³, to convince if possible the rulers, but failing that, the rest of the community?

To what effect? he asked.

Nothing new, I said, but a Phoenician⁴ story, what has happened before now in many places, as the poets affirm and are believed⁵, but has not happened in our time, and I do not

¹ A question is sometimes raised about the relation of the guardians' education to that of the rest of the citizens. Plato is thinking of education at its best, and not primarily of adapting it to different classes, and he says little or nothing that bears directly on this problem. But comparing the present passage with 415 B—C and the progressive selections of 536—7 it is evident that, if we worked out the idea, the result would be that all who are capable of it are to have the ideally best education (Plato does not think there will be many), and the others are to drop off at various ages and stages and turn to other walks of life.

² The last described, who have been chosen in all the selections.

³ 389 B.

⁴ "A miner's story," Pater.

⁵ Again the ironical use of the poets.

know if it is likely to happen ; and to get it believed needs a good deal of persuasion.

It looks as if you hesitated to tell it ; he remarked.

And you will think I was quite right to hesitate, when I have told it.

Tell it, he said, and do not be afraid.

Well, I proceed to tell it ; and yet I do not know with what
 D face or with words I am to speak ; and I shall attempt to persuade first the rulers themselves and the soldiers, and next the rest of the community as well, that all the time we were nurturing and educating them, it was so to speak a dream in which they thought that all this befell them and was done to them, but in reality they were then themselves being fashioned and nurtured within the earth beneath, and their arms and the
 E rest of their array were being wrought ; and that when they were completely finished, the earth who was their mother sent them forth ; and that now it is their duty to take counsel and to fight, if any one attack it, for the country in which they are, as their mother and their nurse, and to feel for the other citizens as their brothers, earth born like them.

It was not without reason that you were so long ashamed to tell your lie.

415 A Naturally enough, I said ; but yet listen to the rest of my story. For "All of you in the state are brothers," as we shall say to them in telling our tale, "but God in fashioning you mingled gold in the creation of as many as are fit to be rulers ; and silver, in the auxiliaries ; and iron and brass in the husbandmen and the artificers. Now as you are all of one family, though for the most part you will have children like yourselves,
 B yet sometimes a silver offspring may be born of golden parents and a golden offspring of silver, and so all the others too of each other¹ To the rulers then it is the *first* and *greatest* command-

¹ The next sentence shews that Plato does not exclude the gold or silver springing from the brass or iron, as the form of this sentence might suggest.

ment of God, that there shall be nothing of which they shall be such good guardians¹ and which they shall watch so intensely as the children, for what they find to be mingled in their souls; and whether a child of their own is born with an alloy of brass or iron, they shall by no mean compassionate him, but assigning him the rank that belongs to his nature they shall thrust him down among the mechanics or the husbandmen, or whether again one is born of these with a tinge of gold or silver, having assayed them they shall bring them up higher, the former to rulership, the latter to auxiliary rank, seeing that an oracle has said that the city must perish when iron or brass shall guard it." Now have you any contrivance to make them believe this story?

By no means, he said, to make these men themselves² believe it; but one might be found to make their sons believe it and their descendants and all future men³.

Well, even this, I said, would be of service to make them more devoted to the city and to one another; for I see pretty well what you mean⁴.

Argument. 415 D—417 B. *Dwellings and life of the Guardians, anticipating Plato's treatment of the household.*

So this shall be left where rumour may carry it; but we must arm our earth-born and march them forth with the rulers

¹ The fact that Plato requires the government to work the mechanism of this career open to talents is quite unimportant to the principle concerned. In a certain sense indeed it is always the government, or at least the constitution and arrangement of the polity, that determines how far such a result can or can not be secured.

² I.e. the supposed first set; those educated to give the State a beginning.

³ All legends, he implies, were new once, and must have taken time to get credence. The Athenians believed themselves to be aboriginal and earth-born, which gives point to Plato's suggestion.

⁴ Viz., that the first rulers must be taken into our confidence (Campbell).

leading. And on arriving they must look for the most suitable place in the city to encamp; one from which they can most easily restrain those within, should any one not be willing to obey the laws, and keep off those without, should an enemy come on them like a wolf on the fold; and after encamping, and sacrificing to whom they ought, they must prepare their sleeping places. Must they not?

Yes, he said.

Then these should be such as to give shelter in winter, and be large enough in summer?

Unquestionably they should: I understand you to be speaking of houses¹.

Yes, I said, but houses for soldiers, not for money-makers.

416 A How do you mean, he asked, that the latter kind differ from the former?

I will try and tell you, I said. It is surely the most horrible of all things and most ruinous to the flock to nurture dogs for defending the fold, of such a character and in such a way that from intemperance or starvation², or some ill habit besides, the dogs themselves set to to injure the sheep, and become like wolves instead of dogs³.

¹ There is Plato's irony in every line of this conversation, as he gradually unveils the difference of the standpoint from which Socrates and Glaucon at first regard the question of residences for the all-powerful knights who are to rule the State.

² The two opposite evils. Cf. 421 D.

³ The illustration from dogs further pursued. The dog, without his gentle qualities and tendency to attachment, 376, becomes like a wolf. Here is an incident which must have been in Plato's mind, told us by Xenophon about the real Socrates. In 404 B.C. (when Plato was about 25) the cruel and covetous oligarchy of "the thirty" was ruining Athens by proscription and confiscation. Socrates at that time took occasion to observe in conversation that it was a strange thing if one thought a man a bad shepherd who made his sheep fewer and poorer, and did not think it a bad government which made the citizens fewer and poorer. The "thirty" sent for Socrates and told him not to talk about shepherds.

Horrible, he said, beyond question.

Then must we not take every precaution that our auxiliaries B may do nothing of the kind to the citizens, as they are stronger than these, becoming like savage masters instead of kindly allies.

We must, he replied.

Then* will they not have been prepared with the very greatest of circumspection if they have been in reality well-educated?

That they have been, he said.

And I answered, That is not fitting for us to affirm so absolutely¹, my friend ; but it is fitting to affirm what we were saying just now, that they must have the right education, what- C ever it is, if they are to have what is most important to make them gentle to one another and to those whom they guard.

Yes, and it is true.

Now in addition to this education any reasonable man would say that we ought to provide their houses and the rest of their belongings² of such a kind as neither to interfere with the guardians being the best of men themselves, nor to uplift them into doing evil to the rest of the citizens.

And he would say true.

See then, I continued, whether they ought to live and dwell D in some such way as this, if they are to be what we desire ; first, none of them possessing any property of his own, except what is absolutely necessary³ ; then, none of them to have any house or store chamber⁴ into which all cannot enter when they

¹ Leading up to the second education of Book VII.

² The word usually = "property." But they are hardly to have property in the ordinary sense of the term.

³ Referring, I suppose, to clothes, armour, and the like.

⁴ In describing the degeneration from the ideal state to the military aristocracy (of the Spartan type), 548 A, "They will be money-lovers, like people in oligarchies (plutocracies), fiercely coveting gold and silver in the dark, because possessed of store-chambers and private treasuries where they can hide them, and walled residences, downright private nests," etc.

please ; and their provisions, all that men need who are experts
 E in warfare, temperate and brave, they are to receive on a settled
 estimate from the rest of the citizens as the wages of their
 guardianship, to such an amount that in every year there shall
 be neither surplus nor deficit¹; and to live in common like
 men in camp, having their meals together²; and for gold and
 silver, we must tell them that they have these always in their
 souls, divine and god-given, and have no need of what men
 call such beside ; and it is a sin to pollute that possession by
 mingling it with the ownership of mortal gold, because much
 417 A that is unholy has been done with the coinage of this world,
 while the gold of their souls is untainted ; but for them alone,
 of all that are in the city³, it is not allowable to handle gold and
 silver, nor to go under the same roof with it, nor to wear
 ornaments of it, nor to drink out of silver or gold. And so
 they would be safe and would save their city ; but when they
 shall acquire land of their own and houses and coined money,
 then they will be estate managers and husbandmen instead of
 B guardians, and will turn into hostile masters of the other
 citizens in place of allies, and will pass their whole life long in

¹ Perhaps the earliest definite suggestion of the "no-margin theory" which has so often seemed to social reformers to cut the knot of economic difficulties. "Just enough" is easily said.

² The *syssitia* or common meals were a feature of the Spartan quasi-military organisation of the State. At Sparta the households existed as centres of private expenditure besides the tables which the men attended, much as tutors at Oxford and Cambridge may have their private houses independent of the college high tables. Plato means to put a stop to all that.

³ It is to be noted that the guardians' way of life is to be exceptional in the city. Money, and probably a wider licence of self-indulgence, is permitted to the other classes—the commercial and industrial society—as we may perhaps say, because of the hardness of their hearts, or the roughness of their duties. Yet the life of the guardians, though exceptional, no doubt stands for the life which Plato believes to be the best. Whether he is right or wrong, we shall note how absolutely opposed his view is to the ordinary associations of aristocracy.

hating and being hated, in plotting and being plotted against, fearing the enemy within much oftener and much more than that without¹, and by that time running most near to destruction, both themselves and the entire community. Now for all these reasons, I ended, shall we say that the guardians ought to be thus appointed as to their dwellings and all else, and shall we enact this as a law or not?

Certainly, said Glaucon.

¹ Anticipates the description of the tyrant, 567 B and C.

BOOK IV.

Book IV. is occupied as far as 427 c with pointing out different respects in which the moral and intellectual unity of the commonwealth—the fact that it is “a whole”—makes itself apparent, a unity resting ultimately on the “music,” or character engrained by education, which one set of guardians hands on to the next. From 427 c to the end it points out the specific moral qualities or cardinal virtues which were most important to a Greek, as revealed (a) in the structure and functions of the commonwealth (i.e. in the behaviour of individuals in their civic and industrial relations) and (b) in the heart and mind of the individuals themselves, as filled and guided by their functions in the commonwealth.

Argument. 419—421 C. The two meanings of happiness—the pleasures of individuals v. the welfare of the whole; which is of course the individuals at their best.

And Adeimantus broke in, Socrates, how will you defend yourself if any one says that you are not making these men particularly happy, and that of their own act; seeing that the city in truth belongs to them, and yet they have no benefit of any of its advantages like others, viz. possessing estates and building fine large houses and acquiring establishments suitable to them, and sacrificing private sacrifices to the gods¹, and having

¹ I.e. killing an ox or a sheep, which would be the occasion of a dinner-party, so that this and the next clause hang together

their friends to dine, and indeed what you yourself referred to just now, possessing gold and silver, and all that people usually have who are to count as at the height of bliss. But, he might say, they appear to be absolutely posted in the city like hired auxiliaries, simply on garrison duty.

Yes¹, I said, and moreover having only their board, and not 420 A even getting wages in addition to their rations like all other mercenaries, so that it will not even be possible for them to go abroad if they wish to, on their private account, nor to make presents to mistresses nor to spend money on anything else they may desire to, after the fashion of people who are supposed to be happy. You are leaving out of your accusation all this and more like it.

Well, he said, consider it all to be included.

And what is our defence to be, you ask?

B

Yes.

If we continue on the same path, I fancy we shall discover what to say. For we shall say, that to begin with, it would be no wonder if these very men as they are² had the greatest possible happiness; but that nevertheless we are not constituting our city with a view to this, that we should make any one group superlatively happy, but that as far as possible the city should be so as a whole³. For we thought that in such a city

¹ Socrates' irony, in accepting and intensifying the objection, shows that his answer to it will be one of principle and not of extenuation.

² I.e. on the terms proposed.

³ This contrast between the "one group" and the "whole" at once reminds us of the modern principle of the greatest happiness of the greatest number. It is well to recall this principle in reading the present passage, in order to observe how wholly different it is from what Plato has in mind. If Plato's contrast was really between the happiness or pleasure of a small number, and the similar pleasure or happiness of a larger number, Aristotle's objection, which we also naturally make, would be unanswerable. "If the guardians are not happy, surely none of the others are. And how can the whole be happy, if none of the members are?" Plato is really contrasting

we should find the highest degree of justice, and injustice in one badly constituted¹; and that having seen both, we should be able to decide the question which has so long been before us. So now, as we believe, we are fashioning the happy commonwealth, not cutting off a part, and making a few people in it happy, but as a whole; and presently we will examine its opposite. Therefore, just as, if we were painting statues², and some one came up and censured us for not putting the most beautiful pigments on the most beautiful parts of the figures, for the eyes, which are the most beautiful part, were not painted with crimson, but with black; we should have thought to make a reasonable defence against him if we said, My good Sir, you must not suppose that we ought to paint such beautiful eyes as not to look like eyes at all³, or the other parts in the same way, but you should see whether, by assigning to every part what is appropriate to it, we make the whole⁴ beautiful; so too in the present case you must not

two different senses of the term happiness, corresponding to two different ways in which individuals may try to satisfy their nature.

¹ See Bk. IX. for the examination of injustice in the degraded forms of state.

² It is interesting to learn definitely from this passage that it seemed natural to a Greek of Plato's time that statues should be painted. The famous sarcophagi from Sidon are said to show with what excellent effect this was done; modern attempts have as a rule been most unsuccessful. The terra-cotta statuettes from Tanagra are prettily coloured.

³ These words contain the whole argument in this passage and the whole principle of the *Republic*. The first thing is to be what you are, what your place in the whole demands. What interferes with this, however fascinating, is of evil. There can be no beauty nor goodness nor truth if parts are not in harmony with the whole.

⁴ We see what is meant by a work of art being beautiful as a whole; but what is meant by a State or society being happy as a whole? It must be understood that the paradox conveyed by this comparison is precisely what Plato means to insist upon. It is happy "as a whole," we might say, when individuals are at their best in and through their membership of it. Note that there is nothing specially "aesthetic" in the comparison, which merely takes the work of art as an example of unity.

force us to attach to the guardians a kind of happiness which will make them anything rather than guardians. For we could very well, for example, take the farm labourers and clothe them in long robes and give them golden ornaments, telling them to E till the land as much as they please; or set the potters on couches by the fire, drinking round and round and enjoying themselves, with their wheel beside them, and order them to make pots as much as they feel inclined; and to make all the rest¹ prosperous in similar fashion, that the whole city may be happy²; but you must not give such advice to us; since, if we do as you tell us, neither the husbandman will be a husband- 421 A man nor the potter a potter; nor will any other possess any such fashion of life as goes to make up a society. Now the rest are of less account; for if the cordwainers become bad and go to ruin and pretend to be cordwainers when they are not, it is no danger to the State; but if guardians of the laws and the commonwealth are not so but only seem, you see that they bring utter ruin on the entire society; and they again alone command the chances of good organisation and happiness. Now if our plan is to make guardians in very truth, far removed B from being evil-doers to society, but he who takes the other view treats them as a sort of landed class³ or happy revellers at a public festival, not members of a State, he must be speaking of something other than a city. We must then examine,

¹ Plato does not put his case on the ground that it is impossible for all to be "happy" in this sense, but that granting the possibility (which he assumes—some extraordinary bounty of nature might partly realise the assumption) it is the destruction of the ethical organism by the non-recognition of definite duties.

² Happy as if in inverted commas "what the objector would call happy."

³ Note how thoroughly Plato applies the principle of *noblesse oblige*. To modern ideas he may seem in the passage just above to restrict the workman to a hard life (cf. too 421 D); but at least he is far from maintaining, what really gives this restriction its sting, that the upper and governing class ought in the nature of things to have an easy life.

whether we are instituting the guardians with a view to engendering the greatest happiness in them; or whether as far as happiness goes we are to look at the entire community to see if it grows up there; while these auxiliaries and guardians are to be persuaded and compelled to act so that they will be the best possible artificers of the work¹ which is their own, and all the others in the same way; and thus, as the whole society prospers and is nobly organised, we must leave each of its groups to what their nature² assigns them in the way of participation in happiness.

Argument. 421 C—423 B. *In all classes, not merely the guardians, wealth and poverty are fatal to function. The strength of the social whole is its unity, which does not depend on wealth.*

Why, he said, I think you are right.

Then shall you think me reasonable when I say what come next to this?

What in particular?

About the rest of the workers³ in their turn, consider if the influences I shall speak of corrupt them, so that they become worthless.

D What are they?

¹ Their work is the liberty, or development of faculty, of all members of the community, cf. 395 C, "consummate artificers of liberty for the commonwealth."

² "Their nature" or "nature"; there is no difference. The society for Plato simply *is* the outgrowth of man's natural endowments in their completest form, or in other words, the maturity of man's endowments in their completest form *is* the nature of society, asserting itself in an intelligent and therefore social being. For the full bearing of the reference to what man's nature permits in the way of happiness see Bk. IX. 586 E and 587.

³ The guardians have been dealt with in this respect; he goes on to the other "public workers," i.e. the artisans, etc.

Wealth, I said, and poverty.

In what way?

In this way; do you think that a potter when he has got rich, will go on attending to his art?

By no means, he said.

But he will become more idle and careless than he was?

Yes, greatly so.

Then he will be a worse potter?

A great deal worse.

And again if poverty prevents him from getting the proper instruments, or anything else necessary to his art, he will make ^E his products inferior, and make worse workmen of his sons or others whom he may teach.

Undoubtedly.

From both of these then, poverty and wealth, the products of art grow worse, and so do the artificers.

It appears so.

We have found then as it seems, another¹ task for the guardians, something which they must watch against by every means, lest it should slip into the city behind their backs.

What is this?

Wealth, I said, and poverty; as the former produces luxury ^{422 A} and idleness and revolution², and the latter meanness and evil-doing in addition to a revolutionary spirit.

¹ Besides keeping themselves clear of property, money, etc.

² This seems strange to us, who think wealth on the whole "conservative." But in the Greek states it was not uncommon for the wealthy party, being or supposing themselves threatened, to adopt violent measures. Anything that gave individuals a preeminent position was apt to be "suspect" to a Greek, and not without reason. There is a quaint expression in Herodotus about a man who "grew his hair long with a view to tyranny," i.e. became peculiar and pretentious in his way of life. The Athenians felt this about Alcibiades, and of course the idea that great wealth sets one above the law is not unknown in the modern world. In 552 B Plato draws out the view here implied, that the useless rich and the helpless pauper are really of the same social type.

Just so, he said. But consider then, Socrates, how our city will be able to go to war, when it possesses no money, especially if it is compelled to fight with one which is great and wealthy.

Obviously, I replied, it would be harder to fight one, but easier to deal with two of that type.

B What do you say?

In the first place, I said, if they have to fight, will it not be with wealthy men, while themselves are experts¹ in war?

Yes, that much is true, he said.

Well then, Adeimantus, I said; do you not think that one prize-fighter, in the best possible state of preparation, could easily fight with two men, who were not boxers, and were rich and stout?

Perhaps not with two at once, he said.

Not even if he were allowed to run away for a little, and
C then turn back² and hit the first who came up with him, and were to do this time after time in the sun and the heat? Could not a man like that defeat many men like the others?

Well, he replied, it would be nothing wonderful.

But do you not think that the rich have more to do with boxing in the way of skill and experience than with war?

I do.

Then our experts in all likelihood will fight with double or treble their own number?

I shall assent to your view, he said, for you seem to me to say right.

D And what if they were to send an embassy to one of the two cities saying, what would be quite true, "We make no use of gold or silver coin³, nor is it lawful for us, but it is for you; so

¹ Greek "athletes," which originally means "competitors" or "prize winners"; i.e. people specially trained for a special purpose.

² A trick of the Spartans in actual war, which Plato may have in mind, as they passed in Greece for military experts *par excellence*.

³ See 419 E and note.

you had better take our side in the war and possess the belongings of the other city." Do you suppose that any body of men after hearing such an offer would choose to go to war against hardy and lean dogs, rather than to join the dogs against soft and delicate sheep?

I do not think so. But, he went on, if the wealth of the one city is gathered into the other, take care lest it bring danger to the city which is not wealthy¹.

You are in a fool's paradise, I said, if you think that the name of city applies to any but such an one as we were establishing.

Why, how is that? he said.

You must find a larger name for all others; for each of them is a number of cities, but not one city, as they say in the game². For if it be anything at all it is two cities, hostile to one another, the one of the poor, the other of the rich; and ^{423 A} each of these contains several, which if you deal with as a single one, you will entirely miss your aim, but if as many, offering the wealth and resources of the one group to the other, or even their persons³, you will always have many allies and

¹ Adeimantus displays an obstinacy on this point quite exceptional in an interlocutor in the *Republic*. Plato seems thus to recognise the strong conviction which had arisen a generation or two previously that wealth is "the sinews of war." Thucydides, for example, gives arguments in its favour, and the event of the struggle between Athens and Sparta could not be held to be really contrary to such a view, considering what a part was played by subsidies from Persia in the close of that struggle. Socrates therefore argues all the more strenuously against it. Perhaps Switzerland is a case in his favour.

² The allusion is not clear. There was a game like draughts in which the two sides of the board were called "cities" (*poleis*).

³ I.e. as slaves. Plato expresses his views on a reform of the laws of war, 470—1; and we must not suppose that he seriously advises the proclamation of plunder and enslavement as a means of setting class against class in a hostile State. He is merely accenting the point, which it is wonderful that he saw so clearly in the small communities of his day, that a State is a tissue of groups within groups and bodies within bodies, and is

few enemies. And as long as your city maintains a sane¹ organisation such as was ordained but now, it will be the greatest, I do not say in prestige, but in real truth the greatest, even if it have only a thousand defenders; for so large a single city you will not easily find either among the Greeks or among
B foreigners, though you will find many that appear to be many times its size. Or do you think otherwise?

No, by Zeus, he said.

423 B—424. *The area of a State to be that compatible with unity. The basis of unity.*

Then, I continued, this will be both the best limit which our rulers can adopt in determining the right magnitude² of the State, and a rule for the amount of territory which they must appropriate for a State of any given size³; and they must let alone all beyond.

What limit? he said.

This, I imagine, I answered. They must enlarge it to the point up to which it can grow and yet be one, but not beyond⁴.

C Yes, you are right.

powerless for external action if these elements fall into conflict beyond a certain point.

¹ Lit. "temperate," i.e. based on a harmonious frame of mind in which the true ends of life have their proper place.

² I.e. in population, as the context shows.

³ Viz. in population.

⁴ Perhaps I may cite a modern equivalent for this principle from my *Philosophical Theory of the State*, p. 185. "A principle, so to speak, of political parsimony—*entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem*, 'two organisations will not survive when one can do the work,'—is always tending to expand the political unit. The limits of the common experience necessary for effective self-government are always operating to control this expansion. We might therefore suggest, as a principle determining the area of States, 'the widest territorial area compatible with the unity of experience which is demanded by effective self-government.'"

Then shall we not lay upon the guardians this further injunction, to ensure in every possible way that the city shall neither be small nor have the appearance of being large¹, but be such as to be sufficient, and *one*.

Yes; no doubt it is a simple² injunction to lay upon them.

And here is one still simpler, I said, which we alluded to previously³, when we urged that if an inferior offspring was born of the guardians, he should be sent away among the others, and if a noble one came of the others, he was to be transferred to the guardians. Now this meant⁴ to declare that they have a duty, extending to all the citizens, to bring every one to that one particular work for which his nature fits him⁵, in order that each practising one work, his own, may be not many people, but one, and so the whole city may grow to be one, not many⁶.

¹ It is implied that if a city strikes us as especially "small" or "large" we must really mean that it is too small or too large for its proper work. If it was just right, thoroughly organised and "sufficient," it would not or need not strike us as small or large. Actual size, Plato is contending, has nothing to do with the point; the question is one of size in relation to unity.

² Ironical.

³ 415 B and C.

⁴ An interpretation of Plato by himself, most valuable as a guide to us in interpreting.

⁵ Or lit. "for which he is born." Note the enormous difference between the phrases "for which he is born" and "to which he is born." The Greek notion of Nature as working for an end is decisive for the former throughout Greek thought.

⁶ The city is "one" if the occupations of its members, though all different from each other, are such as to form a co-operative system. It is "many," in as far as men, while in one capacity, say as professional men, doing definite service to the community, are in another, say as careless givers of charity, supporting a state of mind and of things inconsistent with the aims of a sound commonwealth. Then the State has inside it a secondary system like a cancer or tumour, involving the activity of some of its members in a way inconsistent with healthy life. Plato does not mean to say a man cannot do more than one thing. Plurality is constantly

Yes, he said, this is still easier than the former.

My dear Adeimantus, these are not, as a man might think, many and serious tasks which we shall present to them, but all *E* of them *are* trivial¹, if they secure the one great thing, as men say, or rather, not great² but sufficing.

What is that? he asked.

The education and nurture, I replied. For if they are well-educated and become reasonable men, they will easily see the right in all these matters, and in others too, all that we are now omitting, the possession of wives, and the arrangement of wedlock and of the begetting of children, to the effect that all
424 *A* this ought as far as possible to be treated 'in common as friends' belongings³, according to the proverb.

Yes, he said, that would be by far the best way.

And indeed, I went on, the system of a State, if it is once started right, goes on with accumulating speed like a wheel⁴.

his way of expressing discord, because when there is no discord plurality is a form of unity.

¹ The irony is thrown off, as the latent ardour breaks out.

² He regards the word "great," in the spirit of 423 C. It is irrelevant whether the work looks huge or tiny, costly or cheap (as a modern might say); the point is that it should be *right*, adapted to its end as grasped by the intelligence.

³ This observation anticipates the communism, or abolition of the permanent family, which is fully discussed in Book V. In the casual air with which this tremendous innovation is introduced, we have Plato's customary mingling of irony and overwhelming conviction.

⁴ The suggestion of continued progress which this comparison implies is said to be seldom found in Greek writers. We ought perhaps to compare Greek ideas on this point rather with our own anticipation of the future than with our knowledge of historical events which could not be known to them. What we mean by progress is for the most part with certain reserves an intensification of the state of things in which we find ourselves, and it would be hard to show that the Greeks had no such expectation. They certainly did not anticipate anything like the Roman empire or Christianity, but are we able to conceive anything which should stand to us as these stood to ancient Greece?

For good nurture and education, being kept up, produce good natures, and again good natures, supported by such an education, grow up even better than their predecessors¹, more especially in the begetting of offspring, as with other animals.

In all probability.

Then, to put it in brief, there is one precaution to which the authorities of the city must hold fast, that it may not break down unnoticed, but they may observe it on every occasion, that is, to have no innovation in gymnastic and music contrary to the ordinance, but to guard it with the greatest possible care; in fear lest when a poet says that men care most for the newest song they sing², it may perhaps be thought that the poet means not new compositions but a new fashion of song music, and approves of it. But we must not approve of it, nor understand him so. For we must beware of a change to a new type of music as risking everything; since the fashions of music are never changed without change of the greatest civic laws³, as Damon alleges and I agree.

You may set me down too as agreeing, said Adeimantus.

¹ A singularly modern passage, though as expressed "Lamarckian" rather than purely "Darwinian." In any case it would seem that there is a tendency for the pupil to outstrip the teacher, even in purely physical activities, whatever the reason may be.

² Homer, *Odyssey* I. 351, apparently quoted from memory.

³ The word which means laws also means strains of music. And further, in meaning "laws" it is not restricted to statutes as contrasted with what we should call constitutional usage, or social, sentiment and tradition, but includes all of these. A great Greek historian attributes to a great Greek statesman the view that the unwritten laws, whose sanction is the stigma of public opinion, are the strongest. The remark so often quoted as a parallel to this passage comes from Fletcher of Saltoun (1653—1716). "I said I knew a very wise man so much of Sir Christopher's sentiment that he believed if a man were permitted to make all the ballads he need not care who should make the laws of a nation." Obviously this might mean that statute laws are of no effect compared to popular sentiment, which is connected with Plato's contention, but is very different from it. The question raised is a very large one—the connection of changes in art

Argument. 424 D—427 C. *The unity of the city, then (on which, according to the three preceding sections, its happiness, strength, and proper size depend) is a spiritual or ethical unity, and if this is maintained, all else will settle itself; and if not, all reforms of detail are like medicines to an intemperate man.*

D It¹ is here, then, in music, that the guardians must build their fort²?

Certainly, he answered; lawlessness in this sphere easily creeps in unobserved.

Yes, I said, as if in play and doing no harm.

Nor does it, he replied, unless this is harm—immigrating

and letters with changes in the life of peoples, and whether as causes or as symptoms. Ruskin and William Morris have written about little else than this, and in music proper we may think of the general change of sentiment implied in the popularity of Wagner. Of course Plato sees the point very simply and directly. But his view contains the essence of the matter.

¹ It would be less easy than might seem to "place" Plato with reference to modern political tendencies. He has a profound contempt both for elaborate or paternal legislative regulations, and for timidity in fundamental reform (see 426 B and C). If you say that he is a conservative you are met by the fact that revolutionary changes are just what he does not shrink from. If you try him as an advanced liberal, you are faced by his absolute contempt for reform by progressive legislation, and, to take him at his word, for the achievements of an imperial democracy very like our own. The only right course is to learn his great ideas sympathetically, and trust our own sense for their application.

² An intentional modification of 415 E. The city, as we have said before, is the city of Mansoul, and the fort or watch tower is not an Acropolis such as many Greek cities possessed, but vigilance in maintaining a harmonious and loyal spirit, or as we might say, a civic religion. "We wrestle not with flesh and blood—but with spiritual wickedness in high places." Note that the Greek word here used for fort or safeguard is the original of the word "phylactery" known to us in the New Testament. I do not know whether this Greek name for a Jewish habit could possibly have any connection with Plato's ideas; but in any case it is interesting to observe the analogous symbolism in the two cases.

little by little it quietly permeates both character and conduct; and from these it comes out in greater force into men's dealings with one another, and from their dealings it proceeds to attack the laws and politics, with licentiousness, Socrates, of great violence, until at the end it overturns all, both in the private and the public world.

Well, I said, is this so?

I think so, he answered.

Then as we maintained from the beginning, our children must participate in a more law-abiding kind of play¹ from childhood up, since if it comes to be lawless and the children resemble it, it is impossible that they should grow up to be ⁴²⁵ A loyal and noble men².

Unquestionably.

So when children have begun by learning to play prettily³ and have taken in lawfulness from their "music⁴," then again, in the contrary way to those others, it accompanies them into everything and prospers it, building up again any part of the State that may have been in decay.

¹ Play, including children's games, and also the amusement of having stories told them, and telling them, and all their make-believes, which are the beginning of Music.

² The modern reader thinks of e.g. the remark made to Lord Lawrence by his old teacher, "But, I say, what has become of all our good boys?", and wonders if Plato allows enough for spontaneity and reaction. Some kinds of insubordination however are the other side of loyalty, and *esprit de corps* has many forms. The effect of a bad home seems to show that boys have no chance if they have not somehow or somewhere met with a good tradition of conduct, and this is what Plato is asserting. Just as we hardly remember having been taught to spell, so we are hardly aware of the amount of positive ethical training which we have gone through in childhood and boyhood—to play fair and with good temper, to suppress tricks and negligences annoying to other people, etc., etc. We have never reflected what we should have been like but for this training. "Just because things are familiar they are not known."

³ I.e. in a pleasant and "loyal" temper.

⁴ Cf. 404 D.

That is certainly true.

And they rediscover the minor moralities, as they are called, which former generations had entirely lost.

Of what kind?

B Such as these ; the proper habits of silence in the young before their elders, and offering them a seat, and standing up when they enter, and respect for parents, and hair-cutting and dress and shoes, and in general the personal appearance and everything of that kind. Or do you not think so?

I do.

But I think it foolish to legislate about them ; for they do not come about, and could not be maintained, by enactment in written clauses.

How should they?

C It is probable, at any rate, Adeimantus, I said, that the sequel of a man's education is such as the direction it impresses upon him. Or is it not always so that like calls out like?

Certainly.

And we should say, I imagine, that in the end it results in something complete and vigorous whether good or the opposite.

No doubt.

Then I, I continued, for this reason, should not attempt to extend legislation to such matters.

Quite reasonably.

D And for heaven's sake, I said, what are we to do about market laws, dealing with the covenants between individuals in the market-place, and if you like with contracts for industrial work, and with slander and assault ; and again about the initiation of lawsuits and appointment of juries¹, and any collection or assessment of dues which may be necessary in markets or harbours, or in general the regulations of the market, the city,

¹ Or "judges"; the Athenian "dicast" was both or neither.

or the harbour¹, or anything else of the kind—shall we bring ourselves to enact any of them by law?

Why, he said, it is not fitting matter for injunctions upon good and honourable men; they will easily devise for the most part any legislation that is needed.

Yes, my friend, I said; if God grants them safekeeping² of the laws which we described before.

And if not, he replied, they will spend their lives perpetually enacting and amending things of the kind, expecting some day to hit upon the very best.

You mean that such men will live like invalids whose intemperance makes them refuse to depart from their unwholesome mode of life³.

Exactly so.

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And how charmingly these spend their days. For they gain nothing by continual treatment except to make their ailments more varied and more intense, hoping all the time that every new remedy which is suggested will at last make them well.

Precisely, he said; that is the experience of invalids of that type.

And further, is not this a graceful feature in them, that they think their greatest enemy to be any one who tells them the truth, that unless they stop drinking and stuffing and indulging their lust, and idling, neither drugs nor cauteries nor the knife, nor again spells nor amulets nor anything else of the kind will do them any good?

Not altogether graceful, he said; for there is no grace in being angry with one who speaks the truth.

¹ All these regulations and rates or taxes were very important and elaborate at Athens.

² Note recurrence of this word, 429 C. As Plato expands his idea of human nature, e.g. in Books VI. and VII., we hear less of "safe-keeping" and more of the craving for the completest truth and goodness.

³ Cf. 405 ff.; the comparison with valetudinarianism is now applied to the body politic as before to the conduct of the individual.

You do not seem to applaud such persons, I said.

By Zeus! no.

Then if the whole State acts in this way, as we were saying but now, you will not applaud it. Or do you not think that all States are acting in the same way with them, which having
C a faulty constitution¹ proclaim to the citizens not to touch the fabric of the State as a whole, under penalty of death for whoever does so; but any one who will minister to them most pleasantly, while retaining their constitution, and will make himself agreeable to them by fawning on them and foreseeing their wishes, and who is skilful in accomplishing these, he in their view will be a good man, possessed of the highest wisdom, and will be honoured by them?

I think they are acting in the same way, and I do not at all approve.

D And what of those who consent and are eager to be the ministers² of such States? Do you not admire them for their courage and versatility?

Yes, I do; except those who have been deluded by their communities, and suppose themselves to be statesmen in reality, because they are applauded by the crowd.

What are you saying? Have you no sympathy for the men? Do you think it possible for a man who does not know how to measure, when a number of others who are in the same
E case keep telling him that he is six feet high, not himself to believe it of himself?

No, not in that instance, he answered.

Then do not be angry; for surely too these are the most delightful of all, as they keep legislating and amending the sort of things we enumerated but now³, constantly supposing that

¹ "Constitution," not in the somewhat special sense of modern politics, but the whole way in which the social fabric is constituted and behaves, certainly including its economic system.

² Including the idea of "being medical attendant of."

³ 425 D.

they will put an end to frauds in commercial transactions¹ and to all the evils I referred to just now, not knowing that in fact they are, as it were, cutting off a hydra's heads².

Yes, indeed, that is just what they are doing.

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So then, I said, I should not have thought that the true legislator³ ought to busy himself in this kind with laws or polity either in a State where the civic life is bad, or in one where it is good; in the former because it would be useless and nothing gained, in the latter because part of it any one could contrive⁴, part will follow spontaneously from the practices before laid down⁵.

Then what more have we to do in our legislations? he B asked.

And I replied, We have nothing more; but for Apollo and Delphi there remain the gravest and most beautiful and highest of the enactments.

Of what kind?

¹ Cf. our bankruptcy laws, of which it is said that the method of evading each new Act is discovered in a definite number of years after the Act is passed. No doubt Plato is hampered by the Greek idea of a "law-giver" as a heroic figure—Lycurgus or Solon—at the beginning of history, and does not regard legislation as a perpetual social function.

² The point is that the hydra's heads grew again as often as Herakles cut them off. We sometimes say "hydra-headed" as if it merely meant many-headed.

³ See note before last.

⁴ See 425 D. This is what does require legislation, but need not be incorporated in the fundamental code; matters for bye-laws, as we might say. Of course this so far forms a meeting point between our feeling and Plato's, viz. he admits that certain minor points need authoritative regulation from time to time, only this seems to him a different thing from the main principles of the civic life—the constitution, so to speak. We might illustrate his meaning by the relation of the central departments to local authorities, in leaving the latter free to regulate local matters according to local needs within limits, but not to upset the main principles of administration.

⁵ I.e. is not matter for legislation at all.

The establishment of temples, and sacrifices, and other forms of worship of gods and demigods and heroes, and the sepulture of the dead, and all the services by rendering which
 C to those elsewhere¹ we ought to retain their good-will. For in matters of this kind, as we do not ourselves understand them, so in founding our city we shall obey no other than our ancestral interpreter²; for this god surely as the ancestral interpreter of such matters to all mankind, interprets, sitting in the navel in the centre of the earth³.

You say right, he answered; and we must act accordingly.

D The⁴ foundation of your State, O son of Ariston, may now

¹ The dead.

² As the Pythia, the woman who uttered the oracle, was the forthteller or mouthpiece (prophet) of Apollo, so Apollo himself was the declarer or utterer, here rendered interpreter, of the divine will. "Ancestral," i.e. relied on by the Greek nation from the beginning. There is a curious reticence, almost amounting to irony ("we do not ourselves understand"), combined with a real seriousness in this passage. Religion was to be the culmination of the national life; not a detached object of individual fancy. In the *Laws* Plato would not allow private persons to establish temples and services. This is quite in harmony with the view of the historical Socrates, who when asked, "How should I worship God?" replied, "according to the law of the State."

³ Apollo's temple at Delphi was supposed by the Greeks to stand on a rock or boss which was the actual centre of the earth's surface. This belief had an ethical bearing, for the idea of the unity of mankind can hardly be grasped apart from the conception of the earth's surface as a limited area of some kind. Moderns have remarked on the importance, in this respect, of our knowledge that the earth is a globe. Plato's words, "to all mankind," are unmistakable. No doubt he would be thinking first and chiefly of the Greeks; they inhabited very various regions, Gaul, Africa, Italy, Asia, Thrace, Russia, Cyprus, and were thought of as representative types of the human race making up the civilised world. But foreign princes, as we know, often consulted the Delphic oracle; and there is no reason to doubt that Plato's solemn language was meant to recognise a common spiritual centre for mankind as such. The oracle of course answered with reference to the tradition and descent of the State it was addressing; it made no attempt at introducing religious uniformity.

⁴ See note on 419. Here we pass to the second part of Book IV.

be considered complete, and the next thing is that you should bring a sufficient light from somewhere and look about in it yourself, and ask your brother to help you and Polemarchus and the rest, that we may see if possible wherever justice can be, and where injustice, and in what the two differ from one another, and which of them a man must possess who is to be happy, whether known for what he is, or not, by all gods and men¹.

That will not do, said Glaucon: for you promised to make E the search, seeing that it was a sin for you not to come to the aid of justice in every way to the best of your power².

You remind me truly, I said, and no doubt I must do so; but you must take part with me.

We will do that, he answered.

I hope, then, I said, to find it in this way. I suppose that our city, since its foundation has been rightly conducted, is wise, brave, temperate and just³.

Clearly.

Then whatever of all these we find in it, the remainder will

which traces the four cardinal virtues as displayed first in those actions and relations of individuals, grouped in accordance with their civic functions, by which the commonwealth is constituted and maintained; and secondly the same virtues or excellencies as qualities in the heart or mind of individual citizens, of which inward qualities the constitution and maintenance of the commonwealth is the outward and visible sign. The former are often called the virtues in the State, the latter the virtues in the individual. Plato's whole point is that the two are inseparable aspects of the same thing; cf. 435 E, 443 C to E, 544 E.

First, 427 D—429 A, he speaks of the Wisdom of the State.

¹ Cf. 376 E and 580 C.

² 368 C.

³ The enumeration of these four "cardinal virtues" may be called arbitrary. It represents Plato's judgment as to the kinds of excellence which he takes to be the corner-stones of the life of civilised man, being the qualities which are exhibited on a large scale ("in the State") in statesmanship, war, political loyalty or subordination, and a general habit of fulfilment of function without collision of spheres.

428 A be that which we have not found. So it is just as with any four qualities¹, if we had been seeking one of them in anything, we should have been satisfied as soon as we recognised it; but if we found the other three first, this very fact would have made known to us that which we sought; for plainly it could now be no other than what remained².

You are right.

Then must we not enquire about these qualities, since there are four of them, by the same method?

Clearly so.

B And first I think that wisdom is to be seen in it; and there is a paradoxical³ look about the quality.

How? said he.

The State which we described seems to me to be really wise; for it is well-counselled, is it not?

Yes.

And this very thing, good counsel, is plainly a sort of knowledge; for surely people take good counsel not by ignorance but by knowledge.

Obviously.

Now there are many and various kinds of knowledge in the State.

Undoubtedly.

Then is the State to be called wise and well-counselled by reason of the knowledge⁴ of the carpenters?

¹ The Greek has no substantive where the word "qualities" stands in this sentence. The necessity of inserting one to suit the English idiom makes the argument seem much more naïve than it really is, especially if "things" is the word inserted. Plato thinks of the four moral excellences as the most notable elements of a civic society, and on this basis his argument is fair enough.

² A rather naïve anticipation of the "method of Residues." It depends purely on the investigator's insight, even more than the modern method.

³ See 428 E for the nature of the paradox.

⁴ Any science, art, craft, or skill, may in Greek be described by this

By no means, he said, because of this ; but only "famous c
for woodwork."

Then it is not by reason of the knowledge which has to do with wooden furniture, and by taking counsel how it may be best turned out, that the State is to be called wise?

Certainly not.

Well, then, is it because of the knowledge that deals with things made of brass, or any knowledge of that kind?

It is not due to any of them.

Nor again is the State called wise by reason of the knowledge how to grow crops out of the ground ; but only "famous for agriculture¹."

I think so.

But now, I said, is there any knowledge, within the State which we have just founded, in the minds of any of its citizens, by which counsel is taken not on behalf of any one of the elements that are in the State, but on behalf of itself as a whole, in what way it may best conduct itself both towards itself and towards all other States?

Certainly there is.

What, I said, and in whom?

This, he answered, is the guardian knowledge, and it is in those rulers, whom but now we were speaking of by the name of perfect guardians.

Then in virtue of *this* knowledge what do you call the State?

Well-counselled, he answered, and really wise.

Now, I asked, which do you think will be more numerous in our State, the brass-workers, or these real guardians?

The brass-workers, he said, by a long way.

And of the whole number of those who are given certain

same word, which is also more specially used by Plato and Aristotle for science in the strict sense.

¹ Note by the way how little it occurs to a Greek that a "city" must be a "town."

class names from possessing certain kinds of knowledge¹ will not the guardians be the fewest?

By far.

Then a State which is organised according to nature will be wise as a whole through the smallest group and portion of itself, that which is chief and rules, and through the knowledge
429 A which is in it; and this race, as it seems, naturally comes into being in the smallest number—this which has the gift of partaking in the knowledge in question, of all kinds of knowledge the only one which should be called wisdom.

What you say is most true.

This one then of the four we have made shift to discover, both the quality itself and where in the State it is seated.

I at any rate think, he said, that it is adequately ascertained.

Argument. 429 A—430 A. *Courage as a social or civic quality; not the highest kind of courage conceivable, but on the other hand quite distinct from certain lower kinds².*

Courage, again, both the quality itself and in what part of the city it lies, owing to which the city is to be called courageous, is not very hard to see.

¹ I.e. the members of the various trades and professions. Much may be said from a modern point of view about the need that the ruler's knowledge shall be in touch with the craftsman's life and ideas. But none of it will seriously impeach the paradox which Plato drives home with his whole force here and elsewhere, that actual government is necessarily in the hands of a few. This is almost as true of a trade union or a democracy as of an army or a monarchy. Whether the capacity for ruling is as he thinks a rare gift, is perhaps more doubtful. But the position in which it can be fully developed is necessarily confined to a few.

² The definite conception of courage, excluding a great deal which for us passes by that name, is one of the corner-stones of Greek Ethics. It is well worth while to compare with the present passage Aristotle's account of this quality in *Nicomachean Ethics* (Peters' translation), Book III. ch. 6—9 inclusive.

How so?

B

Who would have regard, in calling a city either cowardly or brave, to anything but that part of it which does battle and goes to war on its behalf?

No one would have regard to any other part.

For I presume that whether the others in it are cowardly or brave would not determine whether the State was the one or the other¹.

No.

Then the State will be brave, again, through a certain part of itself, because in that part it possesses a capacity such as to preserve through everything the opinion² concerning things to be feared, that they are such and such like as the lawgiver in the education taught that they were. Or is not this what you call courage?

I did not quite understand³ what you said, he answered; please to say it again.

I for my part, said I, affirm that courage is a kind of safe-keeping.

What kind of safe-keeping?

That of the opinion, which the law has created by means

¹ Plato is stating broadly and decidedly the doctrine of a social organism which is, in each function, what the organ charged with that function makes it. It would be easy to suggest reservations upon Plato's statement—to ask, e.g. whether England is not brave in virtue of her miners and her commercial marine as well as in virtue of her soldiers and her war navy. But all of these, if they have any social importance, would ultimately fall under Plato's principle.

² Throughout the "first education" and the account of the citizen qualities which is its sequel we are only dealing with "opinion"—the sort of impression or conviction which all of us live under in matters determined for us by early training and moral tradition. That some minds will criticise this tradition is a problem dealt with at a later stage. But it is intended throughout that the education shall embody rational principles, so that there may be as little as possible to unlearn.

³ The treatment of courage as something depending on ideas is new to the hearer.

of the education, about things to be feared, which they are, and of what kind. And by a safe-keeping through everything
 D I meant that they preserve it in pains and in pleasures, in desires and in fears, and do not let it go. And if you wish, I will give you a simile, showing what it seems to me to be like.

Of course I wish it.

You know then that the dyers when they want to dye wool so as to have the true sea-purple¹, in the first place select out of all the possible colours the quality² of white wool, and then prepare it for dyeing by treatment with very elaborate processes, that it may receive the bloom quite perfectly, and not till then do they dye it; and everything that has been dyed in
 E this way has an indelible dye, and no washing either with detergents or without is able to take away its bloom; but what is not done in this way—you know how it comes out, whether they dye it with other colours or even with this, omitting the previous treatment.

I know, he said, it washes out most absurdly.

Then you are to conceive that we too were doing something like this, so far as we were able, when we were selecting
 430 A our soldiers, and training them in music and gymnastic; you must suppose that we were devising nothing else than how with full conviction³ our men might best take the colour of the laws, like a dye, in order that their opinion, both about terrors and about all else, might turn out indelible, because their

¹ The purple that came from a shell-fish, one of the earliest articles of commerce in Greek waters. It is difficult to believe that this idea of the "sea-purple," which the Greeks were fond of dwelling on, had no connection with the colour of the sea.

² Lit. "nature."

³ First comes the preparation, then the acceptance; cf. 401 E and 402 A. This assent or acceptance only amounts to coming to see the meaning of what you have been taught to do and feel; it does not imply a critical attitude, which, as said above, is dealt with at a later stage.

quality¹ and their nurture had been appropriate; and that the detergents of the soul, however fatal in their operation, might never wash away their dye, whether pleasure, more tremendous in its efficiency than any nitre or alkali, or pain and fear and desire, stronger than all other detergents. It is this faculty, a safe-keeping through everything of the right and lawful opinion with regard to what is terrible and what is not, which I name and set down as courage, unless you say something against it.

No, he answered, I say nothing against it. For as regards that right opinion about these same matters which has come into being without education, that of the lower animals and of slaves², I understand you not to consider it altogether lawful, and so to call it something other than courage.

Perfectly true.

Then I agree that courage is what you say.

Yes, you must agree that this is citizen courage³, and you will be right; but we will treat of this excellence more perfectly, if you like, another time. For at present it was not this we were looking for, but justice; so I fancy our enquiry into it is sufficient for the purpose.

You say well, he answered.

¹ Lit. nature; keeping to the simile of 429 D as to selection followed by treatment.

² The citizen character is here definitely marked off from the animal instinct to which it was at first compared (375—6). A dog or servant who will die for his master, is guided by some kind of "opinion" ("seeming") or mental association; but such "courage" is not the courage of the citizen, because it is not founded on the idea of law and of a common good, imparted by society through education. We rank as courage many qualities which would not satisfy Plato's conception. On the other hand, the Greek citizen fell far short of good modern troops in constancy of disciplined valour. Thermopylae would be a matter of course to a modern regiment.

³ Distinguished both from the uneducated impulse, just referred to, and from the courage of the saint or hero, the perfection of manhood, which is to be described when the treatise passes beyond the merely social qualities. See 486 A and B.

Argument. 430 D—432 A. *The quality of temperance, not seated in any one organ of the State, but consisting in a certain responsiveness to law and reason which pervades every element of the community, and gives authority to the recognised higher self of the society, which may (in actual States) be an embodiment of very different principles (432 A).*

D There still remain two qualities, I continued, which we have to discern in the State; temperance, and that for the sake of which we are pursuing the whole enquiry, namely justice. In what way then shall we discover justice—to pass over the discussion of temperance?

I do not know, he said, and I do not care for justice to be first brought to light, if we are not to go on to consider temperance; but if you are willing to do me a favour, scrutinise the latter before you treat of justice.

Why surely, I said, I should like to, if I am not doing wrong.

E Make the scrutiny then.

We will do so, I replied; and looked at from this distance, it is more like a harmony¹ or piece of music² than the others were.

In what way?

Temperance, I said, is a sort of order and restraint of certain pleasures and desires, as people say, and they speak of a man as having self-mastery³, I know not in what way; and other such facts we can see, clues, as it were, to the quality in question. Is it not so?

Most certainly.

¹ Greek *symphōnia*, "sounding together," meaning something analogous to our "harmony."

² Greek *harmonia*, a tune or scale. See 398 ff. and note.

³ Lit. "as being stronger than himself."

Now is not the expression "master of himself" an absurdity? For a man who is master of himself must also surely be subject to himself¹, and one who is subject, master; it is the same person who is spoken of in all these expressions².

Obviously.

But this way of speaking, I think, clearly intends to express, ^{431 A} that within the man himself and belonging to his mind there is a better and a worse; and when that which by nature is better³ has control over the worse, this is what the phrase "master of himself" expresses; certainly it is a phrase of approval; but when under the influence of bad nurture or some evil association that which is better, being the smaller⁴, is overcome by the quantity of the worse, this is censured as matter of reproach ^B by the mode of speech in question, calling the man who is in such a disposition "slave of himself" and profligate.

And quite right, he said.

Now turn your eyes to our new city, and you will find in it the one of the two characters, for you will say that it is rightly called "master of itself," if indeed that, the better part of which rules the worse, is to be described as temperate and possessed of self-mastery.

¹ Lit. "a man who is stronger than himself must also surely be weaker than himself," if e.g. his reason rules his love, it follows that his love is subject to his reason; but both alike seem to be "himself" until some sense has been alleged in which either of them is not so. Thus, without further explanation, these expressions have no sense; they do not distinguish the desirable from the undesirable state of mind.

² Of course it is not meant to be so, but the distinction which they draw falls within a single mind, unless explained as below.

³ This phrase is further explained in the discussion of Book IX.; see especially 586 E. It would not be right to speak as if one element of mind were better from the beginning and by itself than others. The worship of "reason" in a narrow sense is as dangerous as the worship of feeling or sensation. But Plato's "by nature" does not mean "from the beginning and by itself."

⁴ See 428 E and note.

I am doing so, and what you say is true.

- C Yes, and the multitude¹ of various desires and pleasures and pains we shall find principally in children and women and servants and in the inferior natures which form the majority of those who pass for freemen.

Certainly.

But for the simple and moderate ones, which are guided by deliberation under the influence of reason and right opinion, these you will find in few, and only in the best born and best educated.

True, he said.

- So you see that just these elements² are present in your city, and that in it the desires which are in the multitude and D the inferior sort are ruled by the desires³ and the intelligence which are in the fewer and better?

I see, he answered.

Then if any city is to be called superior to pleasures and desires, and master of itself, this one must be called so too.

Most certainly.

And must it not be called temperate also on all these grounds?

Very much so.

- E And moreover, if in any city the same opinion is in the rulers and the ruled on the question who are to be rulers, this will be the case in ours; do you not think so?

Emphatically so, he said.

¹ Explaining, in accordance with the last sentence but one and p. 428 above, how the evil, or at least the unnecessary, element is the "larger." See 428 E and note.

² The "better" and the "worse," which in the proper relation constitute "temperance."

³ He allows desire as well as intelligence to the latter class, and he ought to allow intelligence as well as desire to the inferior class. It is only through intelligence that the ruled can respond to the intelligence of the ruler. Plato is not here speaking with psychological accuracy, but broadly and generally.

Now in which group of the citizens shall you affirm that temperance resides, when they are thus disposed ; in the rulers or in the ruled ?

Surely in both.

Do you see then, I said, that we were prophesying pretty correctly just now, in saying that temperance bears the likeness of a kind of harmony ?

How ?

Because it does not act like courage and wisdom, each of ⁴³² A which residing in a certain part makes the city in the one case wise and in the other brave ; temperance does not act in this way, but extends literally throughout the whole society, producing all down the scale ¹ a concordant voice of the weaker, the stronger, and the middle classes ², ranking them, if you choose, by intelligence, or if you choose, by strength, or by number or by wealth or by any other such standard ³ ; so that we should be nearest the truth if we said that temperance is a unanimity consisting in the natural ⁴ harmony of the worse ⁵ and better as to which of them is to rule, both in the State and in the individual.

I altogether agree with you.

¹ *Dia pasōn*, lit. "throughout all" (strings or notes).

² The idea of the different strings of the lyre, transferred to the members of a society. It is curious here to recall Aristotle's criticism that Plato made society a unison instead of a harmony.

³ This very remarkable passage shows the width of Plato's political intelligence in his recognition of a variety and evolution in States. Cf. Books VIII. and IX. "You may have," he says in effect, "political societies holding together on many different bases ; the essential point is that, whatever the basis, it should be respected and accepted throughout the society, and thus you have a 'temperance' relative to your social standard or basis."

⁴ "Natural," *not* = "primitive," but "as prescribed by an inherent principle."

⁵ Plainly, if the "worse" recognises its "natural" duty to obey the better, it is not bad, though it may be comparatively unimportant. Plato sometimes uses the careless language of common life, and works free from it by degrees.

Argument. 432 B—434 C. *The quality of Justice consists—not merely, as a modern might say, in having or keeping your own, although this is included, 433 E, but—in “doing your own,” i.e. doing your work or duty, with a strong negative implication of not interfering with the work or duty of others [and therefore not with their “means,” 433 E]. See further note on 433 A.*

B Well, I said, we have discerned three out of the four qualities in the State ; so at least it seems to us ; but what can the remaining kind be, the further ground of excellence in the State ? For it is plain that this is justice.

It is plain.

Then, Glaucon, is it not now our duty to stand like a party c of hunters round a cover, giving attention that justice may not slip away and disappear before we detect her ? For it is clear that she is somewhere hereabouts ; so please look out and take pains to see her, in case you should catch sight of her first, and point her out to me.

I wish I could, he answered ; but it is the other way ; if you treat me as one who will follow and can see what you show him you will be treating me very reasonably.

Offer up a prayer then, and come on with me.

I will do so ; only lead on.

Why, I said, the place looks rough to walk in and deep in shade ; it is certainly obscure and hard to explore ; but all the same we must go on.

D Yes, we must, he said.

So I caught sight of her and called out, Hallo, Glaucon ; I think we have found a trace, and I fancy she will not altogether escape us.

Good news, he said.

Really, I went on, we have been behaving very stupidly.

How ?

My dear Sir, as it turns out, the thing has been tumbling about at our feet all along from the very beginning, and we did

not see it, but made ourselves most ridiculous ; just as people sometimes keep on looking for a thing when they have got it ^E in their hands, so we would not turn our eyes upon it, but kept looking away to somewhere at a distance, which probably was the reason why we failed to observe it¹.

What do you mean ?

This, that we have for some time been both speaking of it and hearing each other speak of it, without perceiving that we were saying, in a manner, what it is.

Your preface seems long when one wants to hear the result.

Well, I said, hear if there is anything in what I say. That ^{433 A} which we laid down from the beginning when we were organising our State, as what we ought to effect throughout, that, I think, or some form of it², is justice. We laid it down, surely, and were constantly insisting on it, if you remember, that each one ought to practise some one of the employments belonging to the city, that, namely, for which his nature was naturally best adapted.

We did insist upon it.

And further, that to do one's duty³ and not to meddle with

¹ The beginner in life and in ethics errs as a rule by looking too far afield for his principles and ideals. Cf. the apologue of Naaman the Syrian. It is a constant experience that Plato presents in simple and intellectual forms ideas which the Bible embodies in intensified and poetical expression.

² Viz. the form to be described, 443 C ff.

³ Whatever substantive is used here in the translation must be an insertion, the Greek being simply "to do one's own." The word "business," which readily suggests itself, has unhappy implications to a nineteenth century reader. Plato's meaning is probably very wide—to do what belongs to one to do, what falls to one in the application of one's capacities; to "play" one's own "part," as in a piece of orchestral music. How this covers the everyday idea of justice is pointed out 433 E and 434. There is a negative emphasis in the phrase, though to render it by "minding one's own business" would make it too narrow. "To do one's duty" is perhaps the best rendering all round ; but the Greek has not the notion of something

many businesses is justice,—this too we have heard from many others, and ourselves have frequently maintained.

B Yes, we have.

This then, my friend, the doing one's duty, when it takes place in a certain manner¹, seems likely to be justice. Do you know what makes me think so?

No, he answered, but please tell me.

It seems to me, I said, that what is left over in the State, after the qualities we have examined, temperance and courage and intelligence, is this, which imparted to all those others the power to arise in it; and that when they have arisen, this is what ensures them preservation, so long as it is present. And
c certainly we said that justice would be what was left over after the others, if we could find three out of the four.

And necessarily so.

But again, I said, if we had to determine which of these qualities being engendered in the State will do most to make it good, it would be hard to decide whether this is the agreement of the ruler and the ruled², or the maintenance in the soldiers' minds of an opinion formed by law about what is and what is not to be feared³, or the intelligence and guardianship
D present in the rulers⁴, or whether this principle does most to make it good, when present in every child and woman and slave and freeman and workman and ruler and subject, the principle that each is to be one and to do his own duty and not to interfere with various businesses⁵.

hard and probably distasteful which is apt to attach to duty in the modern mind.

¹ See 443 C.

² Temperance.

³ Courage.

⁴ Wisdom.

⁵ Justice. Note the width of Plato's conception, quite different in principle from what is often ascribed to him. Every creature in the community, the children and the slaves included, is to act, not under

Undoubtedly it is hard to decide.

Then in promoting the excellence of a State the quality by which every one does his duty is a rival to its wisdom and its temperance and its courage.

Quite so.

Should you not give the name of justice to the quality which rivals these in promoting the excellence of a State?

Most certainly.

And see if you come to the same conclusion from this point of view. Shall you require the rulers in your State to determine the lawsuits?

What then?

In determining them, will not their chief object be that individuals shall neither retain what belongs to others nor be deprived of what is their own¹?

It will.

Because it is just?

Yes.

Then in this point of view also the having and doing of what belongs to us and is our own, will be admitted to be justice.

It is so.

See now if you agree with me. Suppose a carpenter to 434 A attempt to do a shoemaker's work, or a shoemaker a carpenter's, either exchanging their tools and privileges, or again the same person attempting to do both, do you think that any interchange in these minor matters would seriously injure the State?

Hardly so.

But, I imagine, when one who is by nature a workman or

external constraint, but from an idea or impression of his duty, present in his own mind. His duty is by the hypothesis whatever he is fit for. Thus justice implies the *free* and *full* development of faculty.

¹ Proceeding to show that the above account of justice covers the essential aim of the law courts.

B some other wealth producer¹, is subsequently uplifted by wealth or numbers or strength or any similar influence till he attempts to pass over into the military type², or one of the military class, without the requisite merit, attempts to pass into the deliberative and guardian type, and these³ then interchange their instruments and their privileges, or when the same person takes in hand to do all these things at once, then, I fancy, you think with me, that the exchange and intermeddling of these with one another is the ruin of the State.

Absolutely so.

C So the intermeddling and reciprocal interchange with one another of the three classes is the greatest mischief to the State, and may most rightly be entitled evil-doing in the strongest sense.

Certainly.

And the gravest evil-doing against one's own State you will affirm to be injustice, will you not?

Unquestionably.

This then is injustice. And the other side we may state in this way; the doing of what belongs to them by the wealth-making⁴ the auxiliary⁵, and the guardian class, each of them

¹ Or "money-maker." This is the first indication, given in Plato's gradual and casual way, that he is going to bring the satisfaction of sensuous desires into intimate connection with the idea of cupidity and avarice.

² Or "kind."

³ I.e. representatives of the different classes, as contrasted with different persons inside the same class.

⁴ See 434 A. This is the first time that "wealth-making" or "money-making" is used as a general term for the "third" class in the *Republic*, described 415 A as the husbandmen and the other workmen. It thus corresponds in Plato's analysis with the element of desire in human nature, and the connection is further insisted on in the later books, e.g. as a connection between avarice and sensuality, while again, desire, as the demand for the true necessities of life, is an essential basis of individual morality, and corresponds to an essential function of society.

⁵ Or military.

performing its duty in the State, this, being the reverse of that other, will be justice, and will make the city just.

I think it is so, he said, and not otherwise.

D

Argument. 434 D—443 B. *Verification of the four moral qualities of a State by comparison with them as experienced in the individual soul*¹.

We will not yet, I said, affirm it as altogether fixed ; but if this principle, when applied to each single human being, is admitted in that case also to constitute justice, we will agree to the conclusion without more ado ; for what indeed shall we have to say against it ? but if not, then we will consider something else. But now let us complete our inquiry, in which we thought² that if we should first set to work to study the quality of justice in a larger one among the objects which possess it, we should then more easily detect what it is in a single human being ; and this larger object seemed to us to be the city-state ; E and so we organised the best city we could, knowing well that in a good city there would be justice. So what in that case it appeared to us to be, let us compare with the single human being, and if it agrees, well and good ; but if justice reveals itself as anything different in the single person, we will test it by returning to the case of the city ; and perhaps by looking 435 A at the two side by side and rubbing³ them together we shall make justice show its light like fire from firesticks, and when it has become clear we will establish it in ourselves.

Why, he said, you speak to good purpose, and we must do what you say.

¹ The argument, though plain in its whole bearing, contains some difficult steps. The first point, however, is simple (434 D—436 A)—to indicate or assume that the soul *has* three aspects corresponding to the three social classes.

² See 368 D.

³ Constantly “applying” the one to the other ; the metaphor is from rubbing bits of wood together to kindle fire.

Now, I asked, is that which one speaks of as the same, in a larger example and in a smaller, dissimilar in the respect in which it is the same or similar¹?

Similar, he answered.

B Then it follows that the just man, in respect of the very principle of justice, will differ not at all from the just State, but will be similar to it.

He will be similar.

Now certainly the State seemed to us to be just, when the three kinds of natures contained in it were each of them doing its duty; and temperate and brave and wise, owing to certain other affections and dispositions of these same kinds². Then, my friend, in accordance with this, we shall expect the
C individual to possess these same forms in his own soul, and to merit the term applied to the State by the same affections which we found in it.

Inevitably.

Then, my dear Sir, we have fallen into a trifling enquiry concerning the soul, whether it has these three forms in itself or not.

I do not quite think, he replied, that it is a trifling one. For perhaps, Socrates, the proverb is true that "Fine things are difficult."

It appears so, said I; and, Glaucon, you must clearly
D understand that in my view there is no chance of apprehending this matter precisely by such methods as we are employing in our discussions³: for it is a difficult path, longer and harder,

¹ E.g. if there is something we call "life" both in a gnat and in an elephant, will it, so far as it is life, be similar or dissimilar in these two examples? Or, to come nearer to Plato's mind, if we give the name of "justice" alike to a great nation refusing to oppress a small one, and to one man resisting the sway of cupidity or vengeance in his soul, will it, so far as it is justice, be described in dissimilar language in the two cases, or in similar?

² Or "classes."

³ Cf. 532 E. Plato had a strong feeling of the imperfection of his methods and data. His mind was possessed with a passion for scientific

that leads to this result ; perhaps however we may achieve it in a way adequate to our discussion and enquiry thus far.

Then must we not be content with that? he said ; I shall be satisfied with it for the present.

Well, I said, it will certainly be quite sufficient for me. E

Then do not give it up, but pursue the enquiry.

Now is it not, I said, quite necessary for us to admit that the same forms of mind, and dispositions, are present in each one of us as in the State? For surely they have come there from no other source. For it would be absurd to suppose that the spirited disposition has not been engendered in States by their individual members, in the case of peoples who bear this character, such as the inhabitants of Thrace and Scythia and, as a rule, in the up-country region¹; or the element of intelligence, by which one would characterise more especially our own part of the world, or the love of wealth², which we 436 A

completeness, and consequently was always progressive. It would, for example, be wholly unjustifiable to accept the following passage as a statement of his psychological conceptions. They develop greatly under his analysis even within the *Republic*. What he actually had in mind, when he threw out the suggestion before us, it is impossible to say; but we can see from the later books of this Dialogue that the wide outlook of modern science and philosophy is in some ways the fulfilment of his aspirations.

¹ Lit. "the upper region"; might="highland," but more probably the region remote from civilisation and the sea, practically limited to the North, whether the word "upper" can indicate that or not. Aristotle seems to mean the same by "the cold regions of Europe." The idea here implied, that Greece was the centre of the world, both geographically and in the happy combination of qualities in its natives, is met with more than once in Greek writers. The non-Greek European races appeared to them fierce and passionate, the Asiatics clever and ingenious but wanting in spirit; an extraordinary contrast with the modern conception of West and East as we find it, say in Browning's *Luria*. The Greek race alone, they thought, had a happy balance of spirit and intelligence.

² Involving, oddly to our ideas, at once the lower desires, and the technical ingenuity which satisfies them; the characteristic of the lowest class in Plato's State.

should assert to belong principally to the inhabitants of Phoenicia and Egypt.

It would be absurd, he said.

Then this is so, I said, and it is not hard to see.

No.

But now we come to a hard question¹, whether we have here a single power² by which we perform our various kinds of action, or whether there are three, and we do one kind of thing with one and one with another; for example, whether we study by one of the powers³ in us, and are angry by another, and by a third have desires for the pleasures of food and sex and any
B kindred affections, or do we act with the whole soul⁴ in each of these directions, when we have got our impulse? These are the points which will be hard to determine adequately.

I think so too.

¹ See note on 434 D. The second point (436 A—441 C) in verifying the existence of the four moral qualities in the soul, is to find out whether its three aspects or kinds or tendencies are really different from one another, so that they can stand in the relations required to constitute the moral qualities. This point is stated here, 436 A—B, answered first about reason and desire, 439 D, and then about all three “kinds,” 441 C.

² No substantive in the Greek.

³ No substantive in the Greek; the phrase is simply “one of *the* (neuter plural article) in us.” This resource of the Greek language gives Plato’s psychology a capacity of not committing itself by premature classification, which a modern may envy.

⁴ Plato is not suggesting that it is open to discussion whether the soul is a unity or in three separate parts. He is merely considering, with reference to the special problem before him, whether the modes of action of the soul are sufficiently distinguishable to conflict with or control one another in the way demanded by his description of the moral qualities.

Argument. 436 B—437 A. *The standard of sameness and difference ; i.e. the principle known in Logic as the Law of Contradiction, a step within the discussion (436 A—441 C) whether the three “kinds” in the soul are or are not “different.”*

Then let us try as follows to distinguish whether they are the same with one another, or different.

How ?

It is plain that the same thing cannot be brought to act or to be affected in opposite ways at the same time in the same part of it and in the same relation ; so that if ever we find this taking place among the kinds in the soul, we shall know that they are really not the same, but several.

C

Granted.

Now consider the case I put.

Say on.

Is it possible for the same thing at the same time to stand still and to move, in the same part of it ?

By no means.

Let us settle the point yet more precisely, lest we should get into difficulties at a later stage. If any one were to say of a man standing still, but moving his hands and his head, that the same man was standing still and moving at the same time, I suppose we should not admit that this was the right way to state the case, but should maintain this to be, that part of the man was at rest and part was in movement. Is it not so ?

It is.

And if such an objector were to refine his argument to a still further subtlety, by urging that tops which spin with their pegs¹ fixed in a single spot, are, as a whole, at once standing still and in movement, or that this is so with anything else which goes round in a circle and does so in the same place, we should reject the conclusion ; since when at rest and in

¹ “*Kentron*,” goad or point, hence the peg of a top, or, I suppose, one point of a pair of compasses, whence our word “centre.”

motion in these ways, it is not with the same part of themselves. But we should maintain that they have, in them a vertical axis and a circumference, and that as regards their axis they are standing still, for they do not deflect in any direction, but as regards their circumference they are moving in a circle; but whenever one of them while going round inclines its vertical axis to right or left, or forwards or backwards, then it cannot in any sense be standing still.

And rightly, he said.

Then no argument of this kind will confound us, nor go any way to make us believe, that anything, while the same,
 437 A could at the same time, in the same part, and in the same relation, act or be affected in opposite ways.

It will not make me believe it.

But yet, that we may not be obliged to protract our discussion by going through all such objections and establishing their falsity, let us assume that this is so¹ and go forward, on the understanding that if at any time this shall appear to be otherwise, all the conclusions which we have drawn from it shall be held to be undone.

Yes, he said, we must do so.

Argument. 437 B—437 D. *There are oppositions in the soul, of the general nature of acceptance versus rejection; an application of the argument, that opposite behaviour indicates different elements to be concerned in it, and so a part of the discussion*
 436 A—441 C. *See note on 436 A.*

B Should you not then, I said, set down assent and dissent, and the longing to get something and the refusal of it, and acceptance and rejection, and everything of this class, to be opposites to one another whether as actions or as affections (for this will make no difference)?

¹ Viz. that the same thing cannot behave in opposite ways at the same time, etc.

Yes, he said, they are opposites.

Well then, I went on, should you not set down hunger and thirst, and in general the desires, and to be willing, and to wish, and everything of the kind, as belonging to those types which have just been mentioned. For example, should you not affirm that the soul of him who desires, in every case¹, either *longs* for that which he desires, or *accepts* that which he wishes to come to him, or again, in as far as he is willing that something should be given him, *assents* to it in answer to itself, as if to some one asking a question, being anxious for its coming to pass?

Yes.

And then *to be averse*, and *not to be willing*, and *not to desire*, we must rank under the head of the soul rejecting and repelling a thing from herself, and under all terms which are opposites of those former ones?

D

Unquestionably.

Argument. 437 D—439 B. *One thing or class of things concerned in these cases of opposition is what we call "desires," by which we mean a positive impulse to the corresponding object, as thirst is to drink. A further step in the discussion* 436 A—441 C.

This² being so, we shall say that desires constitute one type or kind, and the clearest cases of them are what we call thirst and hunger?

¹ The following are different ways of describing the readiness or desire for an act or thing; the point is that they are all affirmative, like Yes opposed to No, and so "opposites" of the negative attitudes, mentioned below.

² The purpose of the refinements of argument in this section is to clear away possible objections and enable the simple statement in the last sentence of it to be maintained, viz. "the soul of the thirsty man, in as far as he is thirsty, wishes nothing else than to drink" (and therefore "opposition" to this act of drinking when thirsty must spring from some mental element which is different from desire).

We shall.

Thirst is for drink, and hunger for food?

Yes.

Now in as far as thirst is thirst, will it be a desire in the soul of anything beyond what we say¹? For example is "thirst" thirst for hot drink or for cold, or for much or for little, or in a word for any particular quality² of drink? Or is the case rather E that, if there is heat in the thirst it will produce the desire of something hot in addition to the desire of drink, and if there is coldness, that of something cold? And if, from the presence of quantity, the thirst is much, it will give rise to the desire of much, and if it is little to that of little? But to be thirsty, as such, can never be a desire of anything but of its natural object, drink as such, and hunger too of *its* object, that is food?

Yes, he said; each desire, as such, is only for its natural 438 A object as such; to be for this or that kind of object belongs to the additions.

Then let no one find us unprepared, and confound us by urging that no man desires mere drink but only good drink, nor mere food but only good food³. All men no doubt desire what is good; so if thirst is a desire it will be for good drink or whatever else the desire may be for, and so with all the rest.

Really, he answered, such an objection might be held to have something in it.

B Well, but, I answered, in all that is such as to be *of* some-

¹ I.e. beyond "drink," the object mentioned in the last sentence.

² It sounds odd that "much" or "little" should count as a "quality," but the meaning is easy to see. If you say, "I want to drink a great deal," of course you have added a "qualification" to the simple statement, "I want to drink."

³ Briefly, the point of this objection would be that desire might limit itself, and so reject certain of its objects, without implying another mental element opposing it. Plato answers that "good" is implied in desire, and constitutes no limitation.

thing, what is such and such is *of* what is such and such, while what is merely itself is *of* what is merely itself¹.

I don't understand, he said.

Don't you understand that the greater is such as to be greater *than*² something?

Quite so.

Greater than the less?

Yes.

And the much greater than the much less, is it not?

Yes.

And the greater at some time or other than the less at some time or other, and the greater in the future than the less in the future?

Why, of course, he said.

And is it not so with the more in relation to the fewer, and the double to the half, and all cases of that kind³, and again with the heavier in relation to the lighter, and the quicker to the slower⁴, and once more with hot things in relation to cold⁵, and everything like that?

Certainly it is.

And what about the sciences? Is it not the same rule? Science itself is science of the knowable itself, or whatever we ought to take science to be "*of*," but a particular science, being such and such, is of a particular branch of knowledge,

¹ The sentence is made difficult by the simplicity of the terms used, partly for fun, though we must remember that the technical language of logic did not yet exist. The following sentence explains the meaning.

² In Greek the comparative is followed by a genitive case, so that "*such as to be greater than* (lit. *of*) *something*" is an example of "*things which are such as to be of something*" in the last sentence—relative terms.

³ Some of the simplest cases of terms relative to each other, those of mere quantity.

⁴ Relative terms of quantity involving a difference of quality.

⁵ Stated as mere opposite qualities, though of course there is a relation of quantity underneath them.

which is such and such. I am thinking of a case like this ;
 D when there came to be a science of the production of a house,
 did¹ it not take on a difference from the other sciences, so as
 to be called the science of house-building ?

No doubt.

Was not this by reason of its being such and such, like
 none of the other sciences ?

Yes.

Then it came to be such and such itself, because it was *of*
 something which was such and such.

It is so.

Well, then, I said, this is what you must take it that I
 meant to say a moment ago, if you now understand it ; that
 with everything which is such as to be *of* anything, itself alone
 is *of* the other's self alone, but if the other is such and such,
 E this which is *of* it is such and such. And I am not saying that
 they are *like* what they are *of*, as for instance that the science
 of what is healthy and unhealthy *is* healthy and unhealthy, and
 that of evil and good *is* evil and good ; but, from the moment
 that² it became the science not merely of that³ *of* which science
 is, but of such and such things, and these were the healthy and
 unhealthy, then the consequence was that itself too came to
 be such and such, and this fact caused it no longer to be
 called simply "science," but, with the addition of the such-
 ness⁴, "medical science."

I understand, he said, and I agree.

439 A Thirst, now, I said ; should you not affirm that it is, in its
 nature, one of these "*of's*" ? Thirst, I suppose, is of—

¹ He puts the logical distinction between genus and species as if it arose
 by a definite step in time. This is merely to give his explanation vividness.
 "When science took to building houses it began to merit, and obtained, the
 distinctive name of 'the science of house-building.'"

² See note on 438 D just above.

³ E.g. the knowable or truth in general, as opposed to the objects of
 particular sciences.

⁴ Or "quality."

I should, he broke in; it is of drink.

Then of such and such drink there is such and such thirst, but thirst in itself is neither of much nor little, nor of good nor bad, nor, in a word, of any such and such at all, but the nature of thirst itself is to be of drink itself and nothing else.

Quite so.

Then the thirsty man's soul, in as far as he is thirsty, wishes nothing else than to drink, and this is what it longs for and what it has an impulse towards¹.

Clearly so.

Argument. 439 B—D. *There is something which can directly oppose desire, and therefore must be something different (according to the standard of the Law of Contradiction). And it appears to be reasoning or calculation. So Desire and Reasoning or calculation are two different kinds in the soul. First conclusion in discussion* 436 A—441 C, *see note on* 436 A.

So then if anything ever drags the soul the other way when it is thirsty, must it not be something in it different from the actual part which is thirsty, and which leads it, like an animal, to drink? For, we maintain², the same thing can certainly never act in opposite ways at the same time with the same part³ of itself in relation to the same object.

¹ See note on 437 D. The above argument, which leads up to this sentence, may be paraphrased in some such way as this. "You ought to mean what you say, i.e. you ought to stand by what is implied in what you say. If you admit (as will be assumed in the next section) that one can be thirsty and yet conquer one's desire to drink, you must not shuffle out of the admission by saying e.g. that it need only mean that one was thirsty for wine, and did not care to drink the water offered to one. This may sometimes be true, but it is not what the words mean, and the plain meaning of the words is accepted by common sense, viz. that one can be thirsty and yet conquer the impulse to drink, which *is* one's thirst. This implies some agency other than desire."

² See 436 B ff.

³ It is worth noticing that the principle is so stated, both here and above 436 B, as to suggest that the same thing *may* include conflicting

Certainly not.

Just as, I imagine, it is not right to say of an archer, that his hands push away the bow and draw it to him at the same moment ; but the truth is that one hand pushes it away, and the other draws it to him.

Quite so.

c Now are we to say that sometimes people when thirsty decline to drink¹?

Why it is constantly the case with very many people.

Then what are we to say of them? I asked. Is it not that their mind contains that which urges them to drink and that which hinders them from drinking, which latter is different from and stronger than that which urges them?

I think so.

d Now does not that which hinders such actions arise, whenever it arises, from reasoning², while the influences³ which pull and drag us towards them, present themselves by means of affections and morbid states?

It appears so.

Then it will not be irrational for us to esteem them to be two and different from one another, entitling that wherewith the soul reasons the reasonable⁴ part of it, and that wherewith it loves⁵ and hungers and thirsts and is agitated by all the

elements or parts. Thus Plato's argument does not deny the unity of the mind, in asserting its diversity.

¹ The statement of plain fact, which the previous section was meant to guard from being explained away.

² Or calculation. Reason is here introduced as a prohibitive and calculating mood. And this is a very important way of regarding the intelligence, but it is not at all a complete way, and Plato does not mean that it is. His doctrine of "Music" has already anticipated the deeper expression of the later books, according to which the intelligent side of the soul is an absorbing positive passion for order and truth.

³ No substantive in the Greek.

⁴ Or "calculative."

⁵ In the sense of desire.

other desires, the irrational and appetitive, the associate of certain replenishments¹ or pleasures.

No, he said; we may reasonably consider them thus. E

Argument. 439 D—441 C. *The "spirited" element distinguished as a third distinct "kind" in the soul. (Second and final conclusion of discussion 436 A—441 C. See note on 436 A.)*

Then we may take these to be two kinds* which we have distinguished as present in the soul; but will the element of spirit, that by which we are indignant, be a third kind, or of one nature with either of these?

Perhaps with the second, the appetitive.

Well, I said, I once heard a story, in which I believe, that Leontius the son of Aglæion, on his way from Peiræus to Athens under the north wall on the outside, noticing some dead bodies lying at the executioner's, at the same time was desirous³ to look at them, and shrank from doing so and tried to keep himself away; but finally his desire overcame him, 440 A and he pulled⁴ his eyes wide open, and running up to the corpses exclaimed, Take what you want, you wretches, and glut yourselves with the noble spectacle.

I have heard it myself, he said.

But this story, I continued, indicates that the anger sometimes makes war on the desires, as if they were different things.

Yes, it does.

¹ Plato represented the satisfaction of desire, which he treated as practically the same thing with pleasure, under the metaphor of "replenishment," the filling up of a vacuum or deficiency. This does not merely mean that in eating and drinking we put something inside ourselves, though this may have suggested the metaphor; but further that in faintness, weariness, pain, or even in perplexity and ignorance, we seem to be below our proper state, defective in some way, and the removal of our uneasiness seems like filling up a deficiency.

² The reasonable and the appetitive.

³ Verb implying the appetitive tendency—desire.

⁴ With his fingers, I suppose, as a sort of revenge on them for their desire.

And do we not see, I said, in many other cases, when desires are constraining any one against his reason, that he
 B reviles¹ and resents the constraining force in himself; and as if in a civil war between two factions the spirit² of such an one becomes the ally of his reason? But the spirit taking part with the desires, when reason judges that she ought not to be opposed, is something which I fancy you would not say that you had ever observed to take place either in yourself or in any one else.

By Zeus, no, he answered.

C Well but, I said, when anyone believes himself to be in the wrong, is he not, the more noble he is, the less able to be angry at enduring hunger and cold and anything else of the kind at the hands of one whom he believes to be acting justly, and, for here is my point, is it not true that his anger refuses to be aroused against that other?

True.

But again, when one thinks he is being wronged, does not his anger in this case boil and rage and take part with what it thinks to be just, and holding out the more for hunger cold and
 D all such like sufferings both triumph in the mind and persist in its noble efforts, till the man has either succeeded or perished, or his anger has calmed down, being called off by the reason within himself, like a sheep dog³ by the shepherd.

Yes, he said; that is a good illustration of your point; and indeed in our city we appointed the auxiliaries like sheep-dogs,⁴ to be under the authority of the rulers—the shepherds of the State.

¹ Cf. Romans vii. 24, "O wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me out of this body of death?" (R.V. margin).

² The tendency to resentment or indignation; it seems necessary to retain the rendering "spirit" in order to show a connection with the "spirited" element of the soul.

³ The original comparison for the "spirit." See 375 A ff.

⁴ See e.g. 416 A.

You understand my meaning rightly, I said, but have you thought of this also? E

What?

That our view of the "spirited" element is the opposite of what it was just now. For then¹ we were supposing it to be a kind of desire, but now we maintain it to be a long way from that, and to be much more disposed, in the civil war of the mind, to take its stand on the side of the reason.

Just so.

Then do we take it to be different from this too, or to be one kind of reason, so as to make not three but two kinds in the soul, the reasoning and the appetitive? Or as in the State there were three kinds that formed its system, the money-⁴⁴¹ A making, the auxiliary and the deliberative, is there in the soul too this third kind, the spirited, auxiliary² to the rational part by nature, if it has not been depraved by evil nurture?

Necessarily it is a third.

Yes, I said, if it is shown to be something other than the reasoning part, as it was shown to be something other than the appetitive.

Why, he said, there is no difficulty in showing it. In children for instance one can see this, that from their birth onwards they are full of spirit, while as for reasoning, some ^B men seem to me never to partake of it at all, and the majority not till late.

¹ 439 E. As Jowett and Campbell point out, Socrates out of courtesy associates himself with Glaucon's erroneous suggestion.

² Here and in 440 B Plato is describing, so to speak, a fair average soul—the soul of a good citizen. He knows, as the end of this sentence and many other discussions show, that the soul is capable both of depths and of heights which are not here represented. For the possible degradation of the "spirited" element cp. 590 B (cited by Jowett and Campbell). "Is it not flattery and meanness when one subjugates this same principle, the spirited, under the multitudinous beast (the image of appetite) and trains it by ignominy for the sake of wealth and the greediness of that monster, to become a monkey instead of a lion?"

By Zeus, I answered, you are right. And further one may see in the animals that what you say is true. And besides this, we may appeal to the passage in Homer, which we mentioned in one place above, for there Homer has distinctly represented in his poetry¹ the part² which has made an estimate³ of what is better and what is worse, rebuking the part which is angry without reason, as one thing addressing another.

Certainly you say true.

Argument. 441 C—443 B completes the argument begun 434 D, of which the discussion 436 A—441 C was a part, by pointing out in the individual soul the qualities corresponding to the four moral qualities of the State.

All this, then, I said, we have swum⁴ through with difficulty; and we are fairly well agreed that the same kinds and in the same number⁵ are present in the State, and in the soul of every one.

It is so.

Then at this point it further becomes inevitable that as, and by what, the State was wise, so, and by that, the private person is wise?

No doubt.

D And as, and by what, the private person is brave, by that, and so, the State is brave; and in the same way both parties⁶ possess all the other elements of excellence.

Inevitably.

¹ See 390 D above.

² No substantive in the Greek.

³ The word implies reckoning up a sum. This is of course a simple type of the attempt to look at all the bearings and consequences of an action in its place in our life.

⁴ Anticipates the simile of the great waves, in the later part of the *Republic*.

⁵ Viz. three.

⁶ State and private person.

Then, Glaucon, I imagine, we shall affirm that a man is just too, in the same way in which the State on its side was just.

This again is quite inevitable.

But I presume that we have not forgotten this, that the State was just, by each kind in it doing its duty, the kinds being three.

I do not think we have forgotten it.

We must bear in mind then that each of us, too, in whom each of the kinds¹ within him does its duty, will be a just man E and one who does his duty.

Certainly we must bear it in mind.

Then it belongs, does it not, to the reasoning part to rule, being wise, and having the task of forethought on behalf of the mind as an entirety², and to the spirited to be its subject and ally?

Quite so.

Then will not, as we said³, a mixture of music and gymnastic make them harmonious, giving tension and vigour to the one⁴ by noble thoughts and studies⁵ while relaxing and 442 A abating the other⁶, taming it by harmony and rhythm.

Completely so.

And these two then having been thus nurtured, and in real truth having learned their duty⁷ and been educated, will have the government of the appetitive part, which forms

¹ No substantive in Greek.

² This is the true ground of the sovereignty of intelligence, and when it is forgotten, the principle that intelligence is the highest thing is liable to dangerous extravagances.

³ 410—12.

⁴ The reason, or "philosophic" (culture-loving) part or kind.

⁵ This strengthening of the mind on its refined and intelligent side—screwing it to the sticking point—would naturally, according to the earlier account, be ascribed to gymnastic. The fact is that music, considered as the endeavour to make life harmonious throughout all its aspects, tended as we saw, to become the type of all education by whatever means.

⁶ The "splrited" temper.

⁷ Lit. having "learned their own"; a counterpart of the phrase "doing their own," by which justice is always described. Our true duty and place has to be discovered, and we to be adapted to it.

the greatest bulk¹ of the mind in every man, and is by nature the most insatiate of wealth; which they will watch, lest through being indulged in the pleasures which are called bodily, it should grow big and strong, and refuse in its turn to do its duty, but should endeavour to subjugate and to govern what it has no right to in virtue of its kind, and thus overthrow the entire life of all the parts.

Most certainly.

Will not these two then, moreover, be the best guardians against enemies from without, on behalf of mind and body as a whole, the one taking counsel for them, and the other fighting their battles, obeying the ruler and by its courage accomplishing his designs?

True.

C Then again in virtue of this part we call each man brave, when his spirited temper preserves throughout both pleasures and pains the law of what is to be feared and what is not, as taught it by the reason².

You are right.

And we call him "wise" in virtue of that little³ part which was the ruler within him and gave this instruction⁴, seeing that it possesses in itself the knowledge of what is expedient for

¹ An expression constantly recurring in Plato, which conveys his sense of the irreducible multitude and confusion of the desires as we meet with them, in contrast with the oneness of intelligence. He does not mean that this disorderly bulk is a feature of the soul as it ought to be. Cf. 588—9 and 611. The positive education of desire, too, by adapting it to the objects of life in their true order and importance, is implied but not expressed in the present passage. It is more fully accented in the later books of the *Republic*.

² Cf. 429 B, C. The idea of "courage against pleasure," frequent in Plato, tends of course to make courage continuous with temperance. We noted in 386—8 how readily the one passes into the other.

³ "Little" symbolises the unity or centrality of intelligence, in which the whole is, as it were, brought to a point. Cf. last note but one; and for the parallel "in the state" see 428 E.

⁴ In the education.

each severally and for the community of these three kinds as a whole.

Quite so.

And again, do we not call him temperate by the friendliness and concord of these very parts, when the one ruler and the two which are ruled are in agreement that the reasoning part should rule, and the latter raise no insurrection against the former.

Temperance certainly, he said, is this and nothing else, both in a State and in a private person.

And just, too, he will assuredly be, by the quality and in the way¹ which we are continually speaking of.

Quite necessarily.

Well then, I went on ; is justice now less distinct to us, so as to seem something different from what we saw it to be in the State?

I for my part do not think so.

E

For we might wholly confirm our view, I said, if there is still any doubt in our minds, by applying commonplace tests² to the quality.

Of what kind?

For example, if we had to determine about the State which we have described, and the man who is like it in his nature and his training, whether such an one seems likely to steal a deposit of gold or silver which he has received for custody, do you think that any one would suppose him likely to do it, and 443 A not, rather, men of a different character?

I think that no one would suppose so.

And he would be far from sacrilege and embezzlement, and from treachery, whether private against his friend or public against States?

¹ Viz. by the principle of doing one's own duty.

² See above 433 E where "justice in the State" was treated in the same way.

Far from it all.

And he would not be in the least degree untrustworthy, whether in promises on oath, or in other forms of covenant.

Of course not.

Acts of adultery, again, or neglect of parents, or omission to do service to the gods, belong to any character but this.

Yes, indeed.

B Is not the reason of all this that in him each of the kinds within his soul does its duty with regard to governing and being governed?

It is this and nothing else.

Then shall you go further, and look for justice to be other than this quality, which gives this character to all those who have it, both men and States?

By Zeus, he said, I shall not.

Argument. 443 B to the end of the book: conclusion as to the inward and essential nature of justice and injustice, and inference to their respective desirableness, from their being the health or disease of "that very essence whereby we live": followed by suggestions for a further comparison of justice or goodness and injustice or badness as at work in further social phases corresponding to further psychical phases¹.

Then our dream is completely fulfilled, that is, the suspicion which we expressed², that from the very beginning, in founding our State, we had probably, by some deity's guidance, hit upon a first step to justice, and in some sort a type of it.

Most certainly.

¹ Note that in treating the inward state as the essence of morality Plato most carefully links it with the outer act, and system of external and social life. He is wholly free from the dangerous separation of faith and works. The further discussion of the bad forms of society and soul is carried out in Books VIII. and IX.

² 433 A.

So, Glaucon, it really was a sort of image¹ of justice (and that was why it helped us), when we said² that it was right for the man who had a natural bent for shoemaking to make shoes and do nothing else, and for him who was fit for carpentering to carpenter, and so on with the rest.

It appears so.

For in reality, as it seems, justice was something of the kind, only not with reference to the external³ doing of one's duty, but to that inward action which in very truth deals with the self and what is most one's own; that is, when a man does not permit each element within him to do what does not belong to it, nor the kinds within his soul to meddle with one another's tasks, but in reality has set in order what is his own, and won the government of himself, and organised himself, and come to be at peace with himself, and has adjusted to one another the three kinds, actually like three fixed notes of the scale, higher, lower, and middle, having bound into one all these and anything between them⁴ and having made⁵ himself completely a unity out of a multiplicity, temperate and in

¹ Plato makes great use of the idea of images or symbols. An image or symbol is really a simple and partial example of the fact or principle which it symbolises, e.g. we use bread as a symbol of bodily and spiritual nourishment or of hospitality. Cp. the images or likenesses of moral qualities, 402 C, compared to letters reflected in water or in mirrors.

² 370 A, B.

³ By this amendment the appearance of rigidity and monotony which might attach to the first description of justice is in principle removed. "One man, one work," is after all only a symbol of justice, a rough approximation which embodies the fundamental truth that it takes all sorts to make a world. The real point is that the spiritual capacities should be developed in harmonious organisation, which involves, of course, an external harmony as a part of it. Of what variety human nature is capable, without injurious distraction, then becomes a mere question of fact.

⁴ Suggesting that the psychology so far has only been a rough sketch for practical purposes.

⁵ See note above 441 A.

tune,—and then, and in this spirit, enters upon action whatever it may be, whether concerning the acquisition of wealth or the treatment of his own body, or whether it be something political, or about his private matters of business; in all these cases esteeming and describing as just and noble a course of action which preserves such a disposition and helps to perfect it, and to the knowledge which governs such a course giving the name
 444 A of wisdom; and holding all action for unjust which tends to break down such a disposition, and to the opinion¹ which governs it giving the name of ignorance.

What you say, Socrates, is quite true.

Well then, I said, if we were to affirm that we have found the just man and State, and justice as a quality in them, we should hardly, I imagine, be thought in error.

No, by Zeus, he said.

Are we to affirm it then?

We are.

B Then let that be, I said; for next, I suppose, we ought to examine injustice.

Clearly so.

Then must it not be a civil war, so to speak, of these three, an over-meddlesomeness and interference and insurrection of some one part against the totality² of the soul, trying to dominate in her contrary to fitness, while being by nature of a kind which ought, properly, to be the servant of that which is of the ruling race? Something of this sort, I imagine, and

¹ "Opinion" emphatically contrasted with "knowledge." It seems odd to treat ignorance as a kind of opinion. But opinion, for Plato, and indeed for ourselves, includes mistake and illusion; while, again, ignorance does not always mean mere blankness or absence of ideas, but is often applied to the erroneous thoughts of an ignorant man. George Eliot somewhere satirises the feeling that a man's ignorance is of more reliable quality than a woman's—that is, his behaviour where he is ill-informed.

² Not, observe, against the intelligence, except in as far as the intelligence represents the mind as a whole.

rooted in distraction and confusion of the "kinds," are injustice and intemperance and cowardice and ignorance¹, and, in short, all wickedness.

The very same, he said.

C

Then, I asked, is it not now plainly manifest what all these are—the doing of unjust actions², and wrong-doing, and again the doing of just actions, seeing that injustice and justice themselves are made clear?

In what way?

That, I said, they differ not at all from healthy and unhealthy living³, that being in the body as these in the soul.

How?

Healthy living⁴ produces health in the body, and unhealthy living disease.

Yes.

Then in the same way does not the doing of just acts produce justice in the soul, and of unjust, injustice?

Infallibly.

Now to produce health is to constitute the elements of the *body* so as to dominate and be dominated by one another according to nature⁵, and to produce disease is to constitute

¹ The opposites of the four typical moral qualities or cardinal virtues, Justice, Temperance, Courage, and Wisdom.

² To be distinguished from "injustice" as the act from the habit. The importance of moral habituation is clearly stated in the following sentences.

³ No substantive. If we supply, say, "conditions," as a modern very likely would, the point of the comparison with particular actions is neglected.

⁴ See previous note.

⁵ Nature, cf. 370 A and B. Aristotle says, "whatever a thing is when its growth is brought to perfection, that we assert to be the *nature* of the thing"—as we say, what it is born *for*. Nature for the Greek thinkers was much what it was for Goethe and Wordsworth, the productive principle of life in the universe.

them so as to rule and be ruled by one another contrary to nature.

Yes, it is.

Then is not to produce righteousness, to constitute the elements of the *soul* so as to dominate and be dominated by one another according to nature, and to produce injustice, to constitute them so as to rule and be ruled by one another contrary to nature?

Completely so, he said.

E Then virtue¹, as it seems, will be a kind of health and good condition of the soul; and vice will be its disease, and ugliness, and infirmity.

It is so.

Then is it not the case, in general, that noble practices lead to the acquisition of excellence, and ignoble ones to that of vice?

Necessarily.

At this point then, as it seems, it remains for us to consider
445 A if, moreover, it is profitable² to do just acts and to pursue noble practices and to be a just man, whether or not one's being such remains unknown, or rather to do injustice and to be unjust, supposing that one suffers no penalty, and does not meet with chastisement to make him better.

Why, Socrates, he said, to me the enquiry appears to be becoming ridiculous. We think life not worth living with a bodily constitution that is being ruined, no, not if we have all possible foods and drinks and wealth and power; and shall we believe it to be worth living when the constitution of that very
B essence³ by which we live is being confounded and ruined, if

¹ Or "excellence." We must not tie down Plato's meaning to the modern use of "virtue," which is very narrow and negative.

² Cf. 367 D and 368 C. But the issue is more plainly stated in the contention of Thrasymachus in Book I. 344 C.

³ No substantive in the Greek. The Greek phrase is a happy expression of what a Greek thinker really meant by the soul, viz. *that*, whatever it may

only a man do what in the world he wishes, except indeed what will rid him of vice and injustice and give him virtue and excellence; these two opposites proving to be such as we have described them?

Yes, it is ridiculous, I said; but since we have arrived at a point from which we may most clearly discern that this is as we say, we must not give up the attempt.

By Zeus, he said, that is the last thing we should do.

Then come up here, I said, that you may see for yourself how many forms there are of vice, which in my judgement are worthy of observation¹.

I follow you, he said; only say on.

Yes, I continued, it appears to me, looking as it were from a high place, since the argument has brought us up to one, that there is one form of excellence and infinite forms of badness, but of these four² in particular which are worth mentioning.

How do you mean?

There are probably as many modes of soul as there are modes of polities forming distinct types.

How many?

Five modes of polities, I answered, and five of the soul. D

Say what they are.

I say that one of them would be this mode of polity which we have described, but it might be called by two names; for if one man arose among the rulers, superior to all, it would be called a monarchy³; if the superiors were several, an aristocracy.

be, by which we live, i.e. which is the centre and principle of *all* phases of our life, and finds its manifestation in them.

¹ He only pretends to touch the main or typical forms, not to treat the subject exhaustively.

² The forms of soul corresponding to military aristocracy, plutocracy, democracy, and unconstitutional monarchy or despotism. Books VIII. and IX. are devoted to an account of these.

³ "Monarchy," lawful and for the highest benefit of the subject, is for

True, he said.

This then, I continued, I call one form ; for neither a number of rulers, nor one if he arose, would disturb any of the more considerable laws of the polity, as long as they adhered to the nurture and education¹ which we have described.

Naturally they would not, he replied.

Plato the very opposite extreme politically to Despotism or unconstitutional monarchy, which the Greeks, and Plato among them, called Tyranny. Of course it is not meant that Plato's rightful monarchy would imply constitutional monarchy in our technical sense.

¹ Cf. 424 D. To keep to the right music was the way to hold the fort.

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